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For over a generation, constitutional theory and academic jurisprudence have
attempted to reconcile, on the one hand, the rule of law and the Constitution's
fundamentality with, on the other hand, the fact that legal and constitutional rules
frequently do not produce determinate answers to concrete controversies. The
approach of radicaldemocrats who would abandon judicial review is unacceptable
to all those who believe that some judicially enforceable limits on politics are
needed to prevent majoritariantyranny. At the same time, however, constitutional
theories that attempt to justify judicial review have limited utility; at best they strike
a compromise between the tyranny of the majority and the counter-majoritarian
difficulty. Academic jurisprudencefaces a paralleldilemma. Under close scrutiny,
both positivism and its principalalternative-Dworkin's "law as integrity"-turn
out to adopt the same strategy for coping with legal indeterminacy: Each claims
that the law's areas of ambiguity are small; yet neither theory nor any of the leading
approaches to constitutionalism proposes concrete measures to minimize the
impact of legal indeterminacy.
Drawing inspiration from the Legal Process approach of Hart and Sacks, this
Article proposes that instead of devising justifications for judicial review or explanations of the task of judges, theorists would do better to design institutions that
reduce the domain of legal indeterminacy. Where Hart and Sacks proposed deference to politically accountable actors, however, this Article advocates deep collaboration with the other institutions of government. Departingfrom the Legal Process
assumption that courts must defer to one of a fixed menu of institutions, this Article
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. A.B., Harvard University,
1986; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1990. This Article emerged out of numerous discussions
and an ongoing collaboration with Charles Sabel, whom I credit as a coauthor of many of
the ideas and even some of the prose contained herein, except of course that all errors are
my own. I am also very grateful to Jean Cohen, Jamison Colburn, Michael Dowdle, Barry
Friedman, Archon Fung, Bradley Karkkainen, Dara O'Rourke, William Simon, Susan
Sturm, Mark Thshnet, and Jeremy Waldron for helpful comments and suggestions, and to
Candice Aloisi, Laura Faer, and David Gold for excellent research assistance.
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develops a model of "experimentalist"courts and agencies that are always in transition. This model is based in part on the explosive emergence of "problem-solving
courts," nominally judicial bodies that are more akin to decentralized administrative agencies than to conventional adjudicators. The model is also based on some
hints in Supreme Court doctrine that suggest a role for appellatecourts in using the
opportunity of legal indeterminacy to create the preconditionsfor local deliberation
about the content of legal norms.
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I
INTRODUCTION

Nearly simultaneously and yet independently, constitutional
theory and academic jurisprudence have run into the same dead end.
For laws in general and constitutions in particular to be legitimate
requires, at a minimum, that they have grown from procedures or rest
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on principles that are widely, if not universally, recognized as legitimate. In practice, however, it is exceptionally difficult to establish
such legitimating procedures or principles for two reasons: complexity and moral diversity. Even if there can be agreement on highorder procedures-such as "count every vote"-or principles-such
as "treat people equally"-the maddening complexity of the world
and the fact of moral diversity often render agreement on specifics
impossible.
For over a generation, the fields of jurisprudence and constitutional theory have struggled to reconcile the fact of considerable legal
indeterminacy with, respectively, law generally and constitutional
legitimacy in particular. In its bare essentials, the problem can be formulated as follows: If the application of a rule requires deliberation
about its meaning, then the rule cannot be a guide to action in the way
that a commitment to the rule of law appears to require; similarly, if
the content of a constitutional right (or other constitutional provision)
can only be determined by extensive deliberation, then the Constitution does not entrench rights (or other principles) in the sense of providing foundational assurances.
Put another way, indeterminacy opens the way to judicial discretion, and both the law and the Constitution are meant to be the
master of those in authority, not the servant of their caprice. Otherwise, why bother writing down the law or the Constitution? Yet we
must, and in fact we do, have a legal order-in the sense of a more or
less functioning democracy, more or less constrained by fundamental
rights and the rule of law. Given the apparent inconsistency between
theoretical legitimacy and actual legal practice, jurisprudence and constitutional theory have come to an impasse.
This Article denies that much progress can be made by further
theorizing about the nature of law and constitutions as they are.
Instead, I propose that we reimagine our legal and constitutional institutions. Although the basic structures of American government are
virtually unamendable,' there remains considerable room for creative
thinking about how law can serve the people. The rise of the administrative state in the twentieth century, after all, occurred without
formal amendments to the constitutional text, even though its opponents saw the transformation as a betrayal of the Constitution's twin
I "[T]hree, and possibly four, structural elements in our constitutional system. [federalism, the presidency, unequal representation in the Senate, and possibly the electoral college] are not, realistically speaking, open to change in the foreseeable future." Robert A.
Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? 143, 143-46 (2001) (answering, in
essence, "not very" to question posed by book's title).
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structural pillars of federalism and separation of powers. 2 Courts
have not been (and should not be expected to be) leading players in
matters of institutional design, but neither have they been irrelevant.
In the case of the administrative state, they (eventually) acquiesced to
the New Deal, 3 while in other instances-such as the democratization
of state processes in the apportionment decisions 4-courts were the
leading actors. The lesson of these great changes is that the current
stalemate is a peculiarity of our time, not an inevitable feature of our
system of government or the nature of law. Asking why theory has
reached its current standstill points the way toward more fruitful questions of institutional design.
But to understand how we have reached the current impasse
requires that we first ask what became of the last great synthesis.
Today, constitutional theory and jurisprudence are generally understood as distinct fields. Jurisprudents consider themselves philosophers specializing in law, while constitutional theorists tend to be law
professors developing approaches to constitutional interpretation by
abstracting from their experience working with concrete doctrinal
questions. To be sure, the disciplines are not hermetically sealed:
Some thinkers, such as Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron, are
active in both fields, occasionally conceptualizing constitutional interpretation as a specific application of general principles. But for the
most part, the two bodies of literature do not talk with one another,
even though both constitutional theory and jurisprudence address the
same central problem: domesticating discretion.
Not all that long ago, however, American constitutional theory
and academic jurisprudence were understood as the same enterprise-an effort to account for and legitimate law, given two historical
phenomena: the ascendancy of legal realism in America and of totalitarian regimes abroad. On the one hand, legal realism rendered
untenable the formalist notion that judges mechanically apply a dis2 For a relatively recent restatement of constitutional objections to the New Deal and
the decisions upholding it, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1233-37 (1994) (objecting to "The Death of Limited Government" in decisions ratifying New Deal state); id. at 1237-49 (objecting to "death" of
nondelegation doctrine, unitary executive, independent judiciary, and separation of
powers).
3 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937), the Supreme Court

accepted a broad view of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, while in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), the Court accepted that an

executive agency exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers could be insulated
from presidential oversight.
4 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause requires equal apportionment by population in electoral districts
for state legislatures).
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embodied entity called "The Law." But on the other hand, in the

wake of Nazism, fascism, and communist totalitarianism, Americans
and others in the democratic West were unwilling to let go of the idea

of using judicially enforceable rules of law not only to regulate private
5
actors but also to circumscribe government power itself.
Scholarship of the post-World War II era wrestled with these
conflicting impulses. In the American legal academy, the response
was a synthesis that lasted for nearly two decades and has continuing
influence today. That synthesis was the "Legal Process School,"
which took its name from a set of teaching materials for a Harvard
Law School course first offered by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in
the 1950s. 6 It aimed to show how the legal process-including constitutional as well as sub-constitutional elements, public law and private

law-domesticated judicial and other forms of official discretion. The
Legal Process portrayed the master task of the judge as allocating

decisionmaking authority among competing institutions in recognition
of the judiciary's own limitations. Those limitations were captured by
the concept of institutionalsettlement, which holds that judges should
defer to decisions taken by other actors, so long as those decisions are
'7
reached according to "duly established procedures."
The Hart-Sacks synthesis broke down under two sets of pressures. First, Brown v. Board of Education8 and the civil rights revolu-

tion it arguably catalyzed revealed that beneath the placid surface of
the American institutional settlement lay grievances that could not be

addressed by adjusting the allocation of power among existing institutions, especially given that these institutions were themselves implicated in oppression. Second, what Hart and Sacks billed as the light
hand of market-perfecting regulation came to be seen by critics of the
administrative state as bureaucratic shackles. 9 Thus, under attack
5 Even amid our current fears of terrorism, we hear virtually no voices calling for the
abandonment of constitutional limits on government power, although we do hear calls for
a reinterpretation of those limits to allow for (in some instances, very much) greater
restrictions on liberty in the name of order than were formerly thought permissible.
6 Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(prepared for publication from 1958 Tentative Edition).
7 Id. at 4.
8 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding de jure racial segregation in public schools
unconstitutional).
9 Some critics viewed regulation as often or even usually inefficient, because agencies
sought to solve problems within their jurisdiction without paying sufficient attention to the
costs of their interventions. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle:
Toward Effective Risk Regulation 11-14 (1993) (criticizing performance of Environmental
Protection Agency). The inefficiency of regulation was also explained by another changed
perception: Government actors came to be seen (again, by some) as self-interested rather
than as selfless public servants. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among
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from both the left and the right, and seemingly outpaced by events,

the Hart-Sacks synthesis shattered into fragments.
In private law, the utilitarian impulse that had informed The
Legal Process was channeled into the harder-edged law and economics movement, while the commitment to principled adjudication
spawned "internal" accounts of the law. No longer confident in the

ability of judges or other government actors to coordinate vast swaths
of activity, and increasingly academically oriented, post-Legal Process
scholars of private law contented themselves with working out the

internal logic of particular fields, such as torts or contracts, 10 while
either succumbing to or resisting the imperialism of law and
economics.1
Meanwhile, the task of explaining what distinguished judicial
interpretation of ambiguous legal norms from the exercise of raw

power was parceled between academic jurisprudence and the
emerging field of constitutional theory. The latter subdiscipline was
only just emerging in the 1960s, because the post-New Deal institu-

tional settlement gave judges an extremely limited role in constitutional matters. The canonical lesson that New Dealers like Justices

Felix Frankfurter and (for a time, anyway) Hugo Black drew from the
excesses of the pre-1937 Court was that courts should defer to legislatures, full stop. 12 But with each new decision of the Warren Court,
progressive constitutional scholars in the legal academy found the
New Deal settlement increasingly inadequate, and thus the central

question of constitutional scholarship over the last half century has
Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371, 373 (1983) (arguing that policies
are products of competition among pressure groups); James M. Buchanan & Gordon
Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 3-9
(1962) (constructing theory of collective choice).
10See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 6-12 (1992) (presenting account of tort
law that rejects market paradigm while incorporating insights of economic analysis).
11 For the classic manifesto of the law and economics movement in torts, contracts, and
beyond, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 6-8 (1st ed. 1972) (describing
both normative and descriptive role of economic analysis of law). For an early account of
torts strongly guided by economic analysis, see Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents:
A Legal and Economic Analysis 135 (1st ed. 1970). For a recent account of torts that
resists the siren song of law and economics, see Coleman, supra note 10.
12 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 523 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(protesting that prior to majority's decision, post-New Deal Court had "'returned to the
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws"' (quoting
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963))); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 649-67 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (urging deference to political actors
wherever reasonable minds might differ, even with respect to assertedly fundamental rights
such as freedom of speech and conscience).
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13
been how we can justify decisions like Brown v. Board of Education,
Reynolds v. Sims, 14 and (in some accounts) Roe v. Wade, 15 without
also justifying decisions like Lochner v. New York, 16 Dred Scott v.
Sandford,17 and (in most of those same accounts) Bush v. Gore.18

Numerous answers have been proposed, but none has satisfied more
than its proponent and a handful of fellow travelers.
If academic jurisprudence in this same period has seemed less
fraught, that is only because it deals in what, from the vantage of outsiders, must appear to be desiccated abstractions. At bottom, however, the question that Ronald Dworkin posed to H.L.A. Hart-What
is the place of principles in your account of law as a system of

rules?19-raises the same fundamental issue (or at least its mirror
image) with which constitutional theory has struggled: Once we
acknowledge with Dworkin that relatively indeterminate principles
inevitably form a substantial portion of what we know as the law, how
can we render legitimate judicial decisions taken in the name of law
but decided in substantial measure by judges themselves?20
This Article argues that thinkers in academic jurisprudence and

constitutional theory have run out of creative answers to this, their
shared fundamental question. It observes two basic limitations in the
current debate.
First, where Hart and Sacks saw the law as a method of coordi-

nating society's capacities to solve problems and thus understood their
job as one of describing how various legal actors communicate with
one another, much of the contemporary debate focuses on how some
single decisionmaker goes about the solitary task of resolving ambiguity. Dworkin's panoptic Hercules, isolated on Mount Olympus, is
only the most obvious example of this attitude. 2 1 Restoring Hart and

13 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
15 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that constitutional right of privacy includes "a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
16 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that state maximum-hours law violated right to freedom

of contract entailed by Fourteenth Amendment).
17 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that African Americans are not citizens of
United States for purposes of bringing suit in federal court).
18531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding that state court's order to recount disputed ballots violated Equal Protection Clause).
19 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 59 (1977) ("[A]ny fundamental test
for law, if it is to include principles as well as rules of law, must be more complex than the
examples Hart offers as specimens of a rule of recognition.").
20 This, to be sure, is not Dworkin's own question, but, as I explain below, his account
of adjudication may be best understood as an effort to rationalize judicial inferences from
ambiguous authority. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
21 See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 239, passim (1986).
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Sacks's focus on the interaction of varied actors to the heart of our
analysis of the legal process is long overdue.
Second, contemporary debate also reflects a limitation of the
Legal Process method itself. For all their sophistication about interactions among various institutions, Hart and Sacks assumed that the
original Madisonian architecture, supplemented by the New Deal
administrative state, supplied all the institutions required to resolve
any conflict likely to emerge. Perhaps this assumption was tenable in
the early 1950s, but it did not remain so for very long.
The assumption that sound policy and sound legal decisionmaking are simply matters of allocating authority among a fixed menu
of institutions is linked in Hart and Sacks's method (and in the work
that has followed them) to a further unstated assumption: that the
appropriate means and ends of public institutions are more or less
fixed. For example, administrative agencies and courts take their ends
as given from outside, from either the legislature or the Constitution.
And the means available to each institution are exactly what fixes the
institution. A court is an arena of reason-giving, so a court resolves
issues by that means alone: reason-giving. A legislature is an arena in
which questions are decided by voting; an agency by applying expertise; and so on. Barely explored in the Hart and Sacks materials is the
possibility that means and ends might be reciprocal-in a continual
state of disequilibrium. A court or agency attempting to satisfy a general legislative mandate may discover that the problem as defined by
the legislature-such as nonviolent crime, to give an example I
develop below22-can only be addressed by focusing on factors
outside the original mandate-such as drug addiction, to continue the
example-resulting in a legislative redefinition of the problem, which
in turn calls for another iteration of practical efforts, which in turn
leads to further refinements of the problem, and so on, ad infinitum.
This Article argues that the way past the current impasse is to
return to Hart and Sacks's commitment to a legal decisionmaking process that is deeply informed about the institutions with which legal
actors interact, while at the same time jettisoning the Legal Process
view that the ends and means of governmental institutions are largely
static. When faced with gaps and ambiguities in the law, judges need
not simply choose between the Scylla of deference and the Charybdis
of usurpation. Trial courts can address some broad social problems
without directly taking over responsibility for running institutions like
prisons, schools, and police forces, while appellate courts need not
themselves fill the gaps in constitutional and other open-ended legal
22 See infra Part IVA.
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norms; they can instead (or at least additionally) instigate reform by
other actors.
Parts II and III of this Article retell the story of post-War constitutionalism and jurisprudence as an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt
to surmount what I shall call the legal indeterminacy problem. Glos-

sing over an important philosophical and jurisprudential debate, by
legal indeterminacy I mean simply that in more than a trivial number
of cases that come before the courts, "[1]egal norms may not sufficiently warrant any outcome.

'23

I do not claim that law is ever completely indeterminate. Even
ambiguous legal norms rule out some possibilities. Nonetheless, at
least where unelected judges are the actors charged with specifying
the content of legal norms, indeterminacy poses a problem so long as
the range of plausible interpretations is not trivially small. For judges
will have difficulty explaining how the law rather than their own inclinations leads them to adopt one plausible interpretation rather than

another.
The indeterminacy problem appears to be built into the nature of
the legal enterprise. Law differs from will in that law is abstract:

Whereas a tyrant issues orders one at a time, according to no general
rule or standard, a government under law specifies, in advance and

through rules or standards of general applicability, how concrete cases
will be resolved.2 4 Yet the very feature of law that allows it to operate
at the wholesale rather than the retail level-its abstraction-limits its
ability to guide concrete decisions taken in the law's name. 25 This is
no mere analytic problem. Law speaks in ambiguous terms for a
variety of quite practical reasons: because the lawmakers wished to

delegate authority to those charged with administering the law;
23 Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 549, 578 (1993).
24 For a useful discussion of abstraction as a definitive element of law, see F.A. Hayek,
The Constitution of Liberty 148-61 (1960) (describing transition from commands and customs to laws).
25 Legal indeterminacy is thus problematic in part because it means that judicial decisions are unpredictable. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 23, at 580-85 (addressing claim
that "set of legal reasons is insufficient uniquely ...to explain or predict" outcomes). The
worry about legal indeterminacy is not, however, limited to questions of predictability.
Suppose it were possible to "account for ... ninety percent of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
bottom-line results by looking, not at anything in the United States Reports, but rather at
the platforms of the Republican Party." Mark V. Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 1326, 1328 (1990) (reviewing Sue Davis, Justice Rehnquist and the Constitution (1989)). That kind of predictability would tend to prove rather than disprove the law's
indeterminacy, for it would suggest that something other than law is generating judicial
outcomes. Accordingly, legal indeterminacy is a worry insofar as judicial decisions are not
simultaneously predictable and, in some sense, attributable to law.
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because of the sheer impossibility of anticipating every contingency;
or because consensus could not be secured on more specific language.
This last source of ambiguity is particularly problematic for constitutional interpretation. Given profound disagreement, any foundational set of procedures or principles sufficiently abstract to secure
consensus and thereby work its way into a popularly chosen constitution will be too abstract to resolve the most acute subsequently arising
constitutional controversies. 26 Part II catalogues the largely unsuc-

cessful efforts of constitutional theorists over the last half-century to
solve or circumvent the indeterminacy problem.
Part III addresses the parallel failure in academic jurisprudence.

The indeterminacy problem in academic jurisprudence can be seen in
the debate over how to understand the legal role played by openended, i.e., general, principles. In the process of showing how the
indeterminacy problem has thwarted progress in academic jurisprudence, Part III draws attention to a previously overlooked connection
between the work of H.L.A. Hart and that of (Henry) Hart and Sacks.
This last linkage serves as the bridge to the affirmative project of

reimagining a substantial portion of the work of the courts in a way
that shrinks the domain of the indeterminacy problem. That project is
the subject of Part IV. Elsewhere, Charles Sabel and I have described
an emerging ensemble of new public problem-solving institutions that
together comprise what we call "democratic experimentalism. ''27 In
democratic experimentalism, local units of government are broadly
free to set goals and to choose the means to attain them. Within these

units, citizens 28-acting as individuals, through stakeholder organizations and through (relatively) local elected officials-engage in a form
of practical deliberation that permits the discovery of novel solutions
to their shared problems, thereby at least partially relaxing the grip of
26 For an excellent account of the indeterminacy problem in constitutional interpretation (using somewhat different terminology), see Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and
Democracy 5, 48-51 (1999) (describing "paradox of constitutional democracy").
27 Michael C. Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 314-22 (1998).
28 Most rights protected by the U.S. Constitution are held by "persons" rather than the
narrower category of "citizens." Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."), with id. ("No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States."). I use the term "citizen" in the text to indicate that the rights at
issue include rights of political participation, which, consistent with existing doctrine, may
be limited to citizens. See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) ("[I]t is clear
that a State may deny aliens the right to vote, or to run for elective office, for these lie at
the heart of our political institutions."). I do not mean to deny that many of the rights of
citizens are also rights of noncitizens.
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familiar political animosities, though in the process opening the way to
new conflicts-and in any case not tending to pacification or complete
harmonization of interests. Concurrently, legislative bodies or regulatory agencies use the pooled experience of relatively local actors to set

and ensure compliance with framework objectives. These framework
objectives shape and are shaped in turn by means of performance
standards based on information about current best practices provided
by regulated entities. And these entities provide such information in
return for the freedom to experiment with solutions they prefer.
Sabel, myself, and others have argued that although it is nowhere fully
realized, the ideal of democratic experimentalism bears a sufficient
similarity to the emerging institutions to warrant studying them as a
group.

29

29 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 27, at 283-84 (arguing that democratic experimentalism
can be seen in "the practices of state and local governments, Congress, administrative
agencies, and the Supreme Court"); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment
Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 837-38 (2000)
[hereinafter Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts] (discussing experimentation in drug
treatment courts); Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 Pol. & Soc'y 73 (2001) (discussing reforms of
Chicago public schools and police department); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New
Paradigm?, 89 Geo. L.J. 257, 260, 262-63 (2001) (presenting EPA's Toxic Release Inventory
as "watershed" for use of "performance monitoring and benchmarking as regulatory
tools"); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 907-08 (2002)
(describing "epistemologically ... modest, pragmatic, and empirically grounded approach"
of recent environmental regulatory tools); Bradley C. Karkkainen et al., After Backyard
Environmentalism: Toward a Performance-Based Regime of Environmental Regulation,
44 Am. Behav. Scientist 692, 702-08 (2000) (discussing "Habitat Conservation Plans" as
example of democratic experimentalism); Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, in Beyond Backyard Environmentalism 3 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds.,
2000) (discussing experimentation in environmental regulations); Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards, Boston Rev., Feb.-Mar. 2001, at 4 (proposing model for strengthening labor standards with goal of increasing transparency of public debate on how
workplaces operate in global economy); Archon Fung, Street Level Democracy:
Pragmatic Popular Sovereignty in Chicago Schools and Policing (July 30, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, http://www.archonfung.net/papers/SLD99.pdf) (discussing reform of
Chicago public schools and police department); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A
Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance
and Legal Reform, http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg02/
liebman sabel.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (discussing "new form of collaboration
between courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies on the one side and between
these organs of government and new forms of public action on the other"); Charles F.
Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy: On the New Pragmatism of Firms and Public
Institutions, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Design.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2003) (arguing that new institutions "allow allocation of a single language of practical
reason in which questions regarding the performance and the coordination of particular
tasks can be addressed by disciplines with similar syntax"); Charles F. Sabel & Rory
O'Donnell, Democratic Experimentalism: What To Do About Wicked Problems After
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Democratic experimentalism-as the name suggests-is principally a model of participatory administration. Nonetheless, courts
also play an important role in this emerging architecture. Experimentalist trial courts, sometimes called "problem-solving courts," 30 are

structured along the same lines as their administrative counterparts.
For example, drug courts-to date the most widespread exemplars of
problem-solving courts-serve primarily to monitor the performance
of defendants and treatment providers. As I explain below, the

affinity of experimentalist courts with experimentalist agencies means
that there are fewer occasions for the judiciary to confront the indeterminacy problem, even as it raises concerns about why courts are
31
needed at all.

Experimentalist appellate courts, as I model them, differ in a crucial respect from appellate courts as conventionally understood within
the academic debate: When experimentalist courts must resolve the
most contentious questions the legal system poses, they give deliberately incomplete answers. Thus, in prospect at least, experimentalist
appellate courts that declare rights based on irreducibly ambiguous
authority deliberately include ambiguity in their own pronouncements

by establishing frameworks for resolution rather than anything like
comprehensive blueprints. They declare, for example, that employers
are vicariously liable for sexual harassment by their employees absent

an adequate program of prevention and remediation, but they leave to
employers in the first instance the task of formulating such programs. 32 Or they announce that criminal suspects are entitled to safeguards to prevent undue coercion in interrogation but leave to local

Whitehall (And What Scotland May Just Possibly Already Be Doing) (Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with New York University Law Review) (discussing school reform
in Chicago). For a summary and critique, see William H. Simon, Solving Problems Versus
Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism (Apr. 24, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with New York University Law Review) (describing recent legal
pragmatist scholarship).
30 See infra Part IV.A., notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
31 See infra Part IV.B.
32 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (holding employer
vicariously liable for supervisor's actionable sexual harassment, "subject," however, "to an
affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that
of a plaintiff victim"); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (same). For an
account of these decisions as nascently experimentalist, see Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme
Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4,
78-79 (1998) (arguing that recent sexual harassment decisions signaled "to the lower courts
and the body politic that they must take these matters seriously, even if ...[the appropriate remedy] cannot be determined by a judicially created, one-size-fits-all legal rule")
and infra Part IV.D.1.
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determination the decision of what safeguards to employ. 33 As these

examples drawn from Supreme Court precedents illustrate, experimentalist principles sometimes inform current practice, so that the
transformation envisioned here does not require wholesale
reinvention.
But can it be that the solution to the problem of ambiguous constitutional and other legal texts is for the courts themselves to render
ambiguous decisions? Yes and no. Obviously, courts can avoid the
charge of arbitrariness by declining to resolve contests over constitutional meaning, leaving politicians and legal actors to supply their own
interpretations. But whether this approach goes under the heading of
the "thin constitution ' 34 or "minimalism," 35 it is not so much a solution to the problem of ambiguity as a surrender to it.
Accordingly, in declining to provide comprehensive solutions,
experimentalist courts are in some sense "minimalist," but their role is
not merely less than that of conventionally understood courts; it is
also substantially different.36 Experimentalist appellate courts selfconsciously rely on the participation of affected actors to explore the
implications of the framework rules that they create and use the

33 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) ("Our decision in no way creates a
constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to
have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search
for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting
efficient enforcement of our criminal laws."); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 440 (2000) (noting that Miranda Court held that legislators not constitutionally precluded from crafting effective alternatives to Miranda warnings). This understanding of
Miranda is advanced in Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 61, 82 (arguing that Miranda should be understood "not as
mandating specific procedures, but as laying down a right [namely, the accused's right to

remain silent] and creating a safe harbor for those charged with respecting it ....

Other

actors are then encouraged to develop alternative ways to achieve these goals."), as well as
in Dorf & Sabel, supra note 27, at 452-57. See infra Part IV.D.2.
34 Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 9-14 (1999) (arguing
that Constitution should be rendered nonjusticiable on ground that "procedural" or
"thick" provisions are self-executing and rights guarantees or "thin" provisions should be
left to politically accountable actors whose views better reflect those of the people than do
judges' views).
35 In recent years, Cass Sunstein has championed minimalism. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal Reasoning]; Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
(1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided].
36 To put this point somewhat tendentiously: C.J. Peters misclassifies me as a minimalist. See Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 Colum. L.
Rev. 1454, 1468-69 (2000).
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record of such actors' efforts continually to refine such framework
37
rules.
My proposed "solution" to the twin problems of complexity and
moral diversity is necessarily a partial one. Inevitably, even framework rules revised in light of experience will conflict with some citizens' views, values, or policy preferences. Some will think, for
example, that any application of the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination to police practices (as opposed to in-court testimony) is unwarranted. Others will object to any inference of a prohibition on sexual harassment from a statute prohibiting "sex
discrimination" and nothing more. No degree of attention to institutional detail will resolve stubborn disagreement over first-order moral
questions. Yet one should not underestimate the power of direct
deliberation among citizens of diverse backgrounds and views to produce workable accommodations-and even to prompt rethinking of
seemingly unshakeable first-order beliefs. Forced together to solve
problems to which ideology provides no obvious solution, or to which
ideological solutions have manifestly failed, citizens may find that
their commitment to solving problems is by itself sufficient to bridge
their other differences. Yes, some fundamental differences will
remain. Moral diversity and complexity are facts of life. The question
is what one does about these facts.
Parts II and III of this Article argue that legal ambiguity and its
consequences cannot be swept under the rug. Part IV contends, however, that this difficulty should not occasion willful blindness or cause
us to despair of the possibility of law. Rather, it should invite consideration of the institutional structures best suited to treating ambiguous
legal texts as invitations to practical problem solving, constrained by
commitments to popular sovereignty as well as to rights. This Article
argues for a particular set of structures, but I hope that even those
who remain skeptical of these experimentalist structures will recognize that the problems of constitutional theory and jurisprudence can
best be addressed if understood, as they were understood not all that
long ago, as problems in institutional design.

37 This statement is partly descriptive and partly aspirational. As noted above, there is
now a budding movement of problem-solving courts in which the participants, including
judges, see their roles in experimentalist terms. For the most part, however, that attitude
remains confined to trial judges-so that problem-solving courts have not to date grappled
much with the question of how to extend their experimentalist outlook to the law-creating
appellate level. See infra Part IV.
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II
THE INDETERMINACY PROBLEM IN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Most modern theories of constitutional interpretation strive to
overcome or circumvent what Alexander Bickel termed the "countermajoritarian difficulty. ' 38 Given the indeterminacy problem, in contested cases the Supreme Court's preferred interpretation typically
will be only one of several plausible understandings. When the Court
rules that a practice violates the Constitution, it removes the issue
from the realm of majoritarian politics, absent the extraordinarily
cumbersome process of constitutional amendment. For this reason,
Bickel observed that judicial review is "at least potentially a deviant
institution in a democratic society. ' 39 How have theorists
40
responded?
This Part casts the leading theoretical approaches to constitutional law as responses to Bickel's counter-majoritarian difficulty.
Each of the following theories offers an approach to constitutional
interpretation that purports to cabin judicial discretion, thus minimizing the consequences of the indeterminacy of constitutional norms,
or to explain why the costs of judicial discretion are justified by the
benefits of judicial review. Although this Part provides only a bare
38 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar
of Politics 16, passim (1962).
39 Id. at 128. It has been suggested that in fact the United States Supreme Court only
occasionally acts in a counter-majoritarian fashion, more commonly reaching results that
closely parallel public opinion. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 285 (1957) ("[T]he policy
views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant
among the lawmaking majorities of the United States."); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking
the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1996) (challenging "the
myth of the heroically counter-majoritarian Court"); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular
Constitutionalism 5 (Feb. 20, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with New York
University Law Review) ("[Wihat the complainants miss is that consistent with the concept
of popular constitutionalism, the rules ... adopted by the judiciary necessarily must fall
within a range acceptable to popular judgment over time."). But even if the Court is not
quite so counter-majoritarian as its critics contend, there remains the problem of justifying
those counter-majoritarian decisions it does make. Certainly these decisions are sufficiently numerous that those constitutional theorists who fret about the countermajoritarian difficulty are concerned about a real problem.
40 In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Chief Justice John Marshall
rooted the Supreme Court's power of judicial review in the very idea of a written constitution. Article III confers jurisdiction on the Court to decide constitutional cases, Marshall
noted, so the judiciary can only be true to its duty "to say what the law is" if it has the
power to set aside those acts inconsistent with the "supreme law of the land." Id. at 177,
180. Yet Marshall's assumption that this duty entails the power to prefer the judiciary's
interpretation to that of other government actors begs the very question it seeks to answer.
See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1,
21-22.
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sketch of each approach, it should suffice to show that no "solution"
has been found, if by solution one means an approach to judicial construction of the Constitution that overcomes the indeterminacy
problem while retaining a substantial role for the judiciary in checking
abuses by the other branches of government.
A.

Radical Majoritarianism

For some radical democrats, the solution appears straightforward:
We must do away with judicial review. 4 1 Citizens of good faith, all
professing strong commitments to liberty, equality, and democracy
disagree fundamentally over what those commitments entail in prac-

tice. For example, they disagree about whether affirmative action
truly remedies denials of equality or itself denies equality, whether

women choosing to have abortions exercise their constitutional liberty
or abridge a constitutional right to life of fetuses, and whether government support of religion affirms or undermines basic principles of tolerance, to name just three divisive controversies. Where
constitutional language is ambiguous, radical democrats assert that it
is better to count the votes of the people's legislative representatives

42
than the votes of life-tenured judges.
Enlisting the indeterminacy problem in their cause, radical democrats further observe that the difficulty cannot be overcome by
attempts at better drafting. The same moral diversity that makes par-

ticular judicial interpretations of liberty, equality, and democracy con-

troversial will typically preclude a supermajority consensus from
forming on specific constitutional language-and supermajorities are
needed to distinguish constitutionalism from the radical democracy
these critics prefer. Moreover, even if consensus can be reached on
41 See generally Tushnet, supra note 34; Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement
(1999) [hereinafter Waldron, Law and Disagreement]. Radical democrats take aim at judicial review of the sort practiced in the United States-i.e., constitutional decisionmaking
by the courts that cannot be reversed except by difficult-to-enact constitutional amendments. These criticisms might bear differently on the more modest sorts of judicial review
practiced in Canada and the United Kingdom. See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 707 (2001) (describing development of constitutional model situated between American form of judicial review and full
legislative supremacy). As used in this Article, the term "judicial review" generally refers
to the American practice, which might more properly be termed "judicial supremacy." See
Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Power and Popular Sovereignty, in Marbury versus Madison:
Documents and Commentary 181 (Mark A. Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002); Keith E.
Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses,
80 N.C. L. Rev. 773, 783-84 (2002) (contrasting judicial review, which allows courts to
refuse to give force to action, with judicial supremacy, which gives courts power to compel
adherence to court decisions).
42 See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 41, at 88-118 (concluding that judicial decisions are just as "arbitrary" as legislative ones).
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particulars, complexity will often render that consensus irrelevant.
For example, a detailed free speech principle will not specifically
address technologies not in existence when it is formulated, once
again leaving interpreters to revert to general norms.
Radical democrats offer a powerful critique. Nevertheless, the
critique has not made, and is unlikely to make, much headway. Americans, like citizens of nearly all of the world's free societies, have come
to believe that democracy is consistent with, indeed dependent upon,
the existence of a rights-protecting institution that is somewhat
independent of ordinary politics. That judgment seems based less on
a calculation of the costs and benefits of judicial review-weighing
Dred Scott v. Sandford43 and Lochner v. New York, 44 say, against
Brown v. Board of Education4 5 and Gideon v. Wainwright 6-than on

a first principle of institutional design. Citizens of modern democracies professing their faith in human rights and constitutions distrust
even their own elected legislators to protect the interests of the vulnerable against the appetites of the politically powerful. Judicial
review, in this account, is a Ulysses contract, a precommitment pact,
or hedge, entailing a modest diminution in the principle of majority
rule in order to restrain government overreaching. Thus, when
Dworkin contrasts a constitutional conception of democracy that
includes judicial review with a majoritarian conception that does
not, 47 he expresses what has become the global conventional wisdom.
Radical democrats sacrifice constitutionalism in the name of democracy and in so doing arguably sacrifice democracy itself.
My point here is not to choose sides in the debate between radical democrats and constitutionalists but to highlight how radical democrats completely surrender to the indeterminacy problem. The only
decisionmaking procedure by which radical democrats can imagine
that courts could resolve disputes over ambiguous text is preference
aggregation, and if there is to be preference aggregation, radical democrats see no reason to aggregate the preferences of judges rather
48
than those of legislators acting as conduits for their constituents.
43 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
44 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
45 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that right to counsel is fundamental right of indigent
defendant in criminal trial).
47 See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 30-31 (1996) ("[Tlhe majoritarian process encourages compromises that may
subordinate important issues of principle. Constitutional legal cases, by contrast, can and
do provoke a widespread public discussion that focuses on political morality.").
48 Given the pathologies identified by public choice theorists, see generally Jerry L.
Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law
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B. Judicial Restraint and Minimalism
The often praised but rarely practiced philosophy of judicial
restraint is a relatively close cousin of radical democracy. The
approach is captured by the doctrinal requirement that courts
reviewing legislative acts must accord them a "presumption of constitutionality. ' 49 Where the constitutional text admits of more than one
interpretation, courts ought to grant significant weight to the interpretation given to it by officials accountable to the people. James
Bradley Thayer articulated this view in the late nineteenth century,50
and virtually all commentators on constitutional law have endorsed
some version of it. In strong form, the position amounts to nearly
complete deference to political actors, 5' at the limit merging with the
views of radical democrats.
In its more modest versions, judicial restraint is a compromise
between, on the one hand, the twin facts of complexity and moral
diversity and, on the other hand, the need for judicial review in the
first place. Thayer's philosophy attempted such a compromise at the
"retail" level, asking in each case whether the Constitution clearly circumscribes government action. Bickel's own suggestion that the
Court should exercise the "passive virtues" by avoiding divisive controversies that would undermine its position in public opinion fits
within the Thayerian tradition, 52 as does Cass Sunstein's suggestion
that the Court should be (and as a matter of observed fact is) "mini(1997) (summarizing and showing limits of arguments that legislation and regulation are
not public-regarding), one might think that the logical end point of the radical democratic
argument is government by popular referendum, but (romantic?) fondness for legislative
deliberation usually tempers radical democrats' radicalism in this regard.
49 Waiters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 468 U.S. 1323, 1324 (1984); see also
Bowen v. Kendrick, 483 U.S. 1304, 1304 (1987); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 585
(1948).
50 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893). The view hardly originated with Thayer, of course.
It was quite arguably the conventional wisdom in the early Republic. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1983) (noting
support for Thayer's theory in early Supreme Court cases).
51 See Lino A. Graglia, "Constitutional Theory": The Attempted Justification for the
Supreme Court's Liberal Political Program, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 789, 791 (1987) ("[W]hy should
the American people prefer to have fundamental issues of social policy decided by the
United States Supreme Court ... in the guise of enforcing the Constitution rather than by
the decentralized process of representative self-government contemplated by the
Constitution?").
52 Bickel, supra note 38, at 111-98; Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 40 (1961); see also
Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 312, 416 (1997)
(defining passive virtues as "the strategic use by courts (particularly the Supreme Court) of
justiciability doctrines and other procedural techniques to avoid deciding issues the Court
believes are best deferred to a later date").
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malist" in the sense that it should leave the political process consider53
able breathing space.
Sunstein also argues that the Court should be minimalist in a
second sense: It should not try to root its decisions in principles stated
at a high level of abstraction. Here, Sunstein appears to invert the
problem of moral diversity. He claims that agreement on particulars
may sometimes be possible-e.g., that there is no constitutional right
to physician-assisted suicide-even if agreement on higher-order rea54 the Justices
sons is not-e.g., in the physician-assisted suicide case,
55
ruling.
offered several competing rationales for the
Thus understood, minimalism is not obviously responsive to the
indeterminacy problem in every case. There can be broad consensus
favoring an abstract principle like liberty, disagreement about whether
liberty should be understood to go no further than the traditions of
positive law or in evolving terms, and then consensus again on some
particular applications, such as the right to physician-assisted suicide-even as there is widespread disagreement about other applications. Moreover, minimalism of the second sort founders on
Dworkin's idea of "justificatory ascent. ' 56 What makes judicial resolution of contested questions of law necessary is precisely the fact that
they are contested-that there can be plausible arguments produced
for a variety of results. But if this is so, a legal culture that demands
reasons as the warrant for judicial decisionmaking will require judges
to appeal to more general principles to justify the intuition that one
rather than another outcome is appropriate. If minimalism sometimes
manages to duck the sorts of hard questions around which moral or
other consensus breaks down, "justificatory ascent is always, as it
were, on the cards: we cannot rule it out a priori because we never
know when a legal claim that seemed pedestrian and even indisputable may suddenly be challenged by a new and potentially revolu'57
tionary attack from a higher level."
On the evidence, this is no mere theoretical worry, for
minimalism has not fared much better in practice than in theory. In
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court Justices who most epitomized the Thayer/Bickel/Sunstein attitude were Frankfurter and the
53 See supra note 35.
54 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (upholding physician-assisted suicide

ban against substantive due process challenge); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)
(upholding physician-assisted suicide ban against equal protection challenge).
55 See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 35, at 5-6; Sunstein, Leaving Things
Undecided, supra note 35, at 20-21.
56 See Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 353, 356-57 (1997).
57 Id. at 357-58.
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second Harlan. They practiced a version of "retail restraint." When
they chose to err on the side of allowing the political process to take
its course-as they did, for example, when they opposed applying
most provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states 5 8-they essentially
acted as radical democrats, and were thus legitimately subject to criticism of radical democracy. On the other hand, when they occasionally
voted to intervene in the political process-as, for example, when Justice Harlan voted to invalidate a Connecticut ban on contraceptive
use 59-they opened themselves up to the opposite criticism of judicial
subjectivity. Why, critics asked, are practitioners of retail restraint
willing to intervene, notwithstanding textual ambiguity, in this case
but not other cases? As Gerald Gunther famously remarked in his
aptly titled The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues," Bickelian
ducking of the hard issues amounts to "100% insistence on principle,
'60
20% of the time."
In other words, retail restraint is a crude sort of split-thedifference compromise: Sometimes it sacrifices rights for majoritarian
decisionmaking, and at other times the tradeoff works in the opposite
direction, but it provides no systematic account of which side of the
balance to favor in any given case. The best retail restraint can offer is
reliance on judicial craft-a store of largely tacit understandings to
which the practiced judge turns to decide when to exercise and when
to abjure authority. In this respect, retail restraint is aligned with the
approach of Hart and Sacks 6 1 (which is unsurprising given Justice
Frankfurter's role in the creation of, and his lionization within, the
Legal Process School). 62 Part III contends that Hart and Sacks were
right to focus on the allocation of decisionmaking authority among
institutions, but also that their reliance on craft-as well as their
assumption that the New Deal state included all possible useful insti58 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(opposing incorporation of Bill of Rights via Fourteenth Amendment because, among
other things, it would "tear up by the roots much of the fabric of law in the several
States").
59 See Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (opposing
Court's dismissal on jurisdictional grounds of challenge to Connecticut ban on birth control, and arguing, on merits, that due process "includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints").
60 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1964).
61 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 TermForeword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 34 & n.27 (1994) (locating Bickel
squarely within the Hart and Sacks framework).
62 See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 465, 507-08 (1988)
(reviewing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960 (1986)) (associating Justices
Frankfurter and Brandeis with the majoritarian strand of Legal Process School).
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tutions-was a limitation of their method. It is likewise a limitation of
judicial restraint practiced at the retail level.
C. Process Theories

Despite frequent rhetorical invocations of the principle of judicial
restraint, since the overruling of Lochner, Supreme Court doctrine
has even more frequently attempted the compromise between majoritarianism and rights at the wholesale level, by designating specific categories of cases in which the political process is likely to be
untrustworthy as falling outside the presumption of constitutionality.
In a famous footnote to an otherwise obscure case, Chief Justice Stone
suggested that the presumption of constitutionality ought to be suspended when laws infringe specific provisions of the Bill of Rights;
when, as in the case of laws infringing freedom of information or the
right to vote, ordinary legislative processes cannot be expected to correct the defect; and when prejudice against minorities curtails their
ability to utilize the democratic process to effect change. 63 As elaborated by John Hart Ely and other theorists building upon the footnote,
the counter-majoritarian practice of judicial review thus employed in
the service of the democratic process avoids the charge that it is
64
undemocratic.
Process theory is explicitly framed as a response to Bickel-and
thus as a response to the indeterminacy problem as well. Does it succeed? Process theory explains why courts are justified in invalidating
egregious affronts to any plausible conception of democracy-such as
profoundly rotten voting districts and entrenched racial apartheid.
But egregious affronts to democracy tend to be recognized as such
only in retrospect. If matters were otherwise, judicial review would be
unnecessary, because democracy would purge itself of the offending
practices. Thus, there may be agreement in principle that the courts
should protect the Bill of Rights and the integrity of the political process, but given complexity and moral diversity, there will be disagreement over particulars, such as whether legislated limits on campaign
contributions and expenditures infringe constitutionally protected
political expression or foster equal political participation (or do both,
and if so, how to resolve the conflict). At the time cases involving
most such issues come before the court, there is division over whether
process theory authorizes judicial intervention.
63 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
64 See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(1980).
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Still, even if validated only after the fact, so long as judicial
review is invoked only to overturn practices that come to be seen as
egregious violations of democratic principles, perhaps process theory
can cabin judicial review. But the area falling outside the presumption of constitutionality in Chief Justice Stone's footnote encompasses

many of the most contentious questions courts face, including affirmative action, gay rights, school prayer, limits on pornography, and so
on. Even the abortion right, which Ely thought an unwarranted constitutional inference by the Burger Court because it is a substantive
right unconnected to clear constitutional text or the political process,

can be, and has been, recharacterized as protecting equal political participation within the process theory framework. 65
Process theory thus highlights but does not resolve the indeterminacy problem. Democratic procedures cannot be used to determine
the ground rules for democracy because this only raises the question
of how to validate the democratic procedures for determining the
ground rules, and so on ad infinitum. But at the same time, extra-

majoritarian mechanisms for setting the ground rules also cannot validate themselves; they will invariably rely on just the sort of controversial moral judgments (about democracy) that process theory is meant
to avoid.
D. Fundamental Values
Process theories of the sort advanced by Ely typically seek to

legitimize judicial protection of democracy-enforcing rights and to de65

Laurence Tribe, for example, writes that
[a]lthough the Court in Roe relied solely on the liberty clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, any restriction that prohibits women from exercising
the right to decide whether to end a pregnancy would, in the absence of a truly
compelling justification, deny them the "equal protection of the laws" also
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

A law that discriminates in such a forceful way against an entire group of
people and that poses such an obvious danger of majoritarian oppression and
enduring subjugation must not be permitted unless it is needed to serve the
most compelling public interest.
Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 105 (1990). See also Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 912 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Roe is an integral part of a correct understanding of both
the concept of liberty and the basic equality of men and women."); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev.
375, 386 (1985) ("Overall, the Court's Roe position is weakened, I believe, by the opinion's
concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective.").
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legitimize judicial enforcement of other constitutional rights. 66 Yet
the Carolene Products footnote by its terms extends to substantive
rights protected by the Bill of Rights, such as the right to free exercise

of religion, that have no direct bearing on the mechanics of democracy. 67 Fundamental values theorists argue that the judicial role properly extends to protecting individuals against interference with a zone
of autonomy that the government has no legitimate business
68
regulating.
Fundamental values approaches pose a serious challenge to pro-

cess theory, which relies on drawing sharp distinctions between process and substance, equality and other norms, and enumerated and
unenumerated rights. Process theory's critics have challenged each of
these distinctions. Laurence Tribe noted that procedural protections

invariably serve underlying substantive values. 69 Peter Westen argued
that equality norms are empty absent a substantive normative framework. 70 And Ronald Dworkin challenged the distinction between
enumerated and unenumerated rights as resting on an incoherent view
of meaning.

71

But while these scholars have demonstrated process theory's
flaws, they themselves have not made much progress in addressing the
indeterminacy problem. Let us grant that constitutions are (of necessity) meant to protect substantive as well as procedural norms. The
66 See Ely, supra note 64, at 14-15 (concluding that Due Process Clause has been
improperly read to "incorporat[e] a general mandate to review the substantive merits of
legislative and other governmental action"); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 Yale
L.J. 1123, 1123, 1146-52, 1162 (1997) (arguing that Due Process Clause does not grant
substantive right to physician-assisted suicide).
67 See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
68 See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 3
(1995) (defining "right of autonomy" as consisting of "protection of basic liberties that are
significant preconditions for persons' development and exercise of deliberative autonomy
in making certain fundamental decisions affecting their destiny, identity, or way of life").
For present purposes, I lump together with fundamental values theorists those thinkers
who believe the counter-majoritarian difficulty is exaggerated, because they, like the fundamental values theorists, posit that majority rule has no presumptive priority over other
values. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 531, 532-35 (1998) (arguing that political accountability has been erroneously tied to majoritarianism and should be understood as separate constitutional value
justifying judicial review); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 TermForeword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 74-76 (1989) (arguing that
constitutional text and Founders did not intend to make majoritarianism "primary premise" of U.S. democracy).
69 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063, 1067-72 (1980).
70 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982).
71 See Dworkin, supra note 47, at 76-81 (declaring that distinction rests on confusion
between reference and interpretation).
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question remains: When faced with social disagreement (because of
complexity or moral diversity or both), how should courts go about
choosing one rather than another interpretation of the substantive
norms a constitution protects?
Dworkin, who unabashedly advocates a "moral reading" of the
Constitution, gives the following answer: Judges should interpret the
abstract moral language of the Constitution-including terms such as
"due process," "liberty," and "equal protection"-as enacting abstract
moral principles. 72 What of the fact that people disagree about the
particular entailments of these abstract principles? Such disagreement, Dworkin contends, does not show that there is no right answer
to these questions, any more than disagreement about what killed the
dinosaurs demonstrates that there was no cause of their extinction. 73
This view-that there are right answers even in hard cases-is
Dworkin's response to the indeterminacy problem in constitutional
law; it is also his answer to the claims of legal realism and legal positivism in jurisprudence more broadly (as discussed in Part III below).
Upon inspection, however, the "right-answers" thesis, even if correct, does not respond to the indeterminacy problem. Suppose there
is a correct answer to the question of whether the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits most forms of affirmative action. There remains the
problem of ascertaining what that answer is. Dworkin asks judges
charged with this task "to find the best ...understanding of what
equal moral status for men and women really requires .. that fits the
broad story of America's historical record. '74 Yet that is precisely
what people disagree about. 75 The metaphysical claim that there is a
right answer to this question does not help unless tied to some mechanism for finding that answer. And without an argument about institutional competence, Dworkin certainly cannot at this point say that the
See id. at 7.
Michael Moore, who unabashedly defends moral realism, nicely puts the parallel by
asking the skeptic to "take whatever skeptical question you direct to morals and ask it of
scientific fact. If such skepticism does not make you doubt the existence of oak trees and
the like, then it should not make you skeptical of moral entities and qualities such as rights,
obligations, and goodness." Michael S. Moore, Remembrance of Things Past, 74. S. Cal. L.
Rev. 239, 246 (2000). Dworkin's more recent work could be characterized as endorsing
moral realism as well. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe
It,
25 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 87, 89 (1996) ("Any successful-really any intelligible-argument
that evaluative propositions are neither true nor false must be internal to the evaluative
domain rather than [independent of] it.").
74 Dworkin, supra note 47, at 11.
75 See Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 41, at 187 ("Different judges will
reach different results even when they all take themselves to be pursuing the right answer,
and nothing about the ontology of right answers gives any of them a reason for thinking his
own view is any more correct than any other.").
72
73
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decision mechanism is adjudication by the courts, because it is precisely the view of law as whatever-the-authorities-say-it-is that his

right-answers thesis aims to dislodge. The right-answers thesis simply
76
does not address the fact of moral diversity.
Nor does the right-answers thesis respond to the problem of com-

plexity. The indeterminacy problem undercuts Dworkin's view of law
as integrity even in cases that do not pose any obvious moral question,
because integrity has very little purchase on concrete problem solving.
Tellingly, as to the hard questions of institutional allocation of power
and empirical method, Dworkin has nothing to say; 77 these he dispar78
ages as mere "policy" questions.
E. Originalism

Judges and constitutional scholars who call themselves originalists
would address the indeterminacy problem by denying that there is

very much indeterminacy in the Constitution, provided that it is interpreted to reflect the original understanding of those who framed and
ratified it. Two rationales typically support this view. First, originalists argue that their method of interpretation allows less room for judicial discretion than other methods because the search for historical
meaning looks outside of the judges' values to an objective past
reality. Second, originalists often invoke a concrete version of social
contract theory: Because the Constitution's status as law derives from
its ratification by the People, it should be interpreted to mean what
79
the People thought it meant when they adopted it.
76 See Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice,.and the American Constitution, 97 Colum. L.
Rev. 133, 150-51 (1997) (reviewing Dworkin, supra note 47; Dennis Patterson, Law and
Truth (1996) (arguing that Dworkin's approach glosses over fact of judges' and others'
disagreement on hard cases).
77 Well, perhaps not quite nothing. In Freedom's Law, Dworkin states that "[t]he best
institutional structure is the one best calculated to produce the best answers to the essentially moral question of what the democratic conditions actually are." Dworkin, supra note
47, at 34. Strikingly, Dworkin does not argue that constitutional adjudication (as opposed
to constitutional decisionmaking by popularly elected legislatures) is best calculated to
produce the best answers, only that this could be true. Dworkin suggests that if it were
true, there would be a sufficient basis for our adhering to the allocation of authority we
have inherited from the Marshall Court. See id. at 34-35.
78 See Dworkin, supra note 21, at 221-24, 243-44, 310-12, 338-40.
79 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3, 37-44 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (declaring
that constitutional interpretive methods that rely on current meaning as opposed to original meaning are akin to common-law style interpretation in their distortion of balance
between social order and individual rights); Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:
The Political Seduction of the Law 143-60 (1990) (arguing that originalism allows judges to
define and apply constitutional principles in neutral manner).
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Yet some of the most well-rehearsed objections to originalism can
be restated as the problems of moral diversity and complexity.

0

With

respect to moral diversity, originalists downplay the difficulty of discerning a common understanding of constitutional text, the meaning
of which was hotly contested even when it was first adopted.8 ' Meanwhile, complexity manifests itself as the problem of changed circumstances. Many of the problems we face today were unknown to the
Framers' generation, and thus they had no expectations with respect
to these matters. And where the Framers' generation did not provide
a concrete answer, we are left to our own ambiguously guided devices.
Nonetheless, rather than abandon original meaning, many constitutional practitioners and theorists argue that the task of the interpreter is "to discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of
the world they knew, apply to the world we know,182 or to "translate"
83
the original understanding to accommodate the modern world. It
should be apparent, however, that weak originalism of this sort
foregoes any claim to determinacy that strong originalism may make,
for the process of translation necessarily depends upon what the interpreter deems worth keeping and worth discarding. 84 Thus, weak

originalists justify their approach by modifying the social contract
theory of strong originalism.

Weak originalists acknowledge an

important role for each generation of Americans in constructing constitutional meaning, and see the job of the interpreter as synthesizing

their written and unwritten contributions. 85 And for that reason,
80 Some, but not all. Consider two objections not described in the text of this Article.
One is the paradox that the framers and ratifiers themselves did not intend or expect subsequent generations to treat original meaning as an interpretive touchstone. See H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885
(1985). A second is that originalism often leads to unacceptable results. See Michael C.
Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 Geo. L.J. 1765, 1771 (1997) (noting that originalism does not solve, and may
amplify, counter-majoritarian difficulty).
81 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
Rev. 204, 213-17 (1980) (describing difficulty in determining identity, interpretive intent,
and intended specificity of those who adopted Constitution).
82 Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.).
83 See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995) (describing forms of "translation" relying on changed social and
economic facts or changed law that allow new decisions to preserve fidelity to prior
understandings).
84 See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381, 408-11 (1997) (illustrating that level of generality of original understanding is normative question).
85 See, e.g., 1 Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 92-104 (1991)
(discussing synthesis of and dialogue between Reconstructionist and founding constitutional principles).
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weak originalists must turn to some other, unspecified theory to
address the indeterminacy problem.
F.

Critical Theories

With historical roots in the legal realism of the early twentieth
century, critical legal scholars challenge the claim that the conven-

tional materials of constitutional jurisprudence-text, structure, original understanding, precedent, and so forth-play the dominant role
in constitutional interpretation. In most important cases, these materials do not uniquely determine a correct answer, and accordingly the

Court chooses the answer most consistent with the Justices' own
values or politics. 8 6 To the "crits," the Court's controversial 5-4 deci-

sion resolving the 2000 presidential election 87 was only the latest and
most dramatic confirmation that law, especially constitutional law, is
88
simply politics.
More generally, critical scholars argue that courts reinforce
existing power structures in society, often acting as a vehicle of class,
race, gender, and other forms of subordination. 89 Some critical
scholars argue that given the impossibility of neutral interpretation,
courts ought to be honest about their value choices and, in essence,
make better ones.90 Other critical scholars question whether constitu86 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional
Law 193 (1988) (describing legal realist attack on classical legal rules).
87 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
88 A subtle form of the critical view appears in Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the
Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 Yale L.J. 1407 (2001). Balkin notes that on the
surface, Bush v. Gore looks like a validation of legal realism or Critical Legal Studies.
However, he then suggests that the opposite might be true: The very fact that the case
could be so clearly and widely recognized as "political" rather than legal shows that, contrary to the assumptions of the "crits," there is a line between law and politics-one that
the Court overstepped in Bush v. Gore. Balkin finds this analysis unpersuasive, however,
because it shows only that the Court wrote a sloppy opinion (perhaps because of the press
of time); given more time, the Court could have written an opinion that, though still politically motivated, would have been legally plausible. Id. at 1441-47.
89 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at
254 (1977) ("Not only had the law come to establish legal doctrines that maintained the
new distribution of economic and political power, but, wherever it could, it actively promoted a legal redistribution of wealth against the weakest groups in the society.");
Kimberl Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1356-66 (1988) (arguing
that critical analysis typically focuses insufficient attention on racial subordination).
90 Joseph Singer asks how, given the impossibility of any theory making value choices
for us, judges should make value choices. He answers:
The desperation with which people ask this question rests on the assumption
that legal rules obtain whatever legitimacy they have by being chosen in a way
that is essentially different from the way in which we make everyday moral
decisions. By now it should be clear that I do not think that there is a differ-

HeinOnline -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 900 20032

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:875

tional law can be anything other than a means of oppression. 91 In an

age of conservative judicial activism, this doubt may lead some critical
scholars to embrace radical democracy. 92 This division in the critical
movement itself has deep roots in American constitutional thinking,
dating back at least to the mid-nineteenth-century debate among abo-

litionists over whether to reform the Constitution's acceptance of
slavery to accord with the supposedly deeper American values of liberty and equality or to denounce the Constitution as a pact with the
93
devil.

Whatever may be said in favor of critical approaches to constitutional interpretation, note that they do not attempt to solve or even
ameliorate the twin problems of complexity and moral diversity. Crit-

ical legal studies is probably best understood as either celebrating or
capitulating to the indeterminacy problem.
G.

Eclecticism

Although individual Supreme Court Justices from time to time
vow allegiance to one or another of the theoretical approaches
discussed above, the Court has never adopted a single interpretive
methodology. In part this reflects the dynamics of a multi-member
body, but more fundamentally, it reflects the complexity of life and

the breadth of subjects regulated by the Constitution. How could any
interpretive approach be satisfactory in all contexts? Constitutional
ence. And this revelation should not be experienced as leaving us helpless;
rather, it should be experienced as empowering us.
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J.
1, 62 (1984). Such forthrightness may be admirable but it is not the universal prescription
of critical scholars. For example, Mark Tushnet once explained that if he were on the
Supreme Court, he would vote so as "to advance the cause of socialism" and then write an
opinion "in some currently favored version of Grand Theory." Mark Tushnet, The
Dilemmas of Liberal Consitutionalism, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 411, 424 (1981). Perhaps in practice, however, Tushnet's approach would not differ so much from Singer's, as Tushnet was
quick to add: "The answer I give today would not necessarily be the one I would give were
I a judge, for that fact itself would signal that political circumstances had changed drastically." Id. at 425.
91 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning of Blacks' Fidelity to the Constitution, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1761, 1763 (1997) (noting that "instrumental fidelity to the Constitution is
the reason for black critical race scholars' disagreement with white critical legal studies
scholars over the significance of rights"); Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72
B.U. L. Rev. 765, 776 (1992) ("[T]he Constitution appears to be fundamentally at odds
with progressive ideals and visions.").
92 See Tushnet, supra note 34 (proposing making Constitution nonjusticiable and instituting instead system of populist constitutional law).
93 See J'.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 1703, 1708-10 (1997) (contrasting views of William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick
Douglass).
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theorists who emphasize the impracticability of any single approach
94
are eclectics or pluralists.
All constitutional practitioners and theorists are partly eclectic at
the level of deciding cases. They accept the necessity of looking at
more than one source of law, consulting text, history, precedent, and
other sources. Wholehearted eclectics go on to deny the capacity of
any overarching theory of constitutionalism to legitimate the practice
of judicial review and provide interpretive guidance.
Some eclectics then argue that it is a mistake to seek any theoretical foundations for judicial review beyond the work-a-day material of
lawyers. On this view, the counter-majoritarian difficulty is at most a
problem for political theorists rather than lawyers. In support of their
approach, these eclectics claim that the justification of a practice such
95
as judicial review is necessarily external to that practice.
Nonetheless, because so much of constitutional theory focuses on
the proper judicial role, we might think that the justification of that
role is both internal and external to constitutional practice. 96 Moreover, even if lawyers did not themselves worry about the countermajoritarian difficulty, that would hardly answer the basic objection,
which is a claim that the lawyer class has usurped power that rightfully
97
belongs to the people at large.

Accordingly, other eclectics address the counter-majoritarian difficulty head-on. They contend that by focusing on multiple sources of
legitimacy, their approach imposes substantial constraints on judges.
Yet "if judicial reasoning takes place on many axes rather than just
one, judges would appear to have even more degrees of freedom than
a linear image suggests." 98 Eclectics can respond that "in the context
of judicial decisionmaking, additional dimensions do not invariably
94 See Stephen M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics 14352 (1996) (describing pluralist approach); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A Matter of
Interpretation, supra note 79, at 65, 73 (expressing doubt "that any defensible set of ultimate 'rules' exists").
95 See Philip Bobbin, Constitutional Interpretation 8-10 (1991) ("[N]one of the conventional legal approaches in addition to precedent that support the constitutionality ofjudicial review can establish its legitimacy, because each depends on assumptions about the
appropriate form of argument that can only be validated as a consequence of constitutional
review.").
96 See Dorf, supra note 80, at 1789-90.
97 The academic version of this charge indicts the Supreme Court rather than the
lawyer class generally. See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 TermForeword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2001) (asserting that Court increasingly
views itself as singular legitimate authority on constitutional interpretation and discounts
views of political branches and citizens); Tushnet, supra note 34.
98 Michael C. Dorf, Courts, Reasons, and Rules, 19 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 483, 502-03
(2000).
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yield additional degrees of freedom; often they impose additional
constraints." 99

Perhaps that answer shows why eclecticism constrains judges to a
somewhat greater extent than single-minded approaches to constitutional interpretation such as originalism. Eclectics acknowledge the
partial indeterminacy of the law, while claiming that the full toolbox
of conventional legal arguments suffices to keep judicial discretion
within acceptable bounds. This is ultimately a craft-based solution,
and thus susceptible to the critique of craft offered below. 10 0
H.

Back to the Indeterminacy Problem

Although the foregoing typology is hardly exhaustive, it suffi-

ciently captures the dominant approaches to constitutional interpretation to illustrate that theorists have not found a way around the
indeterminacy problem. Is it unsolvable? Among theorists who take
the problem seriously, Frank Michelman comes closest to providing a

framework, if not a complete solution. Consider his approach.
Michelman's recent work is both broader and narrower than the
accounts discussed above. It is broader-and appropriately sobecause Michelman understands his task as providing an account of
democracy, not just judicial review. This is appropriate because it situates the question of judicial review in its proper institutional context.
How can one legitimize the purportedly counter-majoritarian practice
of judicial review without some understanding of what makes
majoritarian practices themselves democratic?' 01
99 Id. at 503.
100 See infra Part III.E. The careful reader of these footnotes will note a tension
between the position espoused here and my prior efforts to identify and justify an eclectic
approach to constitutional interpretation. See Dorf, supra note 80 (endorsing non-social
contractarian version of eclecticism); Michael C. Dorf, Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts
on Meaning, Translation and Normative Theory, 85 Geo. L.J. 1857 (1997) (same); Michael
C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 593 (1999) (arguing that
eclectic approach does not need to rank sources of meaning in order of importance). The
short explanation for the apparent tension is that the author wears multiple hats. This is an
article about what jurisprudence and constitutional theory might become; the other works
are situated in debates about the law as it is. I realize that the separation of the descriptive
and the normative assumed in the previous sentence is itself a contested position within the
very debates described. The long answer would nonetheless defend the distinction, but
that would require a very long footnote indeed. Cf. Simon Singh, Fermat's Enigma: The
Epic Quest to Solve the World's Greatest Mathematical Problem 60-62 (1997) ("1 have
discovered a truly marvelous demonstration of this proposition which this margin is too
narrow to contain.").
101See Michelman, supra note 26, at 11-62 (considering various theories of democracy
in order to understand why we value establishment of democratic political arrangements
and how we can justify judicial lawmaking).
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But Michelman's account is also narrower than those considered
thus far in that he does not offer a full-blown theory of constitutional
interpretation. Instead, he sketches its outline by specifying the requisites of constitutional democracy. To be legitimate, Michelman
argues, a constitutional democracy must ensure both that the people
be self-governing and that the higher law guaranteeing the democratic
character of lawmaking itself be protected from popular abuses
through the supervision of a separate institution, typically a constitutional court. 102 Two primary methods are available for articulating the
rules of a democratic polity so defined, 10 3 and each, Michelman shows,
has defects that mirror those of the other. 04 As these defects are
anticipated by the discussion so far, they can be summarized
succinctly.
One approach, associated with the work of Dworkin, is, as we
have seen, substantive. 10 5 Deliberators detached from the passions of
everyday life-constitutional judges, high and high-minded public servants, senators on their august days, and so forth-might reason from
constitutional text and prior judicial decisions to a full specification of
the rights and duties of citizens who regard each other as, say, free and
equal beings. Suppose the deliberators are successful at this manifestly Herculean task of articulating just the principles that we, the
People, believe should govern us. They then run squarely into the
indeterminacy problem. The principles they have labored to define
remain uncontroversial just so long as they are not applied to the
interpretation of actual (new) cases. Once the principles are put to
use, controversial indeterminacies in their meaning are likely to
become evident.
It is just this difficulty that leads many constitutionalists to the
procedural approach, associated with the work of Habermas and, on
this side of the Atlantic, with Ely, the minimalists, and the radical
102 See id. at 5-6 ("'Democracy' appears to mean something like this: Popular political
self-government-the people of a country deciding for themselves the contents (especially,
one would think, the most fateful and fundamental contents) of the laws that organize and
regulate their political association. 'Constitutionalism' appears to mean something like
this: The containment of popular political decision-making by a basic law, the Constitution
... designed to control which further laws can be made, by whom, and by what procedures.
It is, of course, an essential part of the notion of constitutionalism that the basic law must
be untouchable by the majoritarian politics it is meant to contain.").
103 See id. at 10 (articulating two variations as "democracy-as-rights," championed by
Dworkin, and "democracy-as-procedure," championed by Robert Post).
104 See id. at 35 (describing substantive democracy model as "achingly incomplete" and
procedural democracy model as nonetheless "hooked on substance").
105 See id. at 17 ("According to Dworkin, the standard 'democratic,' as meant for application to a country's basic laws, is best conceived as a cluster of primary, substantive
requirements, not of secondary, procedural ones.").
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democrats. Yet this alternative fares no better. Instead of focusing on
the articulation of constitutional values, proceduralists aim to set the
terms of full and fair participation by all citizens in democratic decisionmaking. The responsive democracy that results will decide for
itself what it values. The difficulty is that every choice of participatory
procedure can be challenged, and must accordingly be defended, in
the name of a substantive principle. (Recall our discussion of
minimalism above.) 10 6 Justifications, as we know, ascend. This justificatory ascent takes the procedurally inclined polity just where it was
disinclined (wisely, given the failure of the substantive approach) to
go: into an investigation of first principles.
We might conclude from these circling failures that articulation of
democratic ideals simply is not a useful instrument of critical, democratic self-reflection. If so, we might shift attention from utopia to
dystopia, joining the many who ask whether our polity is still selfgoverning enough to be called democratic at all. (The nearly universal
answer, even after Bush v. Gore, is obviously, and unhelpfully, yes.)
Or, learning from the failures, we can revise our standard of democratic legitimacy to distinguish our modest concerns for self-rule as
political responsiveness broadly conceived from more ambitious concerns for procedural and substantive coherence.
And it is just such a redefinition of standards that Michelman
proposes when he suggests that we might agree epistemically that a
constitutional democracy is legitimate if it meets two conditions. The
first is that its abstract commitments be substantively good ones.
Securing agreement on the canonical formulation of such conditions is
not problematic because, by definition, our commitments are stated at
a sufficiently high level of abstraction to command universal or nearuniversal assent-fairness, equality, liberty, and dignity, for
example. 10 7 The second condition is that any institutions empowered
to interpret the higher law-the Supreme Court and the judiciary
more generally in the American case-expose themselves to the "full
blast" of opinions and interests in society. 0 8
See supra Part I.B.
107 Michelman's list includes "toleration, freedoms of conscience and thought, respect
for human dignity, equality of concern and respect for every person, free and open public
discourse in a system of rule by the governed, and the rule of law." Michelman, supra note
26, at 56.
108 See id. at 60 ("[Tlhis maximum feasible effort to get the basic laws and their major
interpretations right would have to include arrangements for exposing the empowered
basic-law interpreters to the full blast of sundry opinions and interest-articulations in
society, including on a fair basis everyone's opinions and articulations of interests,
including your own.").
106
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The first condition allows us to identify with our democracy. The
second allows us a measure of participation in its actual lawmaking.
Seen together, these epistemic conditions shift the focus from the
coherence of any one set of principles to the coherence of sets of institutions, each of which may embody many different principles. It is a
rough but serviceable attempt to make our standard for judging
democracy a kind of critical heightening of the things our democratic
institutions can (be made to) do. Indeed, given that the "full blast"
condition emerges from, and must respond to, the indeterminacy
problem, the only way to make use of the principle is to try and learn
from the experience of institutions that in some sense apply it.
As Michelman is an American constitutional theorist, and as we
have seen ad nauseum, such theorists are given to think in the shoes of
Justices of the Supreme Court, it is perhaps not wholly surprising that
his own proposal for improving American democracy focuses on the
disposition of the Justices. Thus the constitutional judge will exercise
judicial powers most in conformity with the two conditions by
embracing what Michelman calls romantic constitutionalism: 10 9 the
view that individuals can transcend the limits of their personalities if
society makes the social contexts that both shape and obstruct the
flourishing of identities susceptible to revision." 0 Toleration for the
clash of principles and for the jostling of competing designs for living
is both a sign and an instrument of this heightening of revisability.
Michelman suggests that Justice Brennan embodied this type of
romantic constitutionalism in his willingness to give room to dissident,
even offensive views in his interpretation of the right of free speech; in
his willingness to allow minorities to pursue remedies through courts
or expressive boycotts that they might have pursued through political
parties, circumstances allowing; and in his unwillingness to defer to
109 Id. at 68-71.
110 Lenin and the Bolsheviks believed that the coercive power of the state could create a
"new Soviet man." Geoffrey Hosking, Russia and the Russians: A History 434-35 (2001).
History proved them wrong, but that hardly shows that human nature is completely incorrigible. Indeed, as students of political organizing understand, contrary to Bolshevik
assumptions, citizen participation in ordinary politics is more likely to lead to personal
transformation than is the butt of a gun held by members of the people's supposed vanguard. See Ross Gittell & Avis Vidal, Community Organizing: Building Social Capital as a
Development Strategy 174-76 (1998) (discussing value of and ways to encourage community participation); Clarence N. Stone et al., Building Civic Capacity: The Politics Of
Reforming Urban Schools 7-8 (2001) (highlighting need for "altering relationships" in
order to effect lasting policy changes); Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward A Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54
Stan. L. Rev. 399, 458-93 (2001) (arguing for politically engaged community economic
development); Bill Moyers, Introduction to Mary Beth Rogers, Cold Anger: A Story of
Faith and Power Politics, at i, i-iv (1990) (describing small-scale political organizing as
means to self-empowerment).
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official claims of expertise in disputes between citizens and
bureaucrats."'
But what of the "full blast" of criticism of the Supreme Court
itself? Although the Court's precedents extend protection to speech
critical of the Court no less than to speech critical of other government actors,11 2 in recent years the Court has showed itself to be quite
impervious to the blast. Justices who exhibit sharp ideological divisions find common ground for the proposition that they and they
alone are entrusted with discerning the Constitution's meaning. Thus,
in defense of abortion rights, the Court cites public opposition to Roe
v. Wade as a reason to resist overruling that decision,"

3

while, in

defense of states' rights, the Court insists that Congress's power "to
enforce .. the provisions of" the Fourteenth Amendment" 4 grants
only the power to enforce the Court's (idiosyncratic) interpretation of
that magisterially ambiguous text.115 Whatever else one might say
about American constitutionalism, surely a polity that allows a
Supreme Court to divine the meaning of the Constitution almost
exclusively from the Court's own past divinations must flunk the "full
blast" test pretty miserably."16
What is to be done? We might begin by noting that it was not
always this way. As Larry Kramer observes in a recent article, in the

original conception of the Constitution as higher law, judicial enforcement played second fiddle to popular implementation through
politics. 117 In the early decades of the nineteenth century, before res111 See Michelman, supra note 26, at 68, 78-84 ("[T]he core of romantic constitutionalism lies in two, linked, commitments: to respect for individual human personality under
a certain romantic conception of it, and to pursuit of a certain, emancipated state of persons-in-society.").
112 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (invalidating ban on sidewalk demonstrations in front of Supreme Court building).
113 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992)
("[T]o overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a
watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question.").
114 See U.S. Const. amend. XIIII, § 5.
115 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that
Section Five of Fourteenth Amendment does not confer upon Congress power to enact
Americans with Disabilities Act in light of Court's view that disability is not suspect classification); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Section Five of
Fourteenth Amendment does not confer upon Congress power to enact Age Discrimination in Employment Act in light of Court's view that age is not suspect classification).
116 Although Michelman's book takes the form of a tribute to the late Justice Brennan, I
do not read Michelman as suggesting that the Court-either during Brennan's tenure or
since-satisfied the "full blast" criterion.
117 Kramer, supra note 97, at 41 ("The legislature and the judiciary are, [according to the
early view], the people's 'servants.' As such, they must, with proper intentions and exercising their best judgment, try to comply with the constitution. If conflicts arise, however,
it is 'the people' who constitute the authoritative 'tribunal' to whom such conflicts must be
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olution of contested interpretations of the Constitution came to be
almost automatically a matter for judicial review, the concerned
branches or departments argued out meaning among themselves. Was
this broader deliberation but the first step down a path so constrained
by the notion of a written constitution that utter judicial supremacy
(or its more restrained, New Deal cousin) was a necessary outcome?
Or could such departmentalism have been the starting point for a
widening form of constitutional review that would have come,
somehow, to engage the polity in a continuing discussion of constitutional values? The rediscovery of departmentalism tells us that the
road to where we are was less direct than many may have thought,
and may have branched at crucial points as well. But without further
discoveries it cannot tell us more, and so its value is as a goad to our
imagination in conceiving alternatives and, as ever, a warning against
the shimmer of false necessity that obscures and sanctifies the institutions we know.
Neither Kramer nor Michelman has proposed how new institutions might be created, or old ones reimagined, so as to displace judicial hyper-supremacy with something closer to popular
constitutionalism. Each understands his task as criticizing the
Supreme Court Justices in the hope that they will see the light and
thus stay their own hands. Given our history, this strategy is an uncertain gamble at best. More broadly, it reflects the dilemma of American constitutionalism: Even the most thoughtful critics of our current
practices are unable or unwilling to think about the problem as one of
institutional design. Accepting our institutions as more or less fixed,
they vainly implore the actors to do what they have been doing until
now, only more humbly.118
The next Part argues that nearly the exact same pattern holds in
academic jurisprudence: Dispassionate analysis of the central
problem-how decisions that resolve ambiguities in the law can be
justified by the law-reveals its intractable nature; yet the standard
proposals do little to change the troubled institutions.

submitted.") (quoting "Remonstrance" printed as an appendix to Kamper v. Hawkins, 3
Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 99-108 (1793)).
118 Readers can decide for themselves whether this charge applies to the author's own
work, see, e.g., Dorf & Friedman, supra note 33, at 67 (pleading for humility from Justices
and other actors), and if so, whether that work (as well as that of Michelman, Kramer,
Tushnet, and others) might be defended nonetheless as a wakeup call to the consumers of
Supreme Court opinions that is disguised as a recommendation urged on the Court.
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III
ACADEMIC JURISPRUDENCE

With apologies to those who live within the world of academic
jurisprudence, this Part paints with an even broader brush than the
preceding discussion of constitutional theory. It will suffice for
present purposes to focus on the main point of contention among the
principal antagonists, leaving aside intermediate positions and some
substantial matters of nuance.
This Part examines, in turn, H.L.A. Hart's positivism, Dworkin's
critique of positivism, and Hart's embrace of what is sometimes called
"soft positivism" in his response to Dworkin. I argue that soft positivism, understood as a synthesis of the H.L.A. Hart/Dworkin debate,
entails a view about the institutional allocation of power remarkably
close to the one articulated by (Henry) Hart and Sacks in The Legal
Process. Surprisingly, Anglo-American jurisprudents have largely
overlooked these important parallels between the work of H.L.A.
Hart and that of Hart and Sacks, despite their leading roles on either
side of the Atlantic. This might be the case because, in other important respects, Hart and Sacks's views share more with those of H.L.A.
Hart's chief critics, Dworkin and Lon Fuller (the latter himself a
"member" of the Legal Process School) than they do with those of
H.L.A. Hart. Nonetheless, I find important connections between soft
positivism and the Legal Process school of thought. These connections lay the groundwork for an account of the virtues and limits of
The Legal Process as a response to the indeterminacy problem.
A.

ClassicalHartian Positivism

In The Concept of Law, 119 H.L.A. Hart framed much of the current debate in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Hart aimed to provide
a descriptive, i.e., positivist, account of law that was not tied to any
particular legal system. He rejected J.L. Austin's model of law as
orders of the sovereign backed by threats. 120 In its place he offered a
view of law as consisting of primary rules of obligation, directed at
citizens as well as at other primary actors, and of secondary rules, followed by government officials. 121 Grounding the whole apparatus,
Hart argued, is its ultimate rule, its "rule of recognition," which "pro119 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed. 1994).
120 Id. at 18-71 (arguing that coercion model fails to account for existence of powerconferring rules, application of law to sovereign, various sources of law, and role of law in
deliberative lives of individuals).
121See id. at 91-94.
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vides criteria for the assessment of the validity of other rules" but is
22
not itself capable of validation by reference to any other rule.
Hart's nuanced and powerful account of law has provided much
grist for the mill of academic jurisprudence. I focus here on one
important feature-Hart's treatment of legal rules' ambiguity, what
he called their "open texture.' 12 3 Hart offered a middle position
between strict formalism and thoroughgoing legal realism. With the
legal realists, Hart recognized that complexity renders unattainable
the formalist dream of realizing one-hundred percent precision for
any rule stated in ordinary human language.' 24 But against legal
realism, he maintained that "the life of the law consists to a very large
extent in the guidance both of officials and private individuals by
determinate rules. ' 125 Hart contended that most rules formulated in
ordinary language-rules of law as well as rules governing other activities, such as sports contests-have a "core of settled meaning" that
enables participants and observers to distinguish between courts
applying rules and a system in which the law is whatever the final
12 6
authority proclaims it to be.
Hart quite explicitly equated the open texture of the law with the
discretion of the final authority charged with interpreting the law.
Wherever there is open texture, he believed, the "law leaves to courts
a law-creating power."' 27 Ambiguity, in other words, means the
absence of law. Yet Hart denied the lesson that more radical legal
realists and their intellectual heirs drew from this insight, namely, that
law is simply disguised power. How could he deny this? Because
Hart believed as an empirical matter that, in most legal systems, the
area of open texture is small relative to the areas of settled meaning.
In reference to the U.S. Constitution, he stated, "At any given
moment judges, even those of a supreme court, are parts of a system
the rules of which are determinate enough at the centre to supply
1 28
standards of correct judicial decision."'
Hart did not in fact offer any evidence to support this empirical
claim. Consistent with his goal of providing a conceptual account of
law in general rather than a contingent account of a particular legal
122
123

Id. at 107.
Id. at 128.

124 See id. at 128-35. "If the world in which we live were characterized only by a finite
number of features, and these together with all the modes in which they could combine
were known to us, then provision could be made in advance for every possibility ...
Plainly this world is not our world .. " Id. at 128.
125 Id. at 135.

126 See id. at 143-44.
127 Id. at 145.
128 Id.
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system, Hart supported his empirical claim by reference to his general
view about rules and language: that rules by their nature have a clear
core and an ambiguous periphery. 129 Hart took this proposition to be

either self-evident or so much a matter of common sense that it
required only illustration by a few examples rather than demonstration in any systematic way.
In fact, one can find support for Hart's view. For one thing,
Hart's views of law are really just a special application of ordinary
language philosophy. 130 We know from our everyday experience with
an ordinary language such as English that most words have a core of
settled meaning and a periphery of ambiguity, and that ambiguities
can often be resolved by understanding context. Constitutions, legislation, administrative rules, and judicial decisions written in ordinary
language, one might think, would have the same character.
Hart's view of law as such is also empirically defensible. As

critics of legal realism have often noted, a focus on adjudicated cases,
especially those in appellate courts, yields a distorted picture of the
law. 131 Recall that Hart offered an account of law, not just adjudica-

tion. The law operates even-perhaps especially-when no adjudica-

129 See id. at 123 ("All rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as
instances of general terms, and in the case of everything which we are prepared to call a
rule it is possible to distinguish clear central cases, where it certainly applies and others
where there are reasons for both asserting and denying that it applies. Nothing can eliminate this duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt ... ").
130 See Anthony J. Sebok, Finding Wittgenstein at the Core of the Rule of Recognition,
52 SMU L. Rev. 75, 95 (1999) ("Hart adopted the Wittgensteinian idea that all rules are
silent with regard to some possible set of applications. The core applications were the
equivalent of the 'standard instances,' which Wittgenstein thought proved that the language user knew how to use the rule."). For a useful introduction to how philosophers
think about various forms and sources of indeterminacy, as well as their relevance to legal
questions, see generally Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 509 (1994).
131 As Frederick Schauer argues, "the Realist wants to claim that most positivist legal
sources do not resolve appellate cases," but, even if this is so, given the selection bias of
looking only at cases that reach the appellate level, the picture of law that emerges
"scarcely diverges from what a sophisticated positivist might also believe." Frederick
Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1717, 1730 (1988). For an
argument that published appellate decisions are actually a particularly poor place to look
for evidence of judicial discretion because of the checking function of panels and publicity,
see Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257, 263-64 (1995). Ironically, legal realists
themselves bemoaned legal education's focus on appellate cases to the near exclusion of
other (historical and social science) materials and attempted, with some success, to reform
it. See Peter V. Letsou, The Future of Legal Education: Some Reflections on Law School
Specialty Tracks, 50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 457, 461-62 (1999) (describing Legal Realists'
curricular reforms of 1920s and 1930s).
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132 most civil
tion occurs. Most criminal cases result in guilty pleas,

cases result in settlement, 133 and most citizens conform their conduct
to the demands of the civil and criminal law without court action ever
commencing. Thus, Hart was arguably justified in his belief that,

viewed in its entirety, the law's areas of open texture are sufficiently

134
small as to leave the law's legitimacy intact.
We shall shortly return to Hart, and to his claim that the law's
areas of open texture are sufficiently small to avoid rendering govern-

ment authority illegitimate, but first let us turn to Hart's principal
critic.
B.

Law as Integrity

Whereas Hart conceptualized his brand of positivism as a third
way between the excesses of formalism and legal realism, Ronald
Dworkin understands his own enterprise-"law as integrity"-as a

different sort of third way: an alternative to positivism on the one
hand and to thoroughgoing instrumentalism on the
According to Dworkin, judges resolve cases by selecting the
tation that puts the law as a whole in its best light, where
understood to include both consistency with past decisions

other. 135
interpre"best" is
("fit") as

132 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Case Processing Statistics: Summary Findings, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cases.htm (last revised Feb. 28,
2002) ("Ninety-six percent of convictions occurring within I year of arrest were obtained
through a guilty plea. About 3 in 4 guilty pleas were to a felony."); see also Bureau of
Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Justice Statistics: Summary Findings, http://
www.ojp.usdoj/bjs/fed.htm (last revised Jan. 24, 2003) ("Cases were terminated against
77,145 defendants during 2001. Most (89%) defendants were convicted. Of the 68,533
defendants convicted, 65,168 (or 95%) pleaded guilty or no-contest.").
133 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Justice Statistics: Summary Findings, http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/civil.htm (last revised Oct. 1, 2001) ("The 1992
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts estimated that only 3% of 762,000 tort, contract and
real property disposed of were resolved by jury (2%) or bench trial (1%).... Of the 96,284
tort cases that were terminated in U.S. district courts during fiscal years 1996 and 1997,
3,023 or 3% were decided by a completed jury or bench trial.").
134 To be sure, high plea bargain rates may reflect defendants' fears of long sentences
should they go to trial, high settlement rates may reflect the high cost of civil litigation and,
at least where the law tracks social norms, individuals' compliance with the law may be an
epiphenomenon of their compliance with social norms. Nonetheless, it is difficult to
imagine that the law's relative clarity has nothing to do with parties' willingness to resolve
disputes without final adjudication.
135 See Dworkin, supra note 21, at 225 (describing "law as integrity" as "third conception of law," which "denies that statements of law are either the backward-looking factual
reports of conventionalism or the forward-looking instrumental programs of legal pragmatism"). Some of Dworkin's recent work could be read to suggest that he no longer thinks
of his view as a third way; I have argued, however, that Dworkin is better read as consistent over time. See Dorf, supra note 76, at 141-43, 168 (reading Freedom's Law in light of
Law's Empire).
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well as principles of political justice. 136 I will put Dworkin's affirmative exposition of law as integrity and his critique of instrumentalism
to one side and focus here on the essentials of his disagreement with
Hart.
Dworkin contends that the law's areas of what Hart called open
texture are larger than Hart acknowledged. Centrally, Dworkin
denies two claims that he attributes to positivists. First, Dworkin
claims that knowing the law is not merely a matter of ascertaining
what unique rule applies to a given situation. The law, for Dworkin,
consists both of rules that have an on/off character and principles that
have the additional dimension of "weight or importance." 137 Second,
Dworkin denies the positivists' sources thesis-the idea that the law
can be identified by its source or pedigree without reference to its
content. Courts routinely apply principles such as "[n]o one shall be
permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own
wrong,"' 138 even though they emanate from no official source. What
makes a particular statement of law true in a given context, according
to Dworkin, is that it puts the law as a whole in its best light, 139 and
the best light, recall, is defined by reference to principles of political
justice, 140 not just pedigree, which yield determinate, "right"
14 1
answers.
Dworkin therefore denies Hart's claim that when the positive law
is indeterminate, judges exercise discretion or lawmaking authority.
To begin with, Dworkin observes, even in the very hardest cases (however numerous they may be), judges do not believe themselves to be
exercising discretion. Rather, in such cases they speak as though they
are following the law, even if doing so does not mean following rules.
Dworkin thinks that judges correctly understand the nature of their
enterprise. Following the law, for Dworkin, means interpreting the
law according to the principle of integrity-and that is true in both
142
easy cases and hard cases.
Dworkin's refusal to recognize any deep distinction between hard
cases and easy cases has been criticized for overstating the role of
interpretation in law (and in life). According to one commonsensical
critique, interpretation is an activity of clarification; where, as in easy
cases, there is no ambiguity, there is no need for clarification, and thus
See Dworkin, supra note 21, at 225-75 (laying out argument for law as integrity).
137 See Dworkin, supra note 19, at 24-28.
138 Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
139 See Dworkin, supra note 21, at 167-75, 186-224.
140 See supra text accompanying note 72.
141 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
142 See Dworkin, supra note 21, at 265-66, 353-54.
136
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no need for interpretation. 143 On the other hand, surely it counts in
favor of Dworkin's view that legal practice generally recognizes no
144
sharp boundary between easy and hard cases.
The claim that easy and hard cases are not different in kind
underlies Dworkin's further argument that even in hard cases judges
apply the law, rather than their own discretion (in H.L.A. Hart's
sense). But in order for this to count as more than a quibble over
words, Dworkin must claim not only that law operates in both easy
and hard cases, but also that law operates in roughly the same manner
in easy and hard cases. For Dworkin is not merely interested in
attaching the word "law" to what judges do in hard cases; he wants the
word to connote determinacy rather than what he sees as the alternative: discretion. And that is why the right-answers thesis 145 is crucial
to Dworkin's disagreement with Hart.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that both Hart and Dworkin build
their accounts of law on responses to the indeterminacy problem.
They share the view that ambiguity is the enemy of law. Whereas
Hart minimizes the place of ambiguity in law, Dworkin-by recourse
to the right-answers thesis-denies it entirely. 146
C. Soft Positivism

H.L.A. Hart did not, during his lifetime, offer a systematic
response to his critics. After his death, however, a new edition of The
Concept of Law was published, including a postscript containing
Hart's long-awaited reply to Dworkin.147 In the Postscript, Hart
denied that Dworkin's claims undermined his account. To deflect
Dworkin's critique, Hart adopted a position sometimes called "soft
48
positivism."'1
Hart observes that his own conceptual apparatus is meant to be a
description of any legal system: Legal positivism, Hart claims, is an
external enterprise; Dworkin's interpretive account, by contrast, is
143 See Patterson, supra note 76, at 87. Patterson goes on to argue that "[i]f all understanding were interpretation, then each interpretation would itself stand in need of interpretation, and so on, infinitely regressing to infinity." Id. at 88.
144 There are, however, exceptions, such as legal sanctions for bringing objectively frivolous cases. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
145 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
146 Dworkin does not deny that the law frequently uses terms that appear ambiguous
and about which there exists profound disagreement. But Dworkin believes that contro-

versy sparked by moral language in the law can be definitively and correctly resolved; this

is so because Dworkin believes that moral claims are objectively true or false. See supra
note 73.
147 Hart, supra note 119.
148 Id. at 250.
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internal to the legal system he describes. If it turns out that in a particular legal system the rule of recognition incorporates some moral
norms as legal norms, then the external observer can describe the
social fact of incorporation. Internal participants in this particular
legal system, by contrast, would be obliged to look to the content of a

norm to ascertain whether it is a legal norm. In fact, Hart reminds us
in the Postscript,he had already embraced this position in the original
edition of The Concept of Law, where he acknowledged that in the

United States the ultimate criteria of legality incorporate moral principles.' 49 Thus, the Hartian can give an external descriptive account of
a legal system that is experienced internally as Dworkinian.1 50 As

Hart pithily sums up his point, "[d]escription may still be description,
even when what is described is an evaluation."' 15 1
A substantial literature addresses the question of whether positivism can be reconciled with Dworkin's interpretivism in this way
without sacrificing positivism's essential elements. 152 Dworkin himself
thinks not. He takes the view that if positivism is to have anything
interesting to say, it must be committed to the possibility that the law
can be identified independent of its content-i.e., the sources thesis.

Accordingly, Dworkin argues that in order for Hart's theory to
encompass Dworkin's own approach, Hart's theory must be a hollow
shell.153
Interestingly, the leading contemporary positivist, Joseph Raz,
also believes that Hart's embrace of soft positivism is inconsistent with
positivism's deeper commitments, although he would characterize
149 See id. at 247 (Postscript); id. at 72 (main text).
150 Id. at 243 (noting that "a morally neutral descriptive jurisprudence [may] record but
not ...endorse or share" the incorporation of moral principles into a particular legal
system).
151 Id. at 244.
152 For example, in the two issues of Legal Theory devoted to the Postscript,most of the
essays address some form of this question. See generally Special Issue: Postscript to
H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law, Part I, 4 Legal Theory 249 (1998); Special Issue:
Postscript to H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law, Part II,
4 Legal Theory 381 (1998). Compare Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to
Legal Theory 107-19 (2001) (defending "soft" or "inclusive positivism"), with Joseph Raz,
Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 199-204 (1994)
(insisting only "hard positivism" which does not incorporate moral principles satisfies conditions of legitimate authority).
153See Dworkin, supra note 19, at 45 ("Positivism, on its own thesis, stops short of just
those puzzling, hard cases that send us to look for theories of law."). Although written
long before Hart's Postscript was published, in this respect Dworkin anticipated Hart's
reply. For Dworkin's latest rejoinder, see Ronald Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 Harv. L.
Rev. 1655, 1656 (2002) (reviewing Coleman, supra note 152) (arguing that soft or inclusive
positivism "is not positivism at all, but only an attempt to keep the name 'positivism' for a
conception of law and legal practice that is entirely alien to positivism").
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those commitments differently from Dworkin. In Raz's view, allowing
that the law can sometimes be identified by its content, rather than by
its sources alone, undermines the law's claim to the only legitimate
source of authority it can have. 154 Other "hard positivists" like Scott
Shapiro have found soft positivism self-contradictory on different
grounds, 5 5 while the leading contemporary soft positivist, Jules
Coleman, defended a version of soft positivism (which156Coleman calls
"inclusive legal positivism") before Hart himself did.
Whether Hart's account of law can accommodate the possibility
of legal rules identifiable by their content rather than by their source
is an important question in jurisprudence, but for our present purposes it is a side issue. My principal concern here is how Hart and his
critics respond to the indeterminacy problem. In the Postscript, Hart
reaffirmed his commitment to the views that: (a) the law includes
areas of open texture;' 57 (b) judges called upon to decide questions
falling within the areas of open texture exercise discretion; 58 and (c)
these areas are sufficiently small so as not to call into question the
positivist picture of law or to render law fundamentally indeterminate. 159 Because (a) is offered as a point of agreement with Dworkin,
I only consider claims (b) and (c) here.
With respect to the question of whether judges exercise discretion
in hard cases, Hart concedes that judges speak and write as if they are
"always concerned to discover and enforce existing law," but asks rhetorically, "how seriously is this to be taken?' 160 Hart's response to
Dworkin, in other words, is to endorse one of the main tenets of legal
realism! This is remarkable because so much of The Concept of Law
takes aim at legal realism. Indeed, as Brian Leiter observes, there is a
widely held belief among jurisprudents that Chapter Seven of The
Concept of Law exposed legal realism as "a jurisprudential joke, a
See Raz, supra note 152, at 211-14.
See Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, 4 Legal Theory 469, 476 (1998) (arguing
that by accepting that "the rule of recognition could .. specify moral worth as a condition
on legal validity," Hart "offend[ed] his [own] view that the primary function of the law is to
guide conduct").
156 See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. Legal Stud. 139, 148-56
(1982), reprinted in Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law 3-27 (1988).
157 Hart, supra note 119, at 251.
158 Id. at 252 ("[Where] the law fails to determine an answer either way.... the courts
must exercise the restricted law-making function which I call 'discretion."'); id. at 272
("The sharpest direct conflict between the legal theory of this book and Dworkin's theory
154
155

arises from my contention that ...

the law is ...

partly indeterminate or incomplete.").

159 See id. at 251-52.
160 Id. at 274.
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tissue of philosophical confusions. ' ' 161 Yet in the Postscript, Hart
invokes a central tenet of legal realism to criticize Dworkin's view that
judges use the law even in hard cases.
Hart avoids fully endorsing legal realism by once again relying on
his claim that the law's areas of open texture are relatively small. 162
But as noted above, he does not attempt to substantiate this claim in
The Concept of Law; nor does he offer any empirical support in the
Postscript. Might Hart rely in part on the argument, described in Section A of this Part, that much law does not give rise to adjudication?
This is a plainly inadequate response to the question of what
judges do. The indeterminacy problem does not entail the complete
indeterminacy of legal norms. However, given complexity and moral
diversity, it does entail that the sorts of cases that come to be adjudicated will be just the ones where lawmakers have been unable to produce rules that lead to determinate answers-either because the case
was unanticipated or because representatives of citizens with diverse
conceptions of the good could not agree on language sufficiently precise to resolve it.
To put the point in more practical terms: In an easy case, one
side or the other is likely to concede relatively early in the contest.
Therefore, courts-and appellate courts especially-feed on a diet of
hard cases. If Hart's account is right, then in most cases in which a
court is asked to reach a legal decision (and in nearly every case in
which an appellate court is asked to reach a decision) the court
resolves the matter by exercising its discretion. But if this is so, then
most of what courts do is decide cases where, in Hart's view, the judge
exercises discretion rather than applying the law as received.
Meanwhile, as we saw in Section B of this Part, Dworkin's solution-that in both easy cases and hard cases judges use the same
approach to try to find the right answer, which has a real existence"solves" the indeterminacy problem only in some metaphysical sense.
Dworkin has no useful practical prescriptions given the facts of complexity and diversity.
In the Postscript, Hart fleshes out his own answer (arguably
implicit in the main body of The Concept of Law). Hart characterizes
the zone of the judge's discretion-even in hard cases-as small. He
writes:
[N]ot only are the judge's powers subject to many constraints narrowing his choice from which a legislature may be quite free, but
161 Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 Ethics 278, 278
(2001) (arguing that Hart failed to understand or dispose of legal realism).
162 See Hart, supra note 119, at 274 (endorsing view that judge's law-making task is
"interstitial").
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since the judge's powers are exercised only to dispose of particular
instant cases he cannot use these to introduce large-scale reforms or
new codes. So his powers are interstitial as well as subject to many
163
substantive constraints.

This response should sound familiar from our discussion of judicial restraint 164 and eclecticism

165

in constitutional law. Like those

who preach these approaches, Hart believes that judicial power, properly understood and exercised as a craft, leaves judges a tolerably
small range of options. Therefore, we need not worry about the legiti-

macy of their decisions.
The exegesis to this point has aimed at recharacterizing the Hart/

Dworkin debate as turning on a disagreement about metaphysics and
nomenclature, but not on practical details. At the metaphysical level,
Dworkin contends that there are right answers in hard cases, but he
offers no mechanism by which a judge may persuade those who reasonably dissent from the judge's view. Thus, a Dworkinian judge
decides cases as though he were exercising discretion, regardless of
whether, for metaphysical purposes, one insists that the decision is not
an exercise of discretion. And although Dworkin would likely resist
characterizing his theory in these terms, one can see his principle of
integrity-the requirement that decisions fit within the overall struc-

ture of the legal system including its past decisions-as doing much
the same work as Hart's assertion that the law's areas of open texture
are relatively small. In both accounts, judges are constrained by
1 66
formal and informal limits on their power.

Critics of Dworkin have argued that integrity as he applies it is
virtually no constraint at all-that Dworkin's own principles of political justice almost always swamp criteria of fit. 16 7 In response, one
Id. at 273.
See supra Part II.B.
165 See supra Part II.G.
166 This is a point I already have made about Hart. See supra text accompanying notes
123-28. Here is a statement by Dworkin to the same effect: "[C]onstitutional interpretation is disciplined .. by the requirement of constitutional integrity .... [Judges] must
regard themselves as partners with other officials, past and future, who together elaborate
a coherent constitutional morality, and they must take care to see that what they contribute
fits with the rest." Dworkin, supra note 47, at 10 (emphasis omitted).
167 For example, Michael McConnell has suggested that, by contrast with "[t]he
Dworkin of Fit[,] . ..[t]he Dworkin of Right Answers ...insists that text, history, and
unwelcome precedent must be interpreted at a sufficiently abstract level that they do not
interfere with the judge's ability to... produce the best answers, defined philosophically."
Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on
Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, 1270
(1997).
163
164
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But Dworkin

does not even say how it is that the requirement of fit constrains what
looks to a non-Dworkinian like judicial discretion. 169 In this respect,
Dworkin and Hart are left in the same position. Each claims that the
practices of Anglo-American adjudication sufficiently constrain
judges so as not to call into question the legitimacy of those practices,
but neither offers a persuasive argument to support the claim. Hart
offers no argument at all, simply making the claim as though it were

self-evident, while Dworkin's account tends to undermine rather than
support the conclusion that integrity operates as a substantial constraint on subjective value choices of judges.
D.

The Legal Process

There is, however, an account of law, indeed a whole school of
thought, that purports to show how the legal process constrains judicial discretion within tolerable bounds even while permitting the
effectuation of the law's human ends. I refer, of course, to the Legal
Process School. For Hart and Sacks, the purpose of judges, indeed of
law itself, is to allocate decisionmaking authority among competing
institutions. In those cases that fall within the courts' own circumscribed domain of ultimate decisionmaking, the Legal Process view
treats the distinctive comparative advantage of the judiciary as its
ability-using the defining tools of legal craft-to render decisions
according to principle rather than discretion or subjective policy
170
judgment.

That Dworkin's work falls within the Hart and Sacks tradition has

been widely noted. 17 1 As William Eskridge and Gary Peller have

168 James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1335,
1349 (1997).
169 Fleming argues that "Dworkin's theory of fidelity as integrity is the best conception
of fidelity," id., but concedes that "Dworkin himself may not always satisfactorily do the fit
work that his own theory calls for." Id. Fleming himself has not attempted to fill this gap
in any comprehensive manner.
170 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at143-44 (contrasting exercise of discretion by judiciary with that by executive officials). Herbert Wechsler, who collaborated with Henry
Hart on what is in many ways the companion text to The Legal Process, The FederalCourts
and the Federal System (1st ed. 1950), famously referred to such principles as "neutral."
See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 17 (1959) (arguing that Constitution should be interpreted "so far as possible ...by
standards that transcend the case at hand"). Although the Hart and Sacks materials consistently advance a view of law that is deeply proceduralist, they do not insist on the neutrality of the principles the courts employ. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 144
(conceding that judicial decisionmaking involves value judgments).
171 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical
Introduction to The Legal Process, in Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at li,
cxvii (noting that
Dworkin has "followed" Hart and Sacks's "distinction between principle and policy");
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observed, "Dworkin's theory relies on the legal process distinction
between 'policies' and 'principles' and on the importance of coherence
arguments in law." 172 Perhaps because of this association, 173 the con-

nections between H.L.A. Hart's positivism and the Legal Process
School have been largely overlooked.
No doubt, H.L.A. Hart's famous debate with Lon Fuller 174 has
also played a role in obscuring the resonance between The Legal
Process materials of Hart and Sacks and H.L.A. Hart's The Concept

of Law. In the 1940s and 1950s, Fuller and Henry Hart formed a veritable "mutual admiration society."' 175 It was thus natural for jurisprudents and legal historians to assume that Hart and Sacks shared
Fuller's anti-positivist credo, that "to distinguish sharply between the

rule as it is, and the rule as it ought to be, is to resort to an abstraction
foreign to the raw data which experience offers us."'176 Yet that
assumption was in error, for as early as 1950, Henry Hart had "spun
away from Fuller's natural law view ... and toward a new kind of
positivism '' 177 that closely resembled the soft positivism of H.L.A.
Hart's Postscript.178
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a
Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 707, 731 (1991) (observing "close link
between Dworkin's theory and the legal process synthesis"); Vincent A. Wellman,
Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart and Sacks, 29 Ariz. L. Rev.
413, 413 (1987) (arguing that "Dworkin's approach to a number of problems in legal theory
can be linked to what legal scholars sometimes call the Legal Process school").
172 Eskridge & Peller, supra note 171, at 731.
173 The extent to which Hart and Sacks influenced Dworkin has perhaps been exaggerated. As Neil Duxbury observes, although an "echo of Hart and Sacks certainly emanates
from the writings of Dworkin ... it is very much one echo among many." Neil Duxbury,
Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 Cardozo L. Rev.
601, 703 (1993).
174 See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958) (defending positivism from criticisms of its insistence on distinguishing positive law from law as it ought to be); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958) (criticizing Hart for ignoring
internal "morality of order" necessary to creation of law itself).
175 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 171, at lxxxiii.
176 Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself 10 (1940). Fuller also anticipated
Dworkin's idea of law as a chain novel, providing the analogy of the retelling of a story by
one who has heard it. See id. at 8-9.
177 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 171, at lxxxv; see also Albert M. Sacks, Lon Luvois
Fuller, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 349, 349 (1978) (stating that Fuller's "views fit most comfortably
among natural law thinkers"). But cf. Frederick Schauer, Fuller on the Ontological Status
of Law, in Willem J. Witteveen & Wibren van der Burg, Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on
Implicit Law and Institutional Design 124, 126-28 (1999) (noting shared commitment of
Fuller and H.L.A. Hart to possibility of evaluating law by independent standards of
morality).
178 To be sure, there are passages of The Legal Process that appear to take aim at the
positivist project of separating law and morality. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 107-10.
But they do so in a peculiar fashion. Hart and Sacks say that the distinction between law,
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Accordingly, if we put aside the alignments of familiar debates,

we can see how The Legal Process bids to do the work of constraining
discretion that The Concept of Law assumes takes place but does not
describe in any detail.' 79 We can see in The Legal Process an effort to
operationalize what H.L.A. Hart would (very shortly) afterwards call
the "rule of recognition." 180 In the opening pages of The Legal
Process, (Henry) Hart and Sacks write of the procedures used by
every modern society to allocate decisionmaking authority: "Implicit
in every such system of procedures is the central idea of law-an idea
which can be described as the principle of institutionalsettlement."'81
That principle means simply "that decisions which are the duly arrived
at result of duly established procedures .. ought to be accepted as

binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly
1

changed."

82

It is not much of an overstatement to say that the principle of
institutional settlement performs the same role in The Legal Process
as the rule of recognition performs in The Concept of Law. Each
grounds the authority of law in social acceptance of a master rule or
principle allocating authority among various institutional actors. The
rule of law is, in each account, the submission to duly constituted
183
authority.
as reflected in an institutional settlement, and morals, is really a distinction "between one
aspect of morals in relation to law and another. For the proposition that settled law should
be respected, until it is duly changed-that a decision is in some sense 'right' simply
because it has been duly made-is itself an ethical concept .... " Id. at 109. In other
words, where the principle of institutional settlement operates, law and morals are inseparable, but only because Hart and Sacks believe that there is a moral duty to obey the law.
If one puts aside that moral duty, it becomes clear that Hart and Sacks admit of the possibility of separating law and morality, and it is only that possibility to which soft positivism
is committed.
179 Eskridge and Frickey recount that in the 1956-1957 academic year, H.L.A. Hart
attended a Harvard legal philosophy discussion group featuring most of the major players
in public law, including (Henry) Hart and Sacks. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 171, at c.
Both Harts presented papers on discretion, to be discussed together. Id. at c-ci. Although
H.L.A. Hart's paper has been lost, Eskridge and Frickey speculate, based on a memorandum that was preserved, that it probably contended (as a concession) "that much discretion could not be controlled by law." Id. at ci.
180 Hart, supra note 119, at 94.
181Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 4.
182 Id.
183 It is nonetheless a bit of an overstatement to equate Hart's rule of recognition with
the principle of institutional settlement in Hart and Sacks. For the rule of recognition is a
social fact that may be good or bad-recall that Hart wants to give a sociological, i.e.,
descriptive, account of law-whereas Hart and Sacks defend the principle of institutional
settlement in normative terms. Accordingly, I do not claim that Hart and Sacks were positivists. See Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1138, 1155-58
(1999) (reviewing Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence (1998))
(challenging Sebok's claim that Hart and Sacks held positivist commitments).
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Whereas H.L.A. Hart insists on the existence of a rule of recognition, in The Legal Process Hart and Sacks offer guidance on how in

any given setting, one moves from the general principle of institutional settlement to deciding which institutional actor has authority to
make a decision in some particular case, and whether that actor's decision falls within the bounds of its authority. The answer, understandably, is complex, but at bottom it amounts to legal craft.
The first step in the Hart and Sacks conception of legal craft is an
awareness of the problem-solving limitations of the judiciary. Thus,
the punch line of the case study with which The Legal Process
opens-the case of the spoiled cantaloupes-is a judicial decision to
defer to agency decisionmaking, even though the court plainly would
have chosen a different outcome if reviewing the case de novo. 184 But

deference is not the end of the story, for courts must decide to which
institution to defer in any given case-legislature or administrative
agency; federal, state, or local body; public or private actor-and
sometimes they must decide not to defer, especially when there is
some defect in the decisionmaking process employed by the entity
seeking deference.

Accordingly, as the academic literature generally acknowledges,
within the Hart and Sacks framework, ascertaining the proper alloca-

tion of authority is the very point of law and thus also the master skill
of legal policymakers, lawyers, and ultimately judges.185 Yet strikingly, The Legal Process materials nowhere state the meta-principle of

institutional allocation of decisionmaking authority. As Eskridge and
Frickey note, "[l]egal process thinkers had no theory of law's 'profes184 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 57-58 (reproducing L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph
Martinelli & Co., 169 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1948)). We know the court would have reached a
different result if left to its own devices because it in fact did just that in L. Gillarde Co. v.
Joseph Martinelli & Co., 168 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1948), reproduced in Hart & Sacks, supra
note 6, at 53-56, before reversing itself in response to a submission by the Federal Department of Agriculture in connection with a petition for rehearing.
185 See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 171, at xciii ("Where private ordering does
not work well enough, Hart and Sacks contemplate an interaction between private and
public institutions, with their roles allocated according to their relative 'competence' to
handle the matter... [and] through the choice of rules versus standards."); Carl Landauer,
Deliberating Speed: Totalitarian Anxieties and Postwar Legal Thought, 12 Yale J.L. &
Human. 171, 214 (2000) (describing Hart and Sacks view of law as "a system of allocation"); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 636-37 (1996) (referring to "the
relatively subjective Hart and Sacks methodology [of] determin[ing] a 'reasonable' allocation of interpretive authority"). The same point has been made with respect to other
classic texts of the Legal Process School. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on
the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 953, 962 (1994) ("As defined by Hart
and Wechsler, the central, organizing question of Federal Courts doctrine involves allocations of authority ....").
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sional culture' that suggested how it constrains judges. ' 186 But this
was not a careless omission by Hart and Sacks. Instead of providing a
theory, their materials exemplify a method. Only by absorbing the lessons of all 1380 pages of the published edition, which Hart and Sacks
themselves still regarded as tentative, can aspiring lawyers/policymakers/judges begin to acquire the subtle, tacit knowledge that
enables them to play their chosen roles.
Thus, to return to our main theme, the discretion of a judge who
has learned the lessons of The Legal Process will be safely bounded.
Hart and Sacks offer Dworkin a picture of law in which the requirements of fit are tight enough to assuage doubts about law's legitimacy,
even without the metaphysical aid of the right-answers thesis. At the
same time, by encompassing allocational decisions within the lawyer's
toolbox, The Legal Process appears to make good on H.L.A. Hart's
claim that the law's areas of open texture are manageably small.
The problem, conventional wisdom holds, is that the Hart and
Sacks method does not work. From the right, public choice theory
challenged the central premise of the Hart and Sacks approach to statutory interpretation-that there is such a thing as a legislative purpose
beyond the compromises among the competing goals of competing
187
interest groups who sought or fought the legislation in question.
From the left, within a decade after its publication, The Legal Process
was attacked as hopelessly naive in its assumption that American law
could be deemed fair on procedural grounds without attention to how,
in both substance and procedure, it systematically favored the interests of the strong over the weak. 188 The upshot of both the right and
left critiques was that The Legal Process approach functioned only so
long as there was a broad consensus about social goals-as there
arguably was in the decade and a half after the Second World Warbut could not deal with the fractious world that followed. 189
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 171, at cxx.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 540
(1983) ("Almost all statutes are compromises, and the cornerstone of many a compromise
is the decision, usually unexpressed, to leave certain issues unresolved."); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective,
18 J.L. & Econ. 875, 877 (1975) (describing "the economists' version of the interest-group
theory of government").
188 For a summary of the criticism, focusing on student papers by, among others,
Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 171, at cxviiicxxi. In form, Kennedy's and Unger's critiques closely resemble the criticism that would
later be leveled against John Hart Ely's procedural account of constitutional law. See
supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
189 See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern
America 260 (1976) (describing The Legal Process as "perfectly attuned to the end-ofideology politics of the Cold War"); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 171, at cxviii-cxxv
186
187
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That, at any rate, is the more or less conventional narrative. Yet

these criticisms are ultimately unfair to the Hart and Sacks project.
Most prominently, their method does not assume consensus. Quite

the opposite, as scholars whose primary focus was private law, Hart
and Sacks were well aware of both the ubiquity of conflict and the
diversity of interests in human affairs. They understood that law must
accommodate the often competing interests of producers, distributors,
wholesalers, retailers, and consumers, taking account of the parallel
competition among federal, state, and local regulators acting through
legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial channels. The whole
idea of understanding law as a system for allocating authority reflects
the centrality of conflict in the Hart and Sacks view.

To be sure, right-wing critics of the regulatory state can object
that the Hart and Sacks method makes the unrealistic assumption of
panoptic knowledge on the part of the regulator, and there is consid-

erable truth in this criticism. Their New Deal faith in the expertise of
administrators as neutral scientists has not worn well.' 90 Yet even
here, the criticism goes too far. For one thing, Hart and Sacks saw the

domain of regulation as small, generally preferring private ordering in
the first instance. 191

In addition, it is hardly clear that the solutions proposed by the
right are preferable to those proposed by Hart and Sacks. Hart and

Sacks generally believed that effective regulation requires intimate
familiarity with and accommodation of the practices of the regulated
actors. 192 In private law, this translated into an approach that is some(describing end of consensus in 1960s and rise of scarcity theory of economics in 1970s as
fostering public choice theory of politics, "the most serious challenge to the legal process
approach"). Because Eskridge and Frickey see the Hart and Sacks method as dependent
upon consensus, they view its revival in the 1980s as reflecting a movement back towards
moderation in public life. See id. at cxxv-cxxvi.
190 Although I have characterized the criticism of Hart and Sacks for placing too much
faith in bureaucratic expertise as coming from the "right," liberals also fear the growth of
unchecked administrative power. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 941, 1012 (1999) ("Public
bureaucracy and expertise ...have not dealt with many of the problems the New Deal
reformers hoped to curtail-especially, the growing powerlessness of individual's [sic] in a
society dominated by large impersonal conglomerates of power.").
191See Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 161 (restating "[t]he thesis that private ordering is
the primary process of social adjustment, in the dynamics of a legal system").
192 See, e.g., id. at 118 ("A cardinal principle in dealing with every type of legal arrangement is to keep steadily in view the kinds of people to whom the directions of the arrangement in question are initially addressed-who the people are, in other words, who are
expected to act or refrain from acting in accordance with the arrangement if it works successfully, and under what circumstances they are to act."); see also id. at 119 ("Directions
have to be understood in the light of the circumstances in which they are given, and one of
the most significant of all the circumstances is the position of the person who is supposed
to carry out the direction.").
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thing like that of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which
gives primacy to merchant practice. 93 In public law, it meant purposi94
vism in statutory interpretation.
By contrast, in both domains, the right now urges formalism. In
private law, formalism is proposed as a means of providing economic
actors with clear end-game rules that reduce uncertainty and promote
efficiency. 195 The best developed and most careful such account is
given by Lisa Bernstein, who grounds her tentative proposals in
empirical studies of merchant practices regarding various commodities.' 96 Whether her findings apply to the special-purpose goods that
account for an increasing proportion of economic activity in a world of
flexible production remains to be seen. In any event, even if the work
of Bernstein and others calls into question Karl Llewellyn's assumptions in drafting the U.C.C., it leaves the Hart and Sacks approach
largely intact, for they saw the law's role as largely facilitating private
transactions-and, perhaps in contrast to Llewellyn, they had no
objection to enforcing formal rules in circumstances where such
197
enforcement had demonstrable benefits.
193 See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-202, 2-316, 2-504, 2-723 (2000) (prescribing deference to
"courses of dealing" and "usages of trade" in various contexts).
194 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 1121 (asking rhetorically whether "the enactment
of every statute is, of necessity, a purposive act [such] that no statute can be properly
interpreted without considering the purpose which ought to be attributed to it").
195 See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law,
66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 781, 785 (1999) (suggesting "that the type of flexibility that the Code
potentially promotes is one that often makes contractual parties worse off"); Lisa
Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 770 (1999) (arguing that because "relationshipcreating and relationship-preserving norms are likely to differ in content and structure
from the optimal endgame norms for a tribunal to apply in the event of a dispute,...
merchants do not want either their relationship-specific courses of performance and
courses of dealing or their every-day customary practices ...written into the law" (footnotes omitted)); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26
J. Legal Stud. 377, 406-08 (1997) (arguing that although "the average efficiency of the practices identified by commercial norms will increase over time," there is "no basis for inferring that commercial practices will be even nearly optimal on average"); Eric A. Posner,
Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1698 (1996) (criticizing
"the view that the norms of closely knit groups are efficient" and arguing for laws that
differ from custom on ground "that under a variety of plausible conditions, the state-in
particular, its legislatures and courts-produces rules that are more efficient than group
norms and, furthermore, that help correct the deficiencies of group norms").
196 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1769-70 (1996) (grain and
feed); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 115 (1992) (diamonds); Bernstein, supra
note 195, at 715 (hay, grain and feed, textiles, and silk).
197 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 139 ("Innumerable legal rules do manage th[e]
miracle of successful operation in many if not most of their applications."). I say "perhaps
in contrast to Llewellyn" because although Llewellyn was a well-known rule-skeptic, see,
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In public law, the right urges formalism as a means of, among
other things, disciplining legislators. For example, Justice Scalia's crusade against the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation
aims at reforming legislative practices that, he and his fellow travelers
say, enable interest groups to obtain the benefits of legislation without
the full measure of legislative enactment.

98

Yet it hardly follows that

courts, in the name of respect for the decisions of the elected
branches, are the appropriate institution to discipline the legislative
process. 199 Symbolism aside, legislative practices, to say nothing of
the administrative practices that also fall within the purview of judicial

canons of construction, are complex and refractory. It is for just this
reason that so much of the Hart and Sacks material addresses matters
of institutional detail. Even with a strong inclination to defer to the
appropriate institutional settlement, a judge operating within the Hart

and Sacks paradigm attempts to learn the details of the legislative process that produced a statute, the administrative process that produced
a rulemaking or adjudication pursuant to that statute, and the sphere
of primary activity (such as the trade in fresh cantaloupes) regulated.
It may turn out that in certain contexts, application of this method will
lead an astute judge or legislator to favor formalism, but for Hart and
Sacks, that is always because of particulars, rather than a general commitment to formalism.

e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401 (1950)
(making famous argument that "there are two opposing canons [of statutory construction]
on almost every point"), the U.C.C. does include a goodly number of rules, notwithstanding its preference for industry practice.
198 See Scalia, supra note 79, at 34 ("[T]he more courts have relied upon legislative
history, the less worthy of reliance it has become ....
One of the routine tasks of the
Washington lawyer-lobbyist is to draft language that sympathetic legislators can recite in a
prewritten 'floor debate'-or, even better, insert into a committee report."); John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 687-88 (1997)
(noting that textualist judges like Justice Scalia believe that "once legislators become aware
that legislative history influences courts, they and their agents (the staff) will try to achieve
desired outcomes through the lower-cost mechanism of legislative history" (footnote
omitted)).
199 Nor is it clear that judicial efforts to discipline legislative practices are consistent with
the primacy that formalists (and others) purport to give to legislation. See Bernard W.
Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L.
Rev. 1253, 1271 (2000) (noting that formalist "willingness to review legislative judgments
appears to conflict with the deference that the courts in general, and [formalists] in particular, accord legislative judgments in a wide variety of contexts"). But cf. Jane S. Schacter,
Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 593, 613-46 (1995) (arguing that courts should adopt interpretive methods
that promote particular conceptions of democracy, although not championing formalist
interpretive methods).
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If the right has not proved the superiority of a thoroughgoing formalism over the Hart and Sacks approach, 200 neither has the left
advanced its own program. And that is largely because, as we saw in
our discussion of critical approaches to constitutional interpretation,201 the left has no program-in the sense of an approach to adju-

dication that faithfully seeks to render adjudication legitimate.
Duncan Kennedy's A Critique of Adjudication202 is instructive.
Throughout the book, Kennedy treats Hart and Sacks as laying the
groundwork for Dworkin's coherentism, which Kennedy relentlessly
criticizes. 20 3 Ultimately, however, Kennedy can propose only three
options: One can passively lament; one can pretend to accept the
law's claims to autonomy while surreptitiously advancing a particular
ideological agenda; or one can struggle to bring the law's deep ambiguity into the open.20 4 This counsel of despair is hardly an alternative
to the Hart and Sacks method, even if one thinks (as I do not) that it
thoroughly discredits that method.
The great strength of the Hart and Sacks approach, which enables
it to withstand attacks from both the right and the left, is its emphasis
on the law as a vehicle for coordinating the activities of actors with
diverse interests and skills. Hart and Sacks anticipated a time-our
own-when one of the master skills of the lawyer would be coordinating the activities of and cooperating with others, including many
non-lawyers. In this sense, they partially anticipated a new, emerging
conception of a professional, for The Legal Process was meant as a
sophisticated training device for aspiring legal professionals. In the
traditional conception, professionals bring to bear highly specialized
skills on highly specialized problems; in the new model envisioned
here, professionals (including lawyers) are generalists, whose principal
skill is their ability to collaborate across disciplinary boundaries to

200 Viewed from the institutional perspective, formalism's superiority could only be
demonstrated by an approach that recognized the complexity of the world in which either
formal rules or flexible principles must operate. In my view, Adrian Vermeule states the
best set of arguments along these lines. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74 (2000). As I read Vermeule, however, his endorsement of thoroughgoing formalism is provisional and would be defeasible in particular domains in which
functionalism (or some other non-formalist approach) were demonstrably superior. In this
respect, his view simply reverses the Hart and Sacks presumption in favor of functionalism.
Vermeule does not disagree with their view that the interpretive approach should fit the
circumstances; he simply believes that formalism is a better default than functionalism.
201 See supra Part II.F.
202 Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de sicle (1997).
203 See id. at 33-35, 75, 118, 120-24, 196.
204 See id. at 374-76.
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solve problems.20 5 But Hart and Sacks only just barely hinted at this
new role, as the next Section explains.
E.

The Limits of the Legal Process Paradigm

In one important respect, the new conception of the legal professional (which I have described elsewhere) 20 6 is continuous with the
conception one might extrapolate from the Hart and Sacks materials,

for it takes as a starting point the implicit subtext of The Legal
Process: An appropriate resolution of a legal problem requires a
thorough understanding of how that problem looks from the perspective of all the actors involved. Yet in important respects, Hart and
Sacks did not break with the old model of the professional.
Hart and Sacks conceptualized the understandings necessary for
lawyers to collaborate across disciplinary boundaries as tacit. That is
why, recall, The Legal Process does not set out the lawyer's skills so
much as it exemplifies them. However, tacitness renders the lawyer's
art opaque to outsiders. And that opaqueness may prevent law from
performing its necessary legitimating function.
I can put this point in a way that returns us to the main currents
of jurisprudence. Recall that H.L.A. Hart thought it so obvious that
the law's areas of open texture were tolerably small that he felt no
need to justify this belief. Above I suggested two lines of argument
that might support Hart's view: first, that law partakes of the same
relative clarity as ordinary language; and second, that much of law's
clarity operates hidden away in cases that never arise. 20 7 Hart and
Sacks offer an account of law that perhaps validates H.L.A. Hart's
assumption in a third way. It does so through craft.
How so? Even in the aftermath of legal realism and critical legal
studies, relatively few practicing lawyers think that law in general or
constitutional law in particular is so indeterminate as to call into question every judicial exercise of power in the law's name. To be sure,
lawyers can be a cynical lot, and thus most will be critical of particular
decisions-but this fact only underscores my claim: Criticism typically
assumes a departure from some correct outcome or range of outcomes; were law profoundly indeterminate, there would be no such
20 8
baseline against which to measure failure.
205 See Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 29, at 859-65 (contrasting old
and new conceptions of "profession" with respect to drug treatment courts).
206 See id.

207 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
208 See Michael C. Dorf, Is There a Distinction Between Law and Politics? Yes, and the
Bush v. Gore Decision Proves It (Dec. 27, 2000), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/
20001227.html ("If law were just politics, it would be meaningless to criticize a judicial
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The predominant view in the profession, in other words, asserts
that skilled lawyers know the range of legitimate outcomes, even in
hard cases. If asked to articulate the general principles that limit the
law's areas of open texture to a tolerably small domain, they may well
be dumbstruck; and yet they are equally likely to be able to invoke an
entire range of training and experience in the law. Learning to think
like a lawyer, in this view, means learning to provide what Hart and
Sacks called "reasoned elaboration" of some particular allocation of
institutional authority or judgment. 209 But to see that this process sufficiently fixes the range of outcomes to avoid illegitimacy requires the
sort of familiarity with specific cases that can only be acquired by
careful study (of, for example, The Legal Process) and years of
experience.
Accordingly, the knowledge that the discretion of judges is satisfactorily cabined is available to lawyers but not to the general public.
And that fact itself raises questions about the possibility of legitimate
power in a democracy where most citizens lack legal training.
Perhaps this objection can be answered. One might point,
uneasily, to the nafve formalism of the general public: As any experienced teacher of first-semester law students knows, to an even
greater extent than the most devoted acolyte of Hart and Sacks, most
of the lay public believe that there are techno-professional methods
available for discerning the proper resolution of most legal disputes,
even if they also believe that knowledge of such methods is the quasiexclusive domain of the initiates. 210
This solution-the people believe in the gods and the gods exist,
but the people's belief in them rests only on a leap of faith-is, at best,
uncomfortable. It is made considerably worse by doubts about the
nature of the gods. Hart and Sacks assumed that the sorts of conflict
that law was needed to resolve would occur principally along economic lines: management versus labor, producer versus consumer,
and so forth. When new lines of conflict emerged-most prominently
decision as political, and all the Court's decisions would seem equally 'political' to
observers."). The critics have a response here as well: What fixes the range of legitimate
outcomes is convention, not logic. See Singer, supra note 90, at 22 ("Convention, rather
than logic, tells us that judges will not interpret the Constitution to require socialism.").
What this answer shows, however, is not clear, because no one-and certainly not Hart and
Sacks-asserted that law's determinacy depends on logic alone. Given the conventional
nature of language itself, how could it?
209 Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 143.
210 In my experience, students arrive at law school as nalive formalists. Much of their
legal education aims to convert them into cynical legal realists, but the process does not
take. Many may flirt with radical realism, but most end up believing that constraint comes
from the lawyer's craft.
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in the form of the Civil Rights movement and successor rights movements-it became clear that deference to one or another existing institutional settlement would pit substantive justice against the notion of
a circumscribed judicial role. Issues of racial inequality had, of course,
been central to the entire American experience, but it was not until
the Warren Court that the vindication of the fundamental rights of
citizens (other than property rights) came to be understood as a basic
function of courts.
On these questions, however, The Legal Process was at best
silent. The 1958 materials make no mention of Brown v. Board of
Education, decided just four years earlier. And on the question of
apportionment, which was soon to become the second great front of
the Warren Court's assault on judicial passivity, Hart and Sacks
strongly implied that courts should do nothing about patently
211
undemocratic legislatures.
The conventional account of Hart and Sacks faults them on this
score for defining legal legitimacy in solely procedural terms, a move,
it is said, characteristic of the post-World War II era. In this account,
Legal Process School thinkers wanted to retain the modernist legacy
of legal realism, while at the same time distancing their sociological
jurisprudence from Nazism, fascism, and communist totalitarianism.
The solution was a sharp distinction between is and ought, between
procedure and substance. 212 On this view, Hart and Sacks could not
condemn racial apartheid on substantive grounds; thus, Henry Hart's
collaborator Herbert Wechsler was left unsuccessfully trying to muster
213
the energy to justify Brown in terms of a right of association.
211 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 672-86. Although Hart and Sacks do not formally
endorse a position, their rhetorical questions suggest, to this reader at least, a disposition
similar to Justice Frankfurter's:
Is there any escape from the conclusion that the composition of a state legislature is a constitutional problem in the elementary sense of having to do with
the basic structure of the body politic? Does it not then follow that the
problem is appropriate for solution only by the basic process of constitution
making? Should a people who lack the political wisdom to establish a sound
constitution for themselves expect to be able to shuffle off their deficiencies
simply by running for help to the Magi on the bench?
Id. at 686.
212 See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 561, 566-86
(1988) (noting that Legal Process School thinkers "chang[ed] the focus for critical evaluation from the substance to the process").
213 See Wechsler, supra note 170, at 31-35 ("Given a situation where the state must

practically choose between denying the association to those individuals who wish it or
imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis in neutral principles for holding
that the Constitution demands [the latter]? I should like to think there is, but I confess
that I have not yet written the opinion.").
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There is some truth to this line of analysis and criticism. The Hart
2 14
and Sacks materials were rooted in the assumptions of their age.
But at the same time, the criticism rests on something of a mischaracterization of The Legal Process. Hart and Sacks were well

aware that judgments about procedural fairness rested upon and
implicated substantive value judgments, as, for example, their
embrace of purposivism in statutory interpretation clearly reflects.
Where they went wrong was their assumption-perhaps reasonable in
its time-that America had generated all of the institutions necessary
to resolve the conflicts likely to emerge, or at worst, that the needed
institutions could be found among the menu of arrangements
2 15
throughout the world.
What Hart and Sacks did not contemplate was the possibility of
new sorts of public institutions whose job it would be, not to resolve
legal ambiguity, but to foster continual deliberation and experimenta-

tion.2 1 6 The next Part of this Article sketches these new institutions,
with an emphasis on how their judicial version might ameliorate the

indeterminacy problem. Before offering my account of experimentalist judging, however, I should note that the limitations of the Hart
and Sacks model that I have identified are not offered as a criticism of

them in particular. On the contrary, as I have endeavored to show
above, all of the participants in the constitutional and jurisprudential
debates have long assumed that the institutions of democracy are
fixed, and that the central questions are always: First, in which institution should the discretion necessary to resolve legal ambiguity be
lodged? And second, how can any such allocation be squared with the
competing goals of constraining overzealous government and con-

straining overzealous judges bent on imposing limits on other government actors? By focusing attention on the details of allocational
214 However, as noted above, I disagree with the suggestion by Eskridge and Frickey
that The Legal Process was rooted in a belief that American politics had reached a broad
consensus. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 171, at xcviii (calling The Legal Process
"the classic exposition of the post-war consensus in public law"). The classic general work
is Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (1955) (arguing that spectrum of politics
is considerably narrower in United States than in Europe because, while true conservatism
and socialism are viable forces in latter, in United States all serious political opinion begins
with liberal premises of free markets and democracy).
215 Accordingly, in the final section on the case of the spoiled cantaloupes, Hart and
Sacks pursue "The Problem from an Olympian Point of View." See Hart & Sacks, supra
note 6, at 67-68. It turns out that the gods on Olympus, as envisaged by Hart and Sacks,
compare the institutional arrangement in the United States with what then existed in
western Europe and the Soviet Union. Id.
216 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis
of Legal Orthodoxy 254 (1992) (characterizing "focus on 'institutional competence' as the
basis for the distribution of legal tasks among various legal actors" as one of most distinctive features of Hart and Sacks).
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decisions, Hart and Sacks permit us to see the "fixity" assumption,
and its limits, more clearly than the other thinkers we have
217
examined.
To see the fixity assumption and its limits in the Hart and Sacks
approach, let us return to the core of that approach by considering
how the concept of institutional settlement does double duty in The
Legal Process. The principle of institutional settlement is, as
explained above, 218 simply Hart and Sacks's statement of H.L.A.
Hart's positivist credo: Primary and secondary actors alike must defer
to decisions reached by duly authorized institutions following proper
procedures, regardless of the content of those decisions. Beyond this
general principle, Hart and Sacks also frequently refer to particular
institutional settlements. Used in this way, an institutional settlement
refers to the resolution of some concrete question, such as whether
the buyer or seller bears the risk of loss due to spoliation in the
absence of contractual agreement. Combining these two concepts, we
see that the principle of institutional settlement means that particular
institutional settlements "ought to be accepted as binding upon the
'219
whole society unless and until they are duly changed.
For present purposes, the crucial word here is "until," which
reveals the fixed quality of law as Hart and Sacks envision it. Of
course, the law changes, but-like the market in standard economic
models-the law as envisioned by Hart and Sacks moves instantaneously from one equilibrium to the next.
Nor is this static quality a mere accidental, and thus easily
removed, piece of the Hart and Sacks architecture. Rather, it is essen220
tial to their purposivist, and thus, coherentist, picture of law.
Coherentism requires a judgment about what interpretation makes
the law best hang together. Yet such a judgment seems impossible if
the law is in a constant state of disequilibrium. A system in disequilibrium is, almost by definition, one that does not hang together

217 Cf. Duxbury, supra note 173, at 667 ("Hart and Sacks may have been complacent in
assuming the adequacy of the existing American institutional framework, and they were
certainly wrong to assume a general social consensus concerning the goal of maximization.
But it was not their claim that all is well with the legal world.").
218 See supra text accompanying notes 174-83.
219 See Hart & Sacks, supra note 6, at 4.
220 To see why purposivism entails coherentism, contrast the former with the public
choice account of lawmaking, in which the law is rarely more than an incoherent bundle of
compromises. By contrast, the purposivist lawyer or judge assumes that there is a
coherent, unifying account of any given statute, and ultimately, of the law generally, from
which particular applications can be derived.
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coherently. At least temporary fixity appears necessary for
221
coherence.
Coherentism thus understood also entails tacitness. Suppose
Judge Earl says that notwithstanding the absence of any prohibitory
statutory language, a grandson who poisons his grandfather is not
legally entitled to the inheritance otherwise due him. 222 Judge Gray
disagrees. How can one show that Judge Earl is correct-that the
principle that no one should profit from one's own wrong should prevail over the seemingly plain language of the statute and thus the
equally lofty principle of legislative primacy? The coherentist answer,
argued at length by Dworkin 223 (operating in this sense more or less
within the Hart and Sacks paradigm), is to appeal to other principles
the listener holds dear, and to show, step by step, why Judge Earl's

answer is preferable to Judge Gray's.
Ultimately, however, coherentist arguments are rarely decisive,
for it is always possible to assert that some other set of answers hangs
together as well or better when organized by some other set of principles.224 That coherentism broadly conceived is nonetheless a widely
used (perhaps the most commonly used) methodology in American
law reveals that there are widely shared understandings about what
makes a set of arguments and outcomes cohere with one another. But
those shared understandings cannot be expressly articulated-for if
they could, then they could be argued as such in the effort to induce
the listener to adopt one rather than another coherentist solution.
221 Unless, perhaps, one thinks that law's dynamism itself arises out of efforts by judges
to smooth over local variations as agents of the law working itself pure. See Dworkin,
supra note 21, at 400-03 (arguing that judge's obligation to interpret legal practice as whole
can give rise to changes in prevailing view of extant law). Still, even if such processes
account for some of the law's dynamism, it is difficult to believe that the project of fostering integrity-rather than the constantly changing circumstances of human interactions
and conflicts-accounts for most of the law's dynamism.
222 See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190-91 (N.Y. 1889); see also Hart & Sacks, supra
note 6, at 68-102 (exploring similar fact pattern).
223 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 21, at 225 ("The adjudicative principle of integrity
instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that
they were all created by a single author ... expressing a coherent conception of justice and
fairness.").
224 There is also the problem of what is sometimes called "bad coherence," the notion
that coherence may be achieved around a principle that is morally unattractive. See
Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1699, 1705-11
(1990) (proposing that feminism and pragmatism can correct tendency of institutions to
cohere around oppressive principles). For an argument that coherence theories that accept
precedent will inevitably tend toward bad, or at least morally arbitrary, coherence, see
Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights Thesis,
Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 369, 400-02 (1984)
(describing "ripple effects" to highlight how "dominant theory- of precedent is morally
arbitrary").
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The shared understandings that make coherentism possible are, in
other words, necessarily tacit.
Thus we can identify the linked assumptions of the Hart and
Sacks paradigm:
1. The task of the judge is to identify and defer to institutional settlements;
2. those settlements are fixed, at least until formally
changed using the authoritative procedures (such as constitutional amendment, enactment of new legislation, or promulgation of new regulations) available for changing
institutional settlements;
3. the static nature of the law in between changes in institutional settlements enables the judge to identify the best
answer to any legal question through coherentism, asking
what outcome will best reflect the set of institutional
arrangements taken as a whole, a method Hart and Sacks
call "reasoned elaboration" and that Dworkin calls "integrity";2 25 and
4. coherentism is made possible through the tacit skills that
lawyers and judges 226 acquire by study (of, among other
things, The Legal Process) and experience.

The synthesis embodied in The Legal Process is both elegant and
powerful, more so perhaps than any of the work that builds on or
criticizes it. And it works, in the sense that it does as good a job as
possible at rendering law legitimate given the core assumptions listed
above. The next Part asks what constitutional theory and jurisprudence might become if these assumptions are relaxed. What is the
nature of legal authority when ambiguity opens the way to ongoing
collaboration among institutional actors including, but not limited to,
courts-collaboration in which the institutions' respective means and
ends reciprocally redefine one another?
IV
TOWARD EXPERIMENTALIST JUDGING

This Part describes and assesses what I call experimentalist
judging. It begins by describing a broad class of institutions that go by
225 For the Dworkinian version, substitute "put the law in its best light" for "best reflect
the set of institutional arrangements taken as a whole."
226 As a form of traditional legal education, the Hart and Sacks method prepares students for becoming judges rather than attorneys, even though most students are not
expected ever to serve as judges.
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the name of problem-solving courts. 227 These are courts of first
impression that take their objective to be solving the social problems
that underlie the tip of the various icebergs that appear for adjudication in the form of concrete controversies involving criminal conduct,
drug addiction, family breakdown, and so forth. In a previous article,
Sabel and I described drug courts-to date the most widespread form
of problem-solving court-as an instance of nascent experimentalism. 228 Drug courts in particular and problem-solving courts in general arose to address concrete failures on the ground, rather than as a
response to the institutional limitations of courts as such; nevertheless,
their emerging architecture can address some of those limitations,
even as it raises further questions about the kind of institutions
problem-solving courts are.
After asking whether problem-solving courts are really courts,
this Part sets forth an emerging model of experimentalist appellate
judging.2 29 Building on existing Supreme Court doctrine in the areas
of sexual harassment and criminal procedure, I explain how appellate
courts can simultaneously exercise their power to disentrench problematic practices while leaving room in their decisions for local actors
to experiment with a range of solutions. This Part aims to show how
both the trial and appellate versions of experimentalist judging simultaneously fall within the Hart and Sacks paradigm-as a means of
coordinating activity across professional and institutional boundaries-and break with that tradition-by assuming neither that government institutions are static nor that the courts that interact with them
must operate by reference to necessarily tacit principles.
The Part concludes by explaining how experimentalism can
respond to the indeterminacy problem. First, I draw a distinction
between "big" cases-those that appear to require panoptic knowledge on the part of the judge, thereby presenting the complexity
problem-and "hard" cases-those that call for resolving questions
about which people fundamentally disagree, thereby presenting the
227 A collection of practitioner and other perspectives on problem-solving courts was
recently published in a symposium issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. Symposium,
Problem Solving Courts: From Adversarial Litigation to Innovative Jurisprudence, 29
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1751 (2002).
228 See Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 29.
229 The account builds on some of my earlier work. See Dorf, supra note 32, at 51-79
(proposing "reforms that would enable the Court to do a better job of adjusting its interpretations of authoritative text to new, unforeseen, and changing circumstances"); Dorf &
Friedman, supra note 33, at 107 (arguing that Court should revise constitutional standards
in light of experience of political actors); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 27, at 388-404 (discussing role of courts in experimentalist model); id. at 452-69 (describing "pragmatist"
understanding of rights in existing doctrine and in experimentalist model).
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moral diversity problem. I explain that experimentalism is primarily a
strategy for attacking big cases, but that some seemingly hard cases
will, based upon practical experience, prove to be big cases, and thus
amenable to experimentalist solutions. In the end, the approach I
favor is similar to that taken by both (H.L.A.) Hart and Dworkin in
that it attempts to minimize the domain of legal indeterminacy; however, where Hart and Dworkin ask us to take this proposition on faith,
experimentalism aims to craft institutions that, among their other virtues, in fact shrink the domain of the indeterminacy problem.
A.

Experimentalist Courts of First Impression

Suppose you are a trial judge whose docket mostly consists of
misdemeanor and nonviolent felony charges. What is your job? The
traditional answer is straightforward: You mete out justice. Sometimes you adjudicate guilt or innocence; more frequently, you conduct
a colloquy to ensure that the defendant's guilty plea is voluntary; and
by whichever route a defendant's guilt is determined, you impose a
sentence-time served in jail pending trial, probation, community service, restitution, or perhaps some additional weeks or months in jail.
Over time, however, you notice that many of the defendants
appearing in your courtroom have been there before. You might want
to impose ever-stiffer sanctions, but the prisons are already crowded
with inmates who have committed violent offenses, and in any event, a
lengthy prison sentence strikes you as disproportionate to the offense
in most instances. Thus, you rely on your familiar repertoire of unsuccessful responses to the revolving door of arrest-arraignment-guilty
plea-sentence-release-re-arrest.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, the frustrating circumstances just
described led increasing numbers of judges, prosecutors, and policymakers to explore the long-discarded notion that at least some
criminals can be rehabilitated. 230 Because the majority of lawbreakers
are also illegal drug users, efforts initially focused on drug addiction as
a substantial factor contributing to crime. With support from studies
showing that drug treatment is more cost-effective than imprison230 See Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and
Social Purpose 12-31 (1981) (discussing history of rehabilitation); Morris B. Hoffman,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least
Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 2063, 2079, 2082
(2002) (maintaining that "[b]y 1970 ... the rehabilitative ideal was in theoretical and
empirical shambles" but describing reemergence of rehabilitative ideal beginning in late
1980s); Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1011, 1012 (1991)
(observing that criticisms of rehabilitation beginning in 1960s struck such responsive chord
that by late 1980s "almost everyone involved in the criminal justice system ha[d] rejected
the rehabilitative ideal").
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ment, 231 drug courts emerged as an alternative to cycling nonviolent
offenders through the conventional criminal justice system. The Justice Department under the Clinton Administration provided seed
money for states and localities to establish such courts, a policy that
has continued under President Bush, so that as of late 2002, there
were 946 operating drug courts, with another 441 in the planning
2
stage. 23
What is a drug court? Glossing over important local variations, it
is a court that closely monitors treatment for drug-addicted defendants brought before it. After the defendant pleads guilty (or in some
jurisdictions is found guilty at a trial on the merits) the court sentences
the defendant to a treatment program chosen by the court's clinical
staff based on an assessment of the defendant's needs and in consultation with the defendant. The judge and court personnel then closely
monitor the defendant's progress in treatment, using a system of graduated rewards for successes and punishments-including, ultimately,
the threat of imprisonment-for failures. Defendants who complete
their course of treatment "graduate" in a ceremony that typically
expunges the predicate conviction.
Now suppose that you are a drug court judge. What is your job?
"Meting out justice" is at best a small piece of what you do. You are
fundamentally a problem-solver. Collaborating with your court's own
clinical staff, service providers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, the
police, and others, you attempt to reduce the personal and social cost
of crime committed by drug addicts. But if you are a problem-solver,
you will not be content with evidence that your approach to nonviolent crime fares better than the revolving-door system in the courtroom down the hall. 233 "Better than a broken system" is a low bar
indeed.
231 See generally C. Peter Rydell & Susan S. Everingham, RAND, Controlling Cocaine:
Supply Versus Demand Programs (1994) (finding drug treatment substantially more costeffective than domestic enforcement, source-country control, or interdiction); Drug Treatment Alternative-to-Prison Program, at http://www.brooklynda.org/DTAP/DTAP.htm
(last visited May 16, 2003) (noting that DTAP program resulted in tax savings of $25.9
million) (on file with New York University Law Review).
232 See OJP Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Summary of Drug Court Activity by State and County 53 (Nov. 26, 2002), http://
www.american.edu/justice/publications/drgchart2k.pdf.
233 Although more, and more rigorous, evaluations must be undertaken, the most comprehensive studies show drug courts to be effective. See Steven Belenko, Nat'l Ctr. on
Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia Univ., Research on Drug Courts: A Critical
Review: 2001 Update, at 4 (June 2001) (citing evaluations of drug courts that show
reduced drug use and criminal activity during program participation, and favorable but less
clear results in post-program long-term outcomes), available at http://www.casacolumbia.
org/usr-doc/researchondrug.pdf; see also John S. Goldkamp et al., Crime and Justice
Research Institute, An Honest Chance: Perspectives on Drug Courts (Apr. 2002)
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Accordingly, you will want to know how you can ensure effective
treatment. You will want to keep close tabs on the treatment providers to which you refer defendants. You need to know that the services promised are being provided, but that alone is insufficient. You
got into the drug court business because you thought that conventional courts did not address the underlying social problems-in this
instance, addiction-that lead to criminal conduct. Which forms of
treatment, provided by whom, under what circumstances, to what
client population, do best at retaining clients? At keeping them drugfree? At reducing crime? To answer such questions requires that you
have access to rich information about clients and providers.
Thus, drug courts use sophisticated databases to track client performance. In a prior article on drug courts, Sabel and I observed that
drug court clinical staff used information about clients to monitor
treatment providers, but not systematically. 234 Judges and case
workers would notice over time that clients assigned to a particular
provider frequently missed their court dates despite reports that the
client was attending sessions, and in response, an inquiry would be
initiated or referrals would be diverted. Now, at least one important
player in the drug court movement, the Center for Court Innovation-the research and development arm of the New York State Unified Court System, which also runs a number of demonstration
projects-is taking steps to systematize monitoring of service providers. That project aims to develop a provisional monitoring protocol
2 35
for drug courts and other problem-solving courts nationwide.
Now imagine that the full-fledged monitoring regime exists and
observe the role of the drug court. The court superintends drug treatment for its clients while simultaneously acting to improve the quality
of services through a networked form of learning. Successful innovations by one treatment provider set new benchmarks by which other
providers are measured. Because drug courts are themselves part of a
national network, the successful innovations both in service provision
and in the monitoring of service provision rapidly diffuse around the
country by virtue of the continual ratcheting up of performance
benchmarks: A treatment standard that may have been acceptable in
(reporting generally favorable findings from focus groups of drug court participants in six
locations), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/bja/honestchance; Adele Harrell et al.,
Breaking the Cycle of Drugs and Crime: Findings from the Birmingham BTC Demonstration, 1 Criminology & Pub. Pol'y 189 (2002) (finding significantly lower rates of arrest,
crime, and self-reported drug use among felony defendants participating in pretrial intervention program).
234 See Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts, supra note 29, at 865-68.
235 1 serve as an informal consultant on this project.
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the early days of drug courts is superseded by a more demanding one,
as documented experience reveals which practices succeed and which
(by relative standards) fail.
Drug courts and other problem-solving courts designed along
similar lines avoid what I identified above as the limitations of the
Hart and Sacks paradigm: fixity and tacitness. The design principles
of problem-solving courts do not assume, as in the Hart and Sacks
paradigm, that there is a distinctive, fixed capacity of courts, whether
it is the capacity for "reasoned elaboration" or something else.
Problem-solving courts are always a work in progress. They take as
given that the performance of service providers can always be
improved. Moreover, the very conditions upon which problemsolving courts insist in the actors they evaluate-openness and
revisability in light of experience-apply as well to problem-solving
courts themselves. Accordingly, neither the actors that problemsolving courts monitor, nor the courts themselves, are fixed.
Nor is the master skill of the problem-solving court tacit in the
sense of being resistant to formal articulation. In the Hart and Sacks
approach itself, the skills necessary for courts to make sense of the
complexities of the institutions with which they interact are tacit. The
Hart and Sacks judge is a traffic cop who directs decisionmaking
authority through a dizzyingly busy intersection yet who nonetheless
has difficulty articulating the exact basis for his or her own decisions.
The best such a judge can do is to provide rich examples of the
method-i.e., the Hart and Sacks materials-or a list of factors to be
organized by such open-ended concepts as reasonableness. By contrast, almost no decision made by a problem-solving court requires the
application of unguided judgment. Court sessions serve mostly as an
opportunity for the judge to verify that the exhaustive information on
the progress of each defendant (or other "client" subject to the
problem-solving court's jurisdiction) comports with the judge's own
perception and to ritualize the imposition of graduated rewards or
punishments. There is very little judging in the sense of making a nonmechanical decision. To put the point bluntly, problem-solving courts
"solve," or rather, avoid, the problem of discretion by undertaking
different activities than conventional courts.
But the invocation of problem-solving courts does not appear to
carry us very far toward a solution to the indeterminacy problem.
This is because indeterminacy is mostly an issue for appellate courts,
whereas problem-solving courts are trial courts-and even conventional trial courts do very little in the way of norm generation. Mostly
they approve plea bargains or settlements, sometimes they adjudicate
factual questions, and when they resolve questions of law, their rulings

HeinOnline -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 939 20032

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law

June 2003] LEGAL INDETERMINACY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

941

typically set no precedent binding on anyone other than the immediate parties to the case (who can seek reversal on appeal, in any
event). A better account of how problem-solving courts respond to
the indeterminacy problem would have to grapple with the suspicion
that such courts bear a troubling similarity to judges supervising structural injunctions.236 And of course, the structural injunction has been
widely regarded as problematic because running schools, prisons, and
other complex institutions taxes both the resources and legitimacy of
237
the courts.

The best that can be said for conventional structural reform litigation is that where the need for reform is urgent and politically

accountable institutions do not act, as in the case of prisons, courts
may legitimately step in.2 38 Yet even if we count prison reform, some
school desegregation, and a few other instances of judicially led structural reform as modest successes, that hardly justifies converting
courts into nothing but managers of complex social change. Even the
236 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1281 (1976) (describing and evaluating public law litigation model as compared with traditional conception of adjudication); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1979) (discussing structural reform model
of constitutional adjudication that uses injunction as method of implementing public
values); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 Geo. L.J. 1355
(1991) (discussing practical and theoretical aspects of remedies in public law litigation)
[hereinafter Sturm, A Normative Theory]; Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation,
78 Iowa L. Rev. 981 (1993) (addressing third-party participation in structural injunctions).
237 See Donald L. Horowitz, Brookings Institution, The Courts and Social Policy 17-19
(1977) (questioning whether courts have resources and capacity to engage in social policymaking); Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the
Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (1998) (discussing and
responding to critiques of court-ordered prison reform); Fiss, supra note 236, at 5-6, 17
(arguing that changes in forms of adjudication have been seized upon by opponents of
structural reform to question legitimacy of courts' role in conducting institutional reorganization); Sturm, A Normative Theory, supra note 236, at 1378-1409 (identifying and
responding to critiques of legitimacy of court-ordered public law remedies).
238 The textual reference to "conventional" structural reform litigation is meant to distinguish the approach of courts, circa 1970, that attempted to run failed institutions from a
more recent wave of judicial supervision of failed institutions that relies on the tools of
experimentalism. In the latter approach, following a finding of liability, a court, together
with the parties and other affected actors, creates an institutional process for the continual
articulation of performance standards that requires the creation of a public record to be
judged against the performance of other, similarly situated actors. For an account of this
new form of structural reform litigation, see Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming Feb. 2004) (describing recent successful efforts to reform prisons, schools, and
mental health services in response to litigation). In important respects, this new wave of
structural reform litigation parallels the emergence of problem-solving courts. Where the
former uses the tools of experimentalism to reform existing social and governmental institutions, the latter uses those same tools to reform the court system itself-albeit in a way
that implicates large-scale social problems.
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most enthusiastic defenders of structural reform litigation recognize
that courts are at best "sub-optimal decision makers" in these contexts. 239 The same appears to be true of problem-solving courts: In a
well-functioning criminal justice system, the probation office would
closely monitor defendants' compliance with court edicts, including
requirements for drug treatment; likewise, if one were to begin from
scratch, one might locate responsibility for drug treatment in an effective social services agency rather than within the criminal justice
system.
A defense of problem-solving courts must therefore begin by differentiating them from courts enforcing traditional structural injunctions. The most important distinction is that problem-solving courts
act on individuals rather than attempting to redesign whole institutions at a time. The brief against conventional structural reform litigation begins with the fact that institutions like prisons, schools, and
police forces have their own mechanisms of accountability that courts
displace without legitimacy or expertise. That brief simply does not
apply to contemporary problem-solving courts. Focusing on individuals' drug treatment, drug courts do not issue orders to state or local
bodies charged with addressing drug addiction. Moreover, problemsolving courts are considerably more modest than courts engaged in
structural reform. A problem-solving court faces fewer competency
obstacles than a court overseeing structural reform because the
former does not itself run any institutions, nor does it place itself atop
a hierarchical organization of personnel resentful of its authority. A
problem-solving court is, recall, the hub through which the providers
it monitors-the spokes-learn to improve their respective
240
performances.
If these distinctions suggest that problem-solving courts can succeed where courts engaged in traditional structural reform sometimes
stalled, there is a parallel that raises urgent questions. Just as courts
that attempted to run complex social institutions such as schools and
239 See Malcolm Feeley & Edward Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and Sub-Optimal
Decisions: Revising the New Legal Process Analysis of Courts (Mar. 18, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with New York University Law Review) (arguing that much of
courts' work in structural reform litigation would be better accomplished by administrative
agencies, but that, given legislative or administrative failure to act, courts act legitimately
in this context).
240 One can give an account of experimentalist judging which sees it as an improvement
of, rather than a break with, structural reform litigation. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Resolving
the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev.
805 (1990) (providing account of judging with experimentalist features in context of prison
reform). For my purposes here, I am less interested in the precise relation between experimentalist judging and earlier structural reform litigation than I am in characterizing the
former.

HeinOnline -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 941 20032

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law

June 2003] LEGAL INDETERMINACY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

943

prisons prompted the question of why such tasks should be undertaken by the judiciary rather than legislative, executive, or administrative bodies, so problem-solving courts prompt the same question:
Why courts? If the problem-solving apparatus I am calling a problemsolving court need not be located in the judicial branch, why not spin
it off into an administrative agency-albeit one that operates through
what might be called "coordinated decentralization" rather than
hierarchy?
Answering these questions will illustrate how even though
problem-solving courts emerged for reasons independent of the theoretical worries addressed in Parts II and III of this Article, they provide a partial response to the indeterminacy problem. The complexity
of the modern world renders legal indeterminacy problematic
because, inter alia, it suggests that courts lack competence to implement large scale social reform, especially where authoritative text
does not command the solutions they decree. Why, given the intractability of our common problems, should courts prefer their own interpretations to those of other actors? If we can give an account of
problem-solving courts that legitimates their activities, we will have
simultaneously explained how, despite complexity, courts can act
legitimately even where the law's authoritative pronouncements
appear to leave open spaces. Thus, I turn next to these linked
questions.
B.

Are Problem-Solving Courts Really Courts?

The question Why courts? poses no mere theoretical worry, as a
recent appellate ruling in Oklahoma illustrates. In Alexander v.
State,241 the defendant pled guilty to drug possession and illegal
firearm possession charges and agreed to complete a drug court program. After repeatedly testing positive for cocaine and being given
additional opportunities to comply with program rules, he was terminated from the program. On appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeals, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the drug court judge
was biased because he served as "part of the treatment team. '242
Although the appeals court denied relief because the defendant had
waived the objection by not requesting the judge's recusal at the trial
level, the appeals court agreed with the general thrust of the defendant's claim, prescribing that in future cases, a drug court participant
facing ejection from his program (and therefore a prison term), should
be able to have the termination proceeding adjudicated by a judge
241 48 P.3d 110 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).

242 Id. at 112.
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who is not a member of his treatment team.2 43 A concurring judge
went so far as to say that drug courts violated the Oklahoma Constitution's separation-of-powers requirement by mixing legislative, executive, and judicial functions.2 44 The Alexander case therefore raises
two related questions: First, is it appropriate for drug courts to undertake the activities that they do when these activities could be, perhaps
more appropriately, located in the executive branch of government?
And second, assuming that the answer to the first question is the one
given by the majority in Alexander-namely, a qualified yes-is the
participation of the judiciary in collaborative problem solving inconsistent with the ideal of neutrality associated with adjudication?
These questions take on greater urgency when we realize that if
we deem the drug court experiment a provisional success, there is no
reason not to apply the model to other domains. Successful treatment
for drug-addicted misdemeanants and nonviolent felons has already
led to calls for prison-based drug courts or their equivalent for violent
offenders. Moreover, drug treatment may ameliorate the problems
that give rise to cases in family court, housing court, and juvenile
court, to name just three problem-plagued specialty jurisdictions.
Likewise, addiction is not the only social problem that leads to legal
action. Solving such social problems will often require the government to deliver an array of medical, employment, housing, and general counseling services. Although courts addressing these issues may
lack the ability to threaten parties with imprisonment, they do have at
their disposal other sticks, not to mention carrots, with which to
induce compliance with their orders.
Therefore, it does not take a great leap of the imagination to
envision a not-so-distant future in which much of what front-line
courts do is monitor the delivery of services. To be sure, there will
remain categories of disputes that call for conventional judicial decisionmaking: A claims B breached a contract; C claims D committed
an intentional or negligent tort; the State charges defendant with
murder. Conventional courts would still be needed to resolve contested questions of law and fact in the relatively small percentage of
such cases that are not resolved by settlement or plea. But even in the
subject matter areas just mentioned, as one moves from relatively
simple, one-time bilateral disputes, to questions involving multiple
parties over time, it is not difficult to imagine that some of the most
important work of the courts will be remedial or problem solving.
Structuring long-term relationships between contracting parties, pro243 See id. at 115.
244 See id. at 115-16 (Lumpkin, J., concurring specially).
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viding compensation to victims of mass torts, and addressing the
aggregate costs of crime are not the sorts of problems that courts have
traditionally addressed, or at least they are not the sorts of problems
that courts have traditionally addressed well. This is the domain of
experimentalist courts or agencies.
Is there any justification for choosing experimentalist courts
rather than experimentalist agencies? The short answer, as with other
broken institutions, is necessity. As a matter of first principle, there
will often be no good reason to prefer problem-solving courts to
problem-solving agencies; in fact, the latter may be the more appropriate tool. However, politics and legislative inertia will often prevent
the creation of an appropriate agency-which leaves courts to fill the
gap.
The somewhat longer answer is that for some purposes, courts
have institutional advantages that administrative bodies lack. First,
courts have what champions of problem-solving courts describe as the
convening power: the ability to bring together the various actors
needed to craft effective solutions to multi-dimensional problems. 245
This is a polite way of saying that judicial decrees are backed by the
threat of force; this may ultimately be true of administrative action as
well, but not nearly so directly. The convening power is thus parasitic
24 6
on courts' coercive power.

Second, unlike other actors in the legal system, courts are perceived as neutral parties that lack a direct stake in the outcome of
litigation or substitutes for litigation. Neutrality, or at least the perception of it, permits courts to function as honest brokers when
problem solving becomes a matter of negotiation. In addition, the
courts' perceived neutrality, when combined with such quasi-mystical
symbols of judicial power as the robe and gavel, lends prestige to the
courts, thereby enabling courts to command respect where other
actors might not.

245 See The Judicial Perspective, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 2011, 2012, 2013-14 (2002)
(remarks of Judge Jo Ann Ferdinand) (describing how defense counsel, police officers,
district attorneys, and drug treatment providers are "freed from their traditional constraints" in Brooklyn Treatment Court, allowing them to "really work together").
246 See, e.g., Derek A. Denckla, Forgiveness as a Problem-Solving Tool in the Courts: A
Brief Response to the Panel on Forgiveness in Criminal Law, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1613,
1614 (2000) ("[Tjhe research into drug courts suggests that courts have something unique
to bring to the table when it comes to successful treatment and accessing other services:
coercion.").
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Third, courts have what might be called a disentrenching

capacity.2 47 The ability to declare some course of conduct unlawful,
even where a court does not have a solution ready at hand, enables
248
courts to force other actors to address their problems immediately.
En route to becoming a full-fledged problem-solving court that is the
hub of some wheel of services and actors, a disentrenching court can

impose a "penalty default," a state of affairs so unpalatable to all parties that they have no choice but to hammer out some solution that is,
from the perspective of the default, a Pareto improvement.2 49 The
disentrenching power is especially important in circumstances-unlike
those of drug courts and other problem-solving front-line courts-in
which there is no administrative apparatus associated with the judi-

ciary itself. In such circumstances, the court's disentrenching decision
can call into existence an experimentalist process in other institutions.
I examine this phenomenon more closely in connection with appellate
judging in Section D below.
The three advantages that experimentalist courts possess relative
to other institutions-the convening power, perceived neutrality, and
the disentrenching power-may be real, but one might worry nonetheless that courts retain these strengths only so long as they act primarily as courts-i.e., as traditional resolvers of disputes. 250 This is
247 Sabel & Simon, supra note 238, at 53-64 (explaining how courts can disrupt familiar
patterns of behavior in failing institutions and thus instigate experimentalist process of
reform).
248 Agency adjudication could, in principle, play this disentrenching role, but agency
adjudication tends to focus more narrowly. Were an administrative agency to attempt to
declare, for example, that a state's system of public education or welfare violated the state
constitution, its legitimacy surely would be questioned to an even greater degree than
would a parallel declaration by a state court. As Helen Hershkoff observes in the course
of defending a role for state courts in enforcing state constitutional positive rights, such
courts can fashion remedies with "guidance from external sources of information." Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality
Review, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1182 (1999). Of course, agencies can seek such external
guidance too, but "[i]n just the last fifty years, state courts have revolutionized legal rules
affecting family relations, products liability, and tort immunities," id. at 1181, which cannot
be said of (federal or state) agencies. Courts thus have the ability to disentrench on a
much greater scale than agencies do.
249 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 91-95 (1989) (introducing concept of
penalty default rules); Karkkainen, supra note 29, at 936 n.141 (defining penalty default in
regulatory context).
250 One might also worry that judges are not particularly well trained for the task of
solving social problems. Most law school courses teach students how to think analytically
about doctrine rather than as practical problem-solvers or as evaluators of social science
research, see Dorf, supra note 32, at 33-43, whereas the practical training provided in law
school clinics and the like typically prepares graduates for the functions they will perform
in traditional courts, even if those functions are defined to include skills such as mediation
and negotiation rather than just courtroom advocacy. See Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment
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the worry of the concurring judge in Alexander, writ large. Once
courts become active problem-solvers enmeshed in the messy business
of ordering real-world institutions, they will no longer be perceived as

neutral. Once the perception of neutrality disappears, that will also
signal the end of the courts' convening and disentrenching powers,
both of which depend upon the willingness of other actors to accept
the courts' coercive authority. Or so you might think if you accepted
the view of Hart and Sacks that courts are distinctively reason-giving
institutions.251
If stated as an analytic claim, this last objection misses the mark.

One could take simple measures such as the one adopted by the
Alexander majority that would effectively address claims of improper
bias: Where termination from the program is a possibility, provide
each client with a right to go before a judge who has not previously
worked on his or her case. A legal order that employed such safeguards whenever the coercive power of the state was needed to

enforce the edicts of problem-solving courts could, in principle, persist
indefinitely. One could even imagine that the public would continue
to accept the legitimacy of problem-solving courts' coercive power
long after the actual exercise of such power in problem-solving courts

and traditional courts had become truly exceptional.
Courts, supra note 29, at 861. I would give three responses to this worry. First, judges
sitting in problem-solving courts do not act alone; they are assisted by teams of professionals across a variety of disciplines, including social workers, medical staff, police, and
other lawyers. Indeed, in my own observations of drug courts I have been struck by the
degree to which the clinical director-typically a social worker-appears to be the person
running the courtroom. Second, even if judges come to problem-solving courts without
any special training, as in other specialized courts, they may develop expertise over time.
Cf. Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision-Making: An Empirical Study 26-28 (Feb.
28, 2003) (working paper, on file with New York University Law Review) (finding that
bankruptcy judges in Northern District of Illinois made generally wise liquidation decisions
despite fact that many were appointed with no prior bankruptcy experience). Third, if
problem solving becomes an increasingly important part of what lawyers do, then law
schools will have to modify their curricula.
251 Chayes attributed just such a view to Fuller, who, Chayes claimed, argued that the
ability of courts to resolve the messy questions that arise in public law litigation is
parasitic . .. on the legitimacy and moral force that courts have developed
through the performance of their inherent function, adjudication according to
the traditional conception. A certain limited amount of such parasitism can be
accommodated, but too much undermines the very legitimacy on which it
depends, because the nontraditional activities of the judiciary are at odds with
the conditions that ensure the moral force of its decisions.
Chayes, supra note 236, at 1304 (citing Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication 94-101 (unpublished manuscript, on file with Harvard Law School Library, subsequently published with minor revisions at 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 (1978)). I read Fuller as
more open to the possibility of courts performing such roles, but limiting the term "adjudication" to courts' resolution of disputes through conventional means.

HeinOnline -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 946 20032

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:875

Yet the traditionalist's objection is not so easily dismissed, for it
ultimately poses a question about actual, not perceived, legitimacy. In
other words, even if the people could be "fooled" into thinking that

courts were doing nothing extraordinary in solving social problems, if
that role is nonetheless inconsistent with the basic premises of self-

government, then there remains a legitimacy deficit. Organizing and
coordinating problem-solving actors are the activities in which
problem-solving courts engage, but they are also the activities in
which other actors participate, in particular, administrative agencies
superintending systems of coordinated decentralization of the sort I
described above. 252 To give a concrete example, there is little reason
to think that judges rather than prosecutors must be the people
responsible for diverting defendants to drug treatment, and indeed, in
some jurisdictions, diversion to drug treatment has been organized by
prosecutors. 253 More generally, administrative agencies exercising

their prosecutorial discretion can play much the same role as problemsolving courts. So, the traditionalist is really asking, what makes a
problem-solving court a court rather than an (admittedly newfangled)
administrative agency superintended by a person wearing a robe? If
there is no functional distinction, why not place problem-solving
courts in charge of the problem-solving work of administrative agencies? If we were to do that, the traditionalist concludes, then surely
the advantages that accrue to courts would dissolve, as "court" would

simply be a different word for "agency."
I want to respond to this objection by adopting it, subject to an
important caveat. First, consider the French experience. In France,
the leading adjudicative organs are the Conseil d'Etat and the Conseil
252 See Feeley & Rubin, supra note 239, at 29 (noting that courts, legislatures, and agencies, "[c]onfronted with a particular problem .... may well react in ways that display much
greater similarities than the categorical analysis of legal process would suggest").
253 Indeed, such programs often coexist with court-based diversion. In Brooklyn, New
York, for example, there is currently a felony drug court, a misdemeanor drug court, a
community court in the community of Red Hook that handles mostly drug cases, and a
prosecutorial drug treatment program funded by a federal grant through the Drug Elimination Technical Assistance Program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Telephone Interview with Dana Fox, Associate Research Director, Center for Court
Innovation (July 23, 2002). See generally N.Y. State Comm'n on Drugs and the Courts,
Confronting the Cycle of Addiction and Recidivism: A Report to Chief Judge Judith S.
Kaye § 3 (June 2000), available at http://207.29.128.2/addictionrecidivism62000.html (discussing effectiveness of court- and prosecutor-based programs throughout New York
State). See also Press Release, Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n, Nation's Prosecutors Support
the "Prosecution Drug Treatment Alternative to Prison Act" (Feb. 13, 2001) (announcing
National District Attorneys Association's approval of principles underlying prosecutorbased drug-treatment programs and virtues of Prosecution Drug Treatment Alternative to
Prison Act specifically), available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/newsroom/
pr prosecution-drug-treatment.html.
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Constitutionnel. The former is technically an administrative body
while the latter is not a court either.2 54 Nevertheless, the judgments of

both bodies (and especially those of the former) are respected in
much the same way that judicial decisions are respected in the United

States.

255

Second, both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Supreme

Court's procedural due process jurisprudence recognize that within
the American legal system, resolving high-stakes disputes demands

procedural forms that are both fair and likely to result in accurate
determinations.2 56 One can think that courts have sometimes gone
too far in imposing procedural obligations on agencies2 57 without
254 See Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A Comparative Literary Analysis of American Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
689, 692 n.9 (1998).
255 See Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an
American Perspective, 12 B.U. Int'l L.J. 57, 70 (1994) ("[T]he Conseil d'Etat is the most
respected and visible court in France."); id. at 82 ("[A]lthough a fundamental systemic
difference exists between American and French constitutional review, the end result of
such review [by the Conseil Constitutionnel] in France seems quite close to that in the
United States.").
256 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970) (mandating trial-like procedures as precondition for
termination of welfare benefits).
257 In the area of administrative law, commentators have located the worst excesses in
decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit requiring triallike procedures for rulemaking. See Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 567, 586-87 (1992) (asserting that procedures imposed in
"hybrid rulemaking" cases depended upon "judges' sense of what was necessary to ensure
a full and fair ventilation of the issues"); see also Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1397 (1992) (arguing that
interest groups sought judicial protection from administrative rulemaking via "procedural,
structural, and analytical trappings that have the predictable effect of slowing down the
agency"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on
the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988
Duke L.J. 300, 300-02 (claiming that D.C. Circuit decisions imposing burdens upon
rulemaking process contributed significantly to decline in use of rulemaking as policymaking tool); Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 Yale L.J.
1487, 1488 (1983) (commenting upon leading role of D.C. Circuit in judicial creation of
agency rulemaking procedures in 1960s and 1970s). Among the cases most frequently criticized are: Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(requiring cross-examination procedures to produce "substantial evidence" in informal
rulemaking); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (mandating written responses to specific comments in notice-and-comment rulemaking), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (remanding EPA proceeding for more detailed record, including opportunity for
cross-examination); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(finding ordinary APA standards for agency explanation inadequate for judicial review of
some clean air regulations). In constitutional law, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), which applied a balancing test to measure the legality of procedures for determining eligibility for disability benefits, id. at 334-35, is probably best understood as narrowing the circumstances under which full-blown trial-like adversarial process is required.
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doubting that agencies can and sometimes constitutionally must
8
operate just like courts. 25
But now the caveat: The independence of the American judiciary
relative to administrative agencies means that even if experimentalist
courts and agencies are functionally indistinguishable, there are circumstances in which the formal location of authority in the judiciary
makes a difference. I can explain how in a roundabout way by foreshadowing the remaining Sections of this Part, which concern appellate adjudication. For the indeterminacy problem-my ultimate
concern-is largely a problem for appellate courts, the courts charged
with resolving legal ambiguity. Problem-solving trial courts do not
resolve legal ambiguity in the sense of selecting one of a range of possible meanings as the meaning of the law. Appellate courts (usually)
do, 259 and in so doing they encounter the indeterminacy problem.
Since the Civil War, succeeding generations of legal scholars have
repeatedly claimed that courts have no special ability to divine the
true meaning of ambiguous legal texts. Consider Holmes's attack on
formalism; legal realism; critical legal studies; and even, ironically,
contemporary forms of "textualism," which begin with the public
choice theorist's assumption that legislative enactments have no
deeper meaning beyond the compromise among interest groups and
end in a narrow formalism of their own. Each of these successive
movements asserted, in whole or in part, that when judges ascribe
meaning to ambiguous legal texts, they are engaged in a form of
politics.
The intellectual history I have condensed into the previous paragraph reveals a preoccupation with the same difficulties in constitutional theory and academic jurisprudence explored in Parts II and III
of this Article: how to cope with legal indeterminacy. Notice, however, that legal indeterminacy is generally experienced as the source
of a genuine dilemma. With a very small number of exceptions, theo258 Consider the fact that states are not formally bound by the federal doctrine of separation of powers. See Mayor of Phila. v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 (1974);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84
(1902). Accordingly, a state could locate the responsibility for much adjudication in
administrative agencies rather than in courts (assuming, of course, that such an arrangement did not violate state constitutional separation-of-powers requirements). However,
were a state to rename its criminal courts "administrative agencies," it would not escape
the procedural requirements that the Supreme Court has applied to state courts via the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
259 But not always. Pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), courts reviewing agency action ask whether the agency
has adopted a reasonable interpretation of the statute it is charged with enforcing, not
whether the agency's interpretation is the best as judged by the court's lights. See id. at
844.
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rists do not simply give up on the idea of adjudication. And that is
because courts have their uses. Upholding the rule of law, protecting
human rights, guaranteeing the preconditions of democracy-these
are all slogans, to be sure, but they are not mere slogans. The indeterminacy problem poses a genuine dilemma precisely because of a collective judgment that we want a distinctive institution-the courtsdevoted to these aims. The question is how to achieve the goal of
having such an institution, notwithstanding the indeterminacy
problem. In Parts II and III, I suggested that most of the contemporary approaches fail because they understand the problem as one of
theoretical justification or critique, rather than as a problem of institutional design. However, I certainly did not mean to suggest that the
indeterminacy problem is (as radical democrats would have it) a
reason to give up on the idea of a distinct institution devoted to aims
that the political process is ill-suited to address.
What has this to do with problem-solving courts? Just as our
inability to draw a sharp distinction between political and legal reasoning does not warrant abandoning the quest for judicial approaches
to coping with the indeterminacy problem, so too, our inability to
draw a sharp distinction between the activities of problem-solving
courts and administrative agencies operating by similar principles in
addressing the same or similar problems does not warrant abandoning
the idea that some social problems might usefully be tackled by
courts, even if those courts are structured in much the same way as
agencies.
In particular, for some class of interactions between citizens and
the state, or among citizens, the perception and reality of a neutral
decisionmaker will be very important to the legitimacy of the decisions taken. To be sure, agencies can be made to function according
to norms of due process that ensure neutrality. They can, for example,
separate the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions; 260 conduct hearings at which there is an opportunity for the cross-examination of witnesses; and issue written opinions explaining the reasons for their
decisions. However, where-as in meting out remedies based on
negotiated pleas-the government must exercise coercive power in
response to something other than an adjudication of contested facts,
these mechanisms for making the decisionmaker appear neutral are
unavailable. In other words, the trappings of the judiciary may be
most needed precisely where the decisionmaker is acting least like a
traditional adjudicator.
260

See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000) (prescribing such procedures in agency adjudication).
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Skeptical readers will object to the apparent sleight of hand. Do I
really mean to say that problem-solving courts must be courts because
if we called them what they really are-administrative agencies-the
public would not stand for it? No, that is not what I mean to say. My
point is that even if in their actual operation problem-solving courts
are largely indistinguishable from administrative agencies, the path by
which people enter into the monitoring regime that is constituted by a
problem-solving court places boundaries on the sort of institution it
can be.
Consider two schematic examples: First, suppose that Smith, a
drug addict, decides to seek treatment for his addiction. He goes to a
well-functioning administrative agency that coordinates drug treatment in the jurisdiction in which Smith resides. Smith accepts an
intrusive monitoring regime replete with carrots and sticks because
that is the price of eligibility for public funding. The agency in charge
of this monitoring regime will look much like a drug court (without
the possibility of using jail as a stick), but few will think that it needs
to be a court.
Now suppose that Jones is arrested for shoplifting and is brought
before a court. Jones's lawyer learns that Jones is a drug addict who
steals to support his habit. She asks Jones if he would be willing to
plead guilty to the charged offense, enter a drug treatment plan, and
accept an intrusive monitoring regimen, in exchange for avoiding
imprisonment. At the moment that Jones makes his choice, the state
is exercising the full force of its coercive power, 261 and that fact distinguishes Jones from Smith. Whereas we can presume that Smith's decision to enter treatment was voluntary, the threat of criminal sanctions
means that we need safeguards to ensure that Jones's decision is voluntary. One could imagine an administrative law judge doing the job,
but in our legal culture, courts are the institutions that connote neutrality. The perception in large part makes the reality.
When I say that courts are neutral, I am deliberately borrowing
one of the most despised terms of the Hart and Sacks paradigm. The
generation that followed Hart and Sacks vociferously objected to the
"neutral principles" espoused by Herbert Wechsler, 62 Henry Hart's
261 Cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601 (1986) (observing
that legal interpretation occasions violence).
262 See Wechsler, supra note 170. Characteristic of this critique are Gary Peller,The
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1182-87 (1985) (arguing that legal
discourse itself is not neutral and critiquing Hart and Sacks' Legal Process theory), and
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1983) (arguing that liberalism is inconsistent with
theories of neutral principles and interpretivism).
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long-time collaborator. They were correct, of course, that legal principles are not neutral in the sense of being divorced from contentious
political questions. Yet that is not quite what Wechsler meant, for
"neutral principles" was always something of a misnomer. Wechsler
did not argue that principles themselves are neutral, but that a responsible judge applies principles even-handedly. 263 If a judge invokes the
principle, say, that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional
questions when that principle helps reach a result the judge favors on
policy grounds, the judge cannot dismiss that principle in another case
merely because it leads to results disfavored on policy grounds. "Neutral application of principles" is a fairer rendition of what Wechsler
had in mind.
To be sure, the critique takes aim even at neutral application of
principles. Authoritative text contains ambiguities and, crucially, the
law contains a great many, often conflicting, principles, 264 so that a
skilled judge can purport to be applying principles neutrally even
while deciding cases based on political preferences. That, in a nutshell, is the critical diagnosis in light of the indeterminacy problem.
If, however, one is not prepared to endorse the radical indeterminacy thesis, then Wechsler's aspiration seems quite modest. Judges,
he said, should mean what they say when they explain their decisions
by principles. They cannot (and in my view should not) entirely separate their policy views from their application of legal principles, but
neither should they act as partisans. The widespread acceptance of
this view was demonstrated by the outrage engendered by the
Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore: Academics who might be
skeptical of the possibility of neutral principles roundly condemned
the Court for departing from the rule of law, accusing the Justices of
"acting as political proponents for candidate Bush, not as judges. ' 265
In short, there remains broad consensus that part of what it
means to act as a judge is to maintain a degree of neutrality, in the
sense of not having a stake in the outcome. Especially in an era when
263 See Wechsler, supra note 170, at 19 (acknowledging role of "value choice" in adjudication, while insisting on giving of "reasons that in their generality and their neutrality
transcend any immediate result that is involved").
264 The classic article, making this point with respect to canons of statutory construction,
is Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, supra note 197 (arguing that, because
various divergent canons of construction are accepted, court may reach range of "correct"
results).
265 See Law Professors' Statement on Bush v. Gore, http://www.the-rule-of-law.com/
archive/supreme/statement.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2003). For a skeptical view of this
form of criticism of the Court, see Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process
Theory Constrain Courts?, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 923, 946-50 (2001) (suggesting that claims
of partisanship may be ineffective and equally applicable to Court's critics).
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the power of administrative agencies is rationalized as flowing from
the political accountability of the executive officials who supervise
administration, 66 it will be much easier to create the perception and
reality of neutrality by making judges rather than bureaucrats responsible for protecting the rights of citizens subject to the coercive power
of the state-even if the judges, having exercised that gatekeeping
function, run their institutions in much the same manner as parallel
administrative agencies are run.
The Alexander case holds that a judge cannot simply change hats
when shifting from the superintending role back to the gatekeeping
role, and that is probably a sensible precaution to avoid the appearance of bias. Similar precautions can be, and generally are, taken by
problem-solving courts to ensure compliance with due process norms
at other stages of the proceedings.2 6 7 Thus, the preliminary evidence
suggests that courts can become problem-solving institutions without
necessarily sacrificing the qualities that make them valuable as courts.
C. Appellate Judging in a World of Experimentalist Institutions
Should problem-solving courts continue to play an increasingly
large role in the American judiciary, they will ease the legitimacy
questions raised by the indeterminacy problem. By deciding less,
266 This justification appears most clearly in the work of those espousing the theory of
the unitary executive. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan
Revolution-A Firsthand Account 132-70 (1991) (articulating vision of accountable government involving clear separation of powers and unitary executive); Steven G. Calabresi
& Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541
(1994) (providing textual and originalist argument that agencies cannot exercise executive
power without presidential oversight); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President
and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 93-119 (1994) (endorsing unitary executive
somewhat more hesitantly). But even those scholars who reject the theory of the unitary
executive typically root much of the legitimacy of administrative action in politics rather
than, as an earlier era would have had it, expertise. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan,
Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201 (arguing that agency interpretations of statutes should receive greater judicial deference when they emanate from
higher, politically accountable ranks of agency); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 (2001) (observing increased presidential supervision of administrative agencies during Clinton Administration). Although critical of the trend towards
equating administration with the presidency, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 649-50
(1984) (arguing that "agencies to which rulemaking is assigned," as opposed to President,
possess "ultimate decisional authority"), my colleague Peter Strauss is a characteristically
keen observer of the general trend, see Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The
Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 745 (1996) (addressing
history and developing political character of rulemaking since enactment of APA).
267 See Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem Solving Courts 6 (June 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with New York University Law Review) (concluding, based upon three
case studies and other material, that "with certain cautions problem solving judging and
lawyering... need not be in conflict with due process standards").

HeinOnline -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 953 20032

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law

June 20031 LEGAL INDETERMINACY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

955

courts will have fewer opportunities to make controversial choices.
More importantly, by addressing large-scale social problems through
means other than direct decree aimed at institutions that are nominally accountable in other ways, they will escape the critique of the
traditional structural injunction. But what about the residual (though
in some sense core) role of courts in resolving contested questions of
fact and law?
Because it fits the traditional understanding of the role of courts
relative to the political branches, judicial resolution of contested questions of fact raises fewer legitimacy questions than judicial resolution
of contested questions of law. Although courts exercise enormous
power in resolving contests over facts, that power has rarely engendered much controversy-probably because courts appear to be
among the best institutions we have for ascertaining certain kinds of
facts. When called upon to make judgments about discrete past
events, the courts' neutrality relative to political actors gives them a
marked institutional advantage. Broadly speaking, our legal culture
268
accepts that facts, unlike values, are simply "out there" to be found.
The courts' role in resolving contested legal questions, however,
raises the indeterminacy problem, and experimentalist judging of the
sort I described in the previous Section provides at best a partial and
indirect response to that problem. 269 Questions about the meaning of
ambiguous legal provisions do not present themselves as problems in
the delivery of social services. Accordingly, a model of appellate
experimentalist judging must look rather different from experimentalism as problem solving in courts of first instance. In this Section, I
outline experimentalist appellate judging as the review of decisions by
experimentalist institutions such as problem-solving courts. In the
remaining two Sections I explain how experimentalist appellate
judging might address the indeterminacy problem in a world that is
not thoroughly experimentalist.

268 But see Kim Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1095,
1111 (1987) (reviewing Susan Estrich, Real Rape (1987)) ("There is no such thing as a
value-neutral fact."). For a critical discussion of the fact/value distinction, see generally
Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism 63-71 (1987); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature 363-65, 387 (1979); Richard Rorty, Pragmatism and Philosophy, in
Consequences of Pragmatism, at xvi (1982). I do not mean to take a position on the
validity of the fact/value distinction. Below I suggest that as a practical matter, disagreement over values-moral diversity-is often closely connected to disagreement over factual questions and the clash of interests. See infra Part IV.D.
269 See supra Part IV.B. As I argue in the next Section, however, locating experimentalist trial judging in a larger experimentalist system does provide an indirect means for
attacking the generality problem. See infra Part IV.E.
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Let us begin with the question of appellate review of decisions
made by problem-solving courts. As cases like Alexander270 illustrate,
appeals courts can examine whether a problem-solving court has complied with due process norms.2 71 However, as was true in Alexander
itself, appellate review is limited by the fact that the parties who
appear before problem-solving courts-and especially before drug
courts-typically waive the right of appeal. Standard plea colloquies
in which criminal defendants accept responsibility for their conduct
include this waiver along with that of other procedural rights.2 72 A
client who is unhappy with the court-mandated treatment can negotiate, through his or her defense attorney, for some other course of
treatment-for example, outpatient rather than inpatient in the case
of clients who need to maintain their jobs or tend to family obligations-but the final say remains with the trial court judge. There is
usually no appeal to a higher authority.
Although most drug courts and other problem-solving courts do
not at present provide for appeals of treatment decisions, there is no
reason in principle why these decisions should not be reviewable. The
current dearth of appellate procedures probably results from two features of drug courts. First, as I just noted, drug court clients accept
their treatment program as a matter of contract; accordingly, lawyers
and others accustomed to the ancien r~gime may believe that there is
nothing to appeal. If a client does not like the course of treatment,
the client does not have to accept it. Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, architects of and participants in problem-solving courts
may take the view that appeals to higher authority are a form of
adversarial behavior, best left in the zero-sum world of litigated cases
rather than in the collaborative new world. In my own interactions
with personnel in the problem-solving courts, I have found that this
attitude is widespread (though hardly universal).
Neither causal explanation for the absence of appellate review
amounts to a justification. It may well be true that drug court clients
have no legal right to drug treatment, but that does not mean that
they could not be provided with a right, by law or as part of the contract they sign upon entering treatment, to effective treatment and
judicial review.
The cultural explanation, I believe, accurately describes the attitude of many of the actors involved in collaborative problem-solving
Alexander v. State, 48 P.3d 110 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
See supra text accompanying notes 239-42.
See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. I1(c)(4) (requiring that court inform defendant, and determine that defendant understands, that in pleading no contest he or she waives right to
trial).
270
271
272
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processes that have grown up where command-and-control formerly
reigned. Onetime antagonists-environmentalists and industry; labor
and management; prosecutorial anti-drug warriors and defense attorneys-who see negotiation, mediation, or deliberative collaboration
as superior to deadlocked adversarial processes can lose sight of the
fact that power and interests do not simply vanish in nonadversarial
settings. Given the opportunity, the strong can still oppress the weak,
capturing decentralized collaborative processes in much the same way
that they can capture top-down administrative processes.
Champions of collaborative problem solving such as myself have
three linked answers to the risk that the nonadversarial processes will
simply reproduce external power hierarchies. First, we complain
about the yardstick. It is true that power disparities load the dice
against the weak, but that fact is hardly uniquely true of collaborative
processes. The poor and weak do not hire powerful lobbyists to do
their bidding in the halls of Congress or the Administration, nor do
they have the resources to fund expensive litigation. Traditional forms
of litigation and politics afford the weak only formal equality. Therefore, unless one thinks that no social problems can be addressed until
after a redistributionist revolution, the relevant question about collaborative processes is not whether they afford opportunities for the
powerful to oppress the weak but whether they provide more such
opportunities than conventional adversarial processes.
And that takes me to the second response: Collaborative decisionmaking typically emerges precisely where adversarial processes
fail because none of the parties can clearly identify their interests or
go it alone. Because neither the strong nor the weak are monolithic
entities, commonalities of interest cross these categories. As Sabel
and I put the point:
[T]he pursuit of new alliances can reveal novel solutions to complex
problems, just as the exploration of novel solutions can give rise to
new constellations of harmonious interests.... [Tihese possibilities
are likely to be especially salient in periods of disorientation
marked by the kind of volatility and diversity that recommend
experimentalism. Alliances and confusion do not nullify the bargaining disadvantage of inequality, but they can transform what
might appear to be an insurmountable obstacle to any but radically
redistributive reforms into one of the many considerations that
would need to be addressed by experimentalist means in making
participation in experimentalist deliberation as fair and comprehen273
sive as it can be.
273

Dorf & Sabel, supra note 27, at 409-10.
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The third answer to the problem of power imbalances is, frankly,
to attempt to remedy them through procedural rules. For example, to
prevent collaborative ecosystem governance from becoming a mechanism by which corporate and landowning interests simply weaken
environmental rules to suit themselves, it may be necessary for environmentalists to retain a right to sue. This de facto exit right enhances
the environmentalists' voice in the collaborative process. 274 More

generally, one might characterize collaborative processes or "soft law"
as parasitic upon adversarial or "hard law," at least in the sense that
the latter provides for a penalty default.
If a right to participate backed by a right to sue is sometimes
necessary to ensure the evenhandedness of collaborative processes, it
will rarely be sufficient. As Archon Fung argues, groups such as environmentalists and labor organizations must figure out how to exercise
their "countervailing power" within collaborative processes. 275
Merely threatening to walk or to sue is not a strategy for solving
problems, even if it does effectively guarantee a seat at the table.
In the context of problem-solving courts, those who exercise
countervailing power-criminal defense attorneys-appear to have
solved the problem of how to cooperate with their traditional adversaries. They continue to press for their clients' interests, with the difference that they tend to accept a broader definition of client interest.
Whereas a defense attorney acting within the traditional zealous advocacy model pursues any lawful aim of the client, a defense attorney
operating within a drug court accepts that it will sometimes be in the
client's best interest to receive court-mandated treatment, even if
zealous advocacy might result in a technical diminution in the degree
of control the court exercises over the client. In the end, the decision
remains with the client, but by conceptualizing the defense attorney's
role as part of a problem-solving team that also includes the client, the
prosecutor, the judge, and the clinical staff, the defense attorney inevitably takes a less adversarial position.
But if defense attorneys have mastered the art of collaboration,
they and their clients remain vulnerable to abuse absent some form of
procedural guarantee. Drug court clients who consistently violate the
rules of the court or of their treatment providers are subject to discipline, including, ultimately, expulsion from the program and imprisonment. What happens if clients uphold their end of the bargain, but
treatment providers do not? A well-functioning problem-solving
See generally Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970).
See Archon Fung, Collaboration and Countervailing Power: Making Participatory
Governance Work (Aug. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with New York University
Law Review).
274
275
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court monitors treatment providers to detect and prevent poor practices. But what if the court is not well functioning? Surely it is not a
sufficient answer to say that defendants can "exit" by subjecting themselves to prison. Such an exit right punishes the client without
imposing any substantial cost on the court. By contrast with an environmental organization's threat to sue or a union's threat to strike, the
defendant's exercise of his or her traditional countervailing powerinsisting on utilizing the conventional adversary system-is no threat
at all. Effective countervailing power for a drug court client must take
a different form.
And that is where a right of appeal might be useful. What question would an appeals court reviewing treatment decisions from drug
courts address, given that the trial court itself does not resolve contested questions of law or fact? In short: whether the drug court is
doing its job. Does the trial court monitor service providers to detect
and prevent abuses? Does it continually update and upgrade the level
of treatment it provides by demanding that relatively poor performers
adopt methods employed by more effective performers? In performing these functions, does the problem-solving court perform at
roughly the level of the best problem-solving courts in jurisdictions
with comparable populations? In other words, the appellate court
would apply to the trial-level problem-solving court the same monitoring techniques that the problem-solving court applies to the service
providers it monitors. In this way, just as an experimentalist trial
court's monitoring of individual clients' performance is ipso facto a
form of monitoring of treatment providers, so the appellate court's
adjudication of individual claims of inadequately monitored treatment
would be ipso facto a form of monitoring of the trial court. 276
The foregoing sketch of appellate review of problem-solving
courts also describes appellate review of problem-solving or experimentalist institutions more generally-for recall that in their practical
operation, problem-solving courts act no differently from experimentalist administrative agencies. Accordingly, whether reviewing the
activities of problem-solving courts or other problem-solving institutions, appellate courts would mirror the activities of those institutions
at one remove, i.e., at a meta-level. Whereas a front-line problemsolving institution monitors the provision of services, reviewing courts
would monitor the monitoring of the provisions of services. Therefore, and for the same reasons, just as front-line problem-solving
276 Note that I characterize the client's claim in terms of a right to adequately monitored
treatment rather than a claim to adequate treatment, building in a requirement that clients
exhaust their trial court remedies. The exhaustion requirement has an exact parallel in
judicial review of agency action, the subject to which I next turn. See infra Part IV.D.
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courts rarely resolve contested questions in the sense of choosing one
from a number of possible outcomes, so appellate courts would rarely
resolve contested questions of law in the sense of choosing one rather
than another meaning of authoritative text.
Describing problem-solving appellate courts as, in effect, meta-

problem-solving courts thus casts them as a solution to, or at least a
circumvention of, the indeterminacy problem. If lawmakers increas-

ingly address social problems by creating open-ended problem-solving
institutions, rather than by directing solutions through authoritative
but ultimately indeterminate instructions, the domain of the indeter-

minacy problem will correspondingly shrink.
D.

ExperimentalistAppellate Review in Conventional Cases

In my judgment, public institutions will become increasingly
experimentalist. However, I could be mistaken, and even if I am right
about the long term, the law as it exists contains numerous authorita-

tive yet ambiguous instructions. Moreover, no complete legal system
can be thoroughly experimentalist. Some classes of problems demand
categorical, i.e., command-and-control, approaches. For example, it
would be dangerous to phrase prohibitions on murder, rape, slavery,
and other intentional offenses against the person, as well as some min-

imum regulatory standards, in experimentalist terms. Categorical
rules clearly have their place, 277 and the indeterminacy problem will
appear at the boundary of such rules.278 Accordingly, two questions
frame the balance of my discussion of experimentalism: First, is there
277 See Jean L. Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm 17 (2002)
(acknowledging that "reflexive law," Cohen's term for something like what I call experimentalism, is not panacea suited to all domains).
278 For example, the Thirteenth Amendment is a categorical prohibition against slavery,
U.S. Const. amend. XIII, but the indeterminacy problem arises with respect to the question
of how much freedom Congress has to provide remedies for what it defines as violations of
that Amendment. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court upheld
expansive congressional legislative power under Section Two of that Amendment to
abolish the "badges and incidents of slavery." Id. at 439 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)), 440-41. Does that ruling survive the Court's more recent decisions
narrowly construing congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide remedies for purported violations of its Section One? See, e.g., Bd. of Trs.
of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating Americans with Disabilities Act to extent it authorizes suits against states because Congress failed to demonstrate
"pattern of discrimination by the States" and damages remedy therefore was not "congruent and proportional" to alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating suits against states under Age Discrimination
in Employment Act for similar reasons). In my view, there should be a substantially
greater role for experimentalism in defining the bounds of congressional power to enforce
the Civil War Amendments than the Court's jurisprudence formally recognizes. See Dorf
& Friedman, supra note 33, at 85-98 (discussing congressional power in context of
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)).
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a role for experimentalist appellate review of non-experimentalist
front-line institutions? And second, what purchase, if any, does such
review have on the indeterminacy problem? I address these questions
in this Section and the next one.
In this Section, I briefly describe two areas of law in which the
Supreme Court has, perhaps unwittingly, provided illustrations of how
a court can interpret ambiguous but authoritative commands by
calling into existence a system of experimentation, rather than by-or
at least in addition to-laying down specific rules. The examples, as
foreshadowed in the Introduction, are the regulation of workplace
sexual harassment and coercive interrogation. The modest aim of this
Section is simply to make plausible the claim that our legal culture,
despite its association of law with authoritative commands, already
has room for a different conception of law as an invitation to problem
solving.
1.

Sexual Harassment

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act bars covered employers
from discriminating "against any individual with respect to... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's .. sex .... ",279 Although Title VII presents courts
with questions of statutory interpretation, the body of anti-discrimination law of which Title VII is a part may rightly be called a "superstatute," defined by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn as "one of
the baselines against which other sources of law-sometimes including
the Constitution itself-are read. '28 An examination of the Supreme
Court's approach to Title VII's application to sexual harassment thus
can shed light on the indeterminacy problem in constitutional as well
as statutory interpretation.
One could argue that sexual harassment is not a species of sex

discrimination, and lower courts were initially unreceptive to claims
that what we now call sexual harassment by supervisors counted as sex

discrimination by employers. 281 However, by the time the issue
reached the Supreme Court, these doubts had been resolved, and the

interpretive move from sex discrimination to sexual harassment was
279 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).

280 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215, 1216
(2001); see also id. at 1237-42 (discussing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (2000)).

281 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of

Sex Discrimination 59-77 (1979) (discussing early cases addressing claim that sexual harass-

ment constituted sex discrimination under Title VII); Elvia R. Arriola, "What's the Big
Deal?": Women in the New York City Construction Industry and Sexual Harassment Law,
1970-1985, 22 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 21, 40-44 (1990) (same).
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seen as an easy one. Two unanimous Supreme Court decisions confirmed that Title VII applies to workplace sexual harassment, whether
the harassment consists of an employer's demand that the employee
submit to a quid pro quo or creates a hostile work environment.282
The difficult and divisive questions concern application and
scope. 283 Precisely what acts constitute sexual harassment? Can the
law distinguish between, on the one hand, sexual harassment, and on
the other hand, voluntary office romance or (at the boundary of hostile-environment claims) protected employee speech? What steps
must a business take to prevent and remedy employee-on-employee
harassment, without blocking innocuous or protected activities?
These would appear to be exactly the sorts of questions that the indeterminacy problem tells us courts cannot solve except by choosing one
from a range of contested meanings.
And yet, the Supreme Court has not taken that course. Whenever it has been asked to formulate a categorical rule-for example,
that same-sex sexual harassment is not covered by Title V1I-it has
rejected that approach in favor of the generality of the statutory prohibition. 284 Because "[t]he real social impact of workplace behavior
often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed, ' 28 5 the Court
has repeatedly declined to formulate "a mathematically precise
test. '286 Even the Court's definition of "hostile environment" is circularly opaque: "an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive. '2 87
One might worry that the net effect of the Court's failure to
specify a standard in more detail simply delegates the harassment
determination to juries.288 Yet that is not exactly what the Court has
done either, because two further decisions establish that vicarious lia282 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (holding that plaintiff need not
demonstrate psychological injury to maintain Title VII claim); Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that "hostile environment" claims are actionable under
Title VII).
283 Among the best recent academic efforts to address these questions are Katherine M.
Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 691 (1997) (analyzing
theoretical link between sexual harassment and sexual discrimination) and Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683 (1998) (challenging "sexual
desire-dominance paradigm" of Title VII).
284 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
285 Id. at 81-82.

286 Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
287 Id. at 21.

288 See id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (expressing this concern but finding no alternative within existing framework).
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bility attaches unless the employer has "exercised reasonable care to
avoid harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur. ' 289 To
oversimplify, sexual harassment law now places courts in the role of
monitoring employers' monitoring of their workplaces.
As I observed shortly after the Supreme Court decisions establishing the employer's affirmative defense to vicarious liability for
employee-on-employee harassment, those decisions provided an
opportunity for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) "and similar state agencies [to] take the lead in disseminating
the most successful strategies for preventing and combating sexual
harassment .... "290 Since then, the EEOC has established enforcement guidelines that provide employers with substantially greater guidance than the Court's precedents as to what a harassment prevention
291
and remediation policy must look like to prevent vicarious liability.
Although the EEOC guidelines are of some use, they do not take
advantage of the experimentalist potential in the Court's constructive
ambiguity. For one thing, as a perusal of the footnotes to the EEOC
guidelines indicates, the guidelines are drawn almost entirely from litigated cases. 292 While litigated cases can be useful in establishing
minima-e.g., an employer may face liability if it fails to publicize its
harassment policy293 or to clearly designate a person to whom
employees can complain 294-litigation will typically occur against just
those employers whose policies are at the border of legality.
Employers wishing to avoid litigation as well as liability will prefer to
receive guidance drawn from best practices, not merely from minimally acceptable practices.
Accordingly, the EEOC guidelines could be improved by drawing
upon the experience of firms that have actually reduced the frequency
and severity of incidents of sexual harassment. As Susan Sturm docu295
ments in case studies involving three quite different workplaces,
successful systems typically integrate harassment prevention and
289 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998); accord Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (stating that one element of employer's defense to
vicarious liability claim is "that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior").
290 Dorf, supra note 32, at 77.
291 See Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment
by Supervisors, EEOC Notice 915.002 (June 18, 1999), http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/
harassment.html.
292 Id.

293 See id. at § 5.C.1.
294 See id. at § 5.C.1.c.
295 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 492-519 (2001) (describing approaches at Deloitte &
Touche, Intel, and Home Depot).
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remediation with other operations and rely on detailed data to
develop outcome measures that are used to hold individuals and units
accountable. 296 As Sturm also observes, because harassment policies
must be customized to particular workplaces, 2 97 the law shapes but
2 98
does not determine their content.
Because each workplace is in some sense unique, EEOC guidelines that draw upon the experience of firms like those Sturm discusses would not be exact prescriptions. Nonetheless, EEOC pooling
and promulgation of guidelines outlining effective approaches would
be valuable. Under the conventional compliance approach, an
employer has a perverse incentive not to discover whether its
employees are harassing one another, because if it does, it may
become liable for the harassment.2 99 The Supreme Court's vicarious
liability rule, like strict liability rules generally, realigns incentives.
Under existing doctrine, an employer is liable for not knowing,
because ignorance signals an inadequate policy of detection and
remediation. The doctrine thus encourages a problem-solving
approach, although the EEOC has yet to make full use of the doctrine's potential. 300 At the same time, because the very lawfulness of a
firm's conduct depends upon the firm's adoption of a successful detection-and-remediation program, such programs can become a matter of
public record, thus avoiding the possibility that firms would hoard
information about their harassment policies as though they were trade
secrets.
Finally, in pointing to the limitations of the EEOC's response to
date, 30 1 I do not mean to suggest that administrative action is crucial.
As Sturm observes, attorneys, insurers, union as well as non-union
employee associations, and other intermediaries are already acting to
translate the promise of Supreme Court doctrine into a problemsolving regime. 30 2 Sturm is no doubt correct in cautioning that the
regime remains incomplete and subject to being undermined by legal
and other change, 303 but on the whole, her assessment of the condi296 See id. at 519-20.
297 See id. at 519.
298 See id. at 520.

299 See id. at 539 (observing that "due process" or compliance approach "does not
encourage employers to design systems that will bring problems to the surface").
300 Cf. id. at 479 ("[T]he Supreme Court has outlined a framework that is capable of
providing for dynamic interactions between general legal norms and workplace-based institutional innovation that promotes effective problem solving.").
301 See id. at 551 (remarking that EEOC "struggle[s] primarily with how to function
most effectively as an enforcement agency").
302 See id. at 522-37.
303 See id. at 537-53.
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tions that make an experimentalist approach appropriate for what she
terms "second generation problems" seems a fair description of a
wide range of problems that the law regulates:
Any rule specific enough to guide behavior will inadequately
account for the variability, change, and complexity characteristic of
second generation problems. General rules, unless linked to local
structures for their elaboration in context, provide inadequate direction to shape behavior. ....Externally-imposed solutions also
founder because they cannot be sufficiently sensitive to context or
integrated into the day-to-day practice that shapes their implementation. Yet, internally-generated solutions are often insufficiently
attentive to their normative implications, or to the connection
between those local practices and the general antidiscrimination
304
norm.
If I am right that many of our most vexing policy questions involve
such "second generation problems," then the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in its sexual harassment cases can serve as a more
general model for combining externally-imposed and internallygenerated solutions.305
2.

ProphylacticRules in ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure

In Miranda v. Arizona,30 6 the Supreme Court held that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive and therefore that police officers
interrogating suspects must follow safeguards designed to ensure both
that suspects are informed of their right to remain silent in the face of
questioning and that that right, if asserted, "will be scrupulously
honored. ' 30 7 The Court also appeared to prescribe a traditional command-and-control rule, stating:
[T]he following measures are required. [The suspect] must be
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires. 30 8
Id. at 475-76.
The regulation of corporate wrongdoing has long included a limited version of the
approach described in the text. Under federal sentencing guidelines, an organization that
has in place "an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law" may have its
criminal sanction reduced if, despite the program, an offense occurs. U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(f) (2002).
306 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
304
305

307 Id. at 479.
308 Id.
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Failure to comply with this rule, the Court made clear, would bar the
introduction of any evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation
in a state or federal trial of the suspect. 30 9
Despite its seemingly categorical requirement, the Miranda
Court also stated that the Constitution does not require any specific
code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation: "Congress and the States are free
to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are
fully as effective as those described above in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity
to exercise it.'' 310 Thus, for example, a state could substitute a
requirement that all confessions be videotaped for the Court's default
rule requiring notification of a right to counsel. Congress and the
states could avoid liability in the form of exclusion of evidence by
complying with what Barry Friedman and I have called Miranda's
"safe harbor, '' 31' or they could devise their own safeguards.
The notion of a safe harbor, or, as the Court and some commentators referred to it, a "prophylactic rule," 312 should have been
straightforward, but the Court's disingenuous use of the concept muddied the waters. In decisions following Miranda and in cases involving
the parallel exclusionary rule the Court had crafted for unlawful
searches and seizures, Justices who were hostile to the underlying
limits on police conduct or to the exclusionary rule invoked the prophylactic nature of those limits to justify cutting them back 313-even
when the state had made no effort to substitute alternative procedures
for the Court's default. Thus, prophylactic rules came to be seen by
their critics as a kind of optional constitutional doctrine, created by
judicial whim, and therefore illegitimate. 31 4 Eventually, the critics
See id.
Id. at 490.
Dorf & Friedman, supra note 33, at 82.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974); David Huitema, Miranda:
Legitimate Response to Contingent Requirements of the Fifth Amendment, 18 Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. 261, 269-70 (2000); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 190 passim (1988).
313 See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446 (declining to suppress fruits of interrogation that
"departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down ... in Miranda" but "did
not abridge respondent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination");
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (declining to exclude unlawfully
obtained evidence from grand jury proceeding because Miranda's "judicially created
remedy [is] designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved").
314 See Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100 (1985) (challenging constitutional legitimacy
of prophylaxis and related doctrines). But see Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court,
1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975) (antici309
310
311
312
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took aim at Miranda itself, arguing that Congress could overrule and
had in fact overruled Miranda in toto. At that point, the Court
balked, 315 concluding "that Miranda announced a constitutional rule
that Congress may not supersede legislatively. '3 16 Yet the Court
made no serious effort to reconcile its own intervening decisions
317
treating Miranda as something less than a constitutional rule.

Viewed through the lens of legal realism, the academic debate

about prophylactic rules is almost silly. Of course courts, in interpreting ambiguous constitutional text, must create doctrines that are
not strictly commanded by it. In this sense, prophylactic rules are, as
David Strauss observes, ubiquitous. 3 18 To borrow an apt phrase from

Richard Fallon, constitutional doctrine, as an overlay on the terse con39
stitutional text, is necessary for "implementing the Constitution." 1
While I share the view that prophylaxis is legitimate, I want to
resist the effort to assimilate all constitutional doctrine to the prophylactic category. What is distinctive about Miranda is not the fact that
it infers a constitutional command from ambiguous constitutional text.
That is simply conventional constitutional interpretation. What makes
Miranda interesting is the form of the constitutional command it

infers. It states the condition of constitutionality in the form of a performance standard rather than a design standard. Miranda says: If
the government conducts custodial interrogation, it must use safe-

guards that are at least as effective as the canonical warnings.
Miranda does not require the canonical warnings, but instead uses
them as a benchmark against which alternatives are to be measured.
Nonetheless, Miranda has not served as the backbone of a regime

for judging the legality of experiments in alternative means of safepating much of Grano's critique and offering tentative response); Martha A. Field, Sources
of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 883 (1986) (responding less
tentatively).
315 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
which made admissibility of confession turn on its voluntariness).
316 Id. at 444.
317 The failure of any of the seven Justices in the Dickerson majority to attempt to
explain the post-Miranda decisions may have been the product of papered-over differences
among these Justices. See Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson
to . .. , 99 Mich. L. Rev. 879, 893 (2001) (suggesting that direct confrontation of postMiranda cases might have splintered 7-2 majority). Whatever the explanation, the Court
must now confront the apparent inconsistency between its post-Miranda decisions and
Dickerson. See United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1019-23 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding
that Supreme Court decisions permitting introduction of evidence that is "fruit" of
Miranda violation do not survive Dickerson), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1788 (2003).
318 See Strauss, supra note 312; accord Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda,
54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 448-49 (1987).
319 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54 (1997).

HeinOnline -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 966 20032

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:875

guarding the right against coercive interrogation, because there has
been remarkably little in the way of such experimentation. At least
two factors probably explain the absence of experimentation.
First, the Miranda benchmark is not a penalty default but a safe
harbor with which police have grown quite comfortable. Indeed,
there is some evidence that police have learned how to provide the
warnings in a manner that actually discourages suspects from exercising their rights to silence and counsel. 320 Accordingly, law enforcement has little incentive to adopt alternative safeguards that might be
more difficult to implement.
Second, even if Miranda'ssafe harbor is suboptimal, law enforcement authorities understandably are reluctant to deviate from it for
fear that any alternative they adopt would be deemed unacceptable by
the courts, leading to the invalidation of convictions obtained in reliance on confessions produced using the alternative safeguards. After
all, the Court's invitation to experimentation in Miranda provided
little guidance as to the dimensions along which it or lower courts
would judge whether alternative safeguards were "fully as effective"
as the safe harbor set out in the opinion. Suppose that, as compared
with advising suspects of a right to counsel, videotaping of all interrogation led, on average, to fewer complaints of undue police pressure
but also produced more confessions. Would the decrease in complaints indicate that videotaping was more effective than the right to
counsel, or would the increased confession rate signal increased, albeit
subtle, coercion? No doubt the experience under competing regimes,
including review of the videotapes themselves, would bear significantly on this question, but before adopting an alternative set of safeguards such as videotaping, a jurisdiction cannot know how the
experiment will unfold. 321 That, after all, is the very point of experimentation. 32 2 Yet without some assurance ex ante that a good faith
but ultimately unsuccessful experiment will not result in an ex post
sanction, no jurisdiction will take the risk of deviating from the safe
320 See Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators'
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 397, 431-50
(1999) (detailing techniques employed by interrogators to induce Miranda waivers).
321We do not currently have data on this question because the states that require videotaping of all interrogation, Alaska and Minnesota, require it in addition to the full complement of Miranda warnings. See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1157-58 (Alaska 1985);
State v. Scales. 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
322 One need not agree with the Court's decision to uphold a Los Angeles ordinance
requiring sexually-oriented businesses to operate at a distance from one another to see the
logic of Justice O'Connor's statement in that case that a government body "considering an
innovative solution may not have data that could demonstrate the efficacy of its proposal
because the solution would, by definition, not have been implemented previously." City of
Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439-40 (2002) (plurality opinion).
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harbor-unless perhaps the safe harbor is itself a truly draconian penalty default of the sort that courts will be understandably reluctant to
impose in many contexts.
Thus, Miranda suggests but does not put in place a model of
experimentalist appellate judging capable of calling into existence a
more general experimentalist regime. The elements of this model are:
1. specification of a safe harbor, compliance with which satisfies a legal obligation;
2. recognition that alternative approaches are permissible
so long as they are as effective at safeguarding the underlying legal interest (whether a constitutional right or something else) as the safe harbor; and
3. temporary immunity from liability or other legal penalty
for good faith efforts to construct an alternative approach
that, judged ex ante, has a reasonable probability of equaling
the safe harbor.
Elements 1 and 2 are already present in existing law, while element 3 would require courts to engage in what I have called "provisional adjudication"-resolving a legal question for the time being,
subject to being overruled on something less than the standard ordinarily required to depart from stare decisis should experience demonstrate a superior solution.323 Employing provisional adjudication
would require courts to acknowledge that the point of legal doctrine is
not to implement the "real" or "true" meaning of ambiguous text, but
to solve practical problems whose character may become apparent
only over time.
Although the general concept of provisional adjudication would
allow courts to lower as well as raise provisional standards, it is primarily the latter shift-ratcheting up constitutional or other legal
requirements-that connects provisional adjudication to experimentalist judging. A fully functional model of experimentalist appellate
adjudication would thus include a fourth element:
4. As experience with alternative regimes accumulates over
time, courts could displace the initial benchmarks they set
with new, more stringent ones that have been successfully
deployed in experimenting jurisdictions.
To return to our schematic example, if several states substituted
videotaping of interrogation for a right-to-counsel warning with
demonstrably superior results, videotaping would replace the right-tocounsel warning as the safe harbor. Of course, that decision itself
323 See Dorf, supra note 32, at 60-73.
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would be provisional, subject to being supplanted in response to still
further experience.
Taken together, the Court's sexual harassment doctrine and (to
the extent it survives the decision upholding Miranda in Dickerson v.
United States 324 ) the concept of prophylactic rules in constitutional
criminal procedure and beyond, provide two important lessons. First,
as my extrapolations from these doctrines indicate, they suggest a
model for experimentalist appellate judging even when the front-line
institutions whose decisions are being reviewed are not (yet) themselves structured along experimentalist lines. Second, because my
proposed extrapolations are not wild departures, the examples suggest
that a regime of experimentalist appellate judging is not utterly fantastic but can be fashioned from existing doctrinal materials.
E. From Big Cases to Hard Cases
Experimentalism as I have described it would appear to address
the indeterminacy problem in three ways. First, problem-solving trial
courts are not susceptible to the standard, competency-based critique
of structural reform litigation, for although problem-solving courts do
address large-scale social problems, they do not substitute themselves
for other institutional decisionmakers, instead acting on individual
cases to prompt reform by others. Second, both problem-solving trial
courts and appellate courts hearing challenges to the efficacy of
problem-solving trial courts have fewer occasions to resolve contested
questions of law and fact than do conventional courts, and thus fewer
occasions to confront the indeterminacy problem. Third, appellate
courts that call into existence experimentalist regimes by crafting their
judgments as provisional performance standards rather than as onceand-for-all resolutions of contested meaning can overcome the
bounded rationality generally thought to limit institutions like courts
in their ability to address complex social problems.
Nonetheless, experimentalism does not appear to address the
portion of the indeterminacy problem that arises out of moral diversity. Is affirmative action consistent with "the equal protection of the
laws"? Do abortion restrictions deprive women of "liberty . . .
without due process of law"? Do publicly funded vouchers redeemable at parochial schools constitute "an establishment of religion"?
How can different structures for decisionmaking provide broadly
acceptable answers to such fundamentally contested questions?
The short answer is that experimentalism cannot eliminate the
problem of moral diversity. However, that does not mean that it has
324 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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no bearing on the problem. To see how experimentalism sometimes
addresses moral diversity, consider two accounts of normative reasoning. The first account is modeled on a debating society. Each of
the participants in the debate begins by figuring out what she thinks
about the controversy at issue. Participants may consult religious
authority, or they may turn to the writings of moral philosophers and
attempt, after consulting their own moral intuitions, to arrive at a
reflective equilibrium. 325 The debaters then come together and butt
heads. If the process is functioning at its best, a collective reflective
equilibrium or accommodation may be reached, but if not, the position that attracts the most votes prevails.
This first conception of moral reasoning fairly characterizes the
conventional view of judicial resolution of moral questions.
Dworkin's account is revealing. Hercules's efforts to find the result
that best fits with prior law, as organized by the best understanding of
moral and political principles, occur in, as it were, a metaphorical
armchair. Rather than go out into the world or even discuss cases and
principles with his colleagues, Hercules can learn all he needs to know
by reading prior decisions as well as works of moral philosophy, and
by thinking hard about what he has read. Collective deliberation
326
plays almost no role.
Moreover, even if we imagine conventional appellate courts
engaged in moral deliberation, the image that comes to mind is simply
a sort of interactive search for a reflective equilibrium. The process,
which I have elsewhere called "Socratic deliberation," closely tracks
discussion in a law school classroom, except without the feeling that
there is a single puppeteer leading the marionettes down an unseen
path. 327 Whatever its virtues for training students how to trace the
implications of their moral intuitions, in the end, Socratic dialogue
typically cannot resolve first-order value disagreement, which perhaps
explains why the legal academic literature on the subject constructs
multi-member courts as places in which judges individually decide
328
outcomes and then aggregate what are taken to be preferences.
325 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 42-45 (rev. ed. 1999)" (describing "reflective
equilibrium" as end state of process whereby one adjusts one's general philosophical
account in light of one's particular judgments and/or adjusts one's particular judgments in
light of one's general philosophical account).
326 See Gerald J. Postema, "Protestant" Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 Law &
Phil. 283 (1987) (describing and criticizing Dworkin's theory of "Protestant" interpretation
where individuals articulate principles to put practice in "best light").
327 See Dorf, supra note 32, at 33-43 (noting similarities between Socratic method in law
school classrooms and common-law methodology).
328 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802
(1982) (noting that Supreme Court, which decides cases by majority vote, is subject to
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Now contrast a second, quite different, conception of normative
reasoning. In this conception, people come together or are thrust
together to solve their common problems. Instead of asking
"vouchers: pro or con," they ask what can be done to improve education. Rather than reasoning from first principles to a list of what is
and what is not impermissible sexual harassment, they work toward
the common goal of a workplace in which all employees can concentrate on doing their jobs effectively.
Practical deliberation does not depend on homogeneity of values
or persons. Indeed, it is striking that responses to workplace sexual
harassment provide a leading example of practical problem solving,
given the diversity of the American workplace. As Cynthia Estlund
observes, "[i]n the workplace, and often only there, citizens must find
ways of cooperating on an ongoing basis, over weeks or years, outside
of and often counter to traditional racial, ethnic, or sexual hierarchies. '329 To cooperate, of course, is not necessarily to agree, and it is
precisely for that reason that experimentalism-by imagining law as a
pathway to cooperative problem solving rather than as a tool for adjudicating conflicting claims-promises a path around the problem of
moral diversity.
In contrasting, on the one hand, normative reasoning by introspection and Socratic dialogue with, on the other hand, practical
problem solving around value-laden issues, I do not mean to suggest
that the latter can wholly supplant the former as a method of adjudication within the courts. The idea, instead, is that where legal ambiguity appears to raise divisive issues, the courts need not necessarily
take it upon themselves to choose one rather than another side in the
contest. They can instead fashion doctrines that give front-line actors
primary responsibility for working out the practical meaning of contested terms, thereby (partly) circumventing the indeterminacy
problem.
The indeterminacy problem manifests itself in two kinds of cases:
what I call "hard cases" and "big cases." A hard case is hard because
fleshing out ambiguous legal text calls for a controversial moral judgment. Abortion, affirmative action, euthanasia, gay rights, school
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and other defects that arise from aggregating preferences
through voting); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
Yale L.J. 82 (1986) (examining aggregation of judgments of multi-member courts to conclude that results might be consistent but not coherent); Matthew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria
Choice Processes: An Application of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the
Courts, 88 Yale L.J. 717 (1979) (applying public choice theory to analyze judicial
decisionmaking).
329 Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law,
89 Geo. L.J. 1, 4 (2000).
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prayer, and other issues caught up in the culture wars present hard
cases. Big cases, by contrast, tax the administrative capacities of
courts. Electoral redistricting, prison reform, school desegregation,
and other tasks that do not seem readily amenable to supervision by
less-than-panoptic courts present big cases. One might think that
experimentalism-as a mechanism for courts to overcome their
bounded rationality by monitoring without superseding the efforts of
local actors-is at least a partial answer to the charge that courts
cannot handle big cases; yet that seemingly technocratic solution
would not apply to hard cases.
The sexual harassment example is meant to suggest that experimentalism can address hard cases as well as big cases. There was perhaps no hotter hot-button issue in the 1990s than sexual harassment.
The subject of numerous works of popular fiction, 330 sexual harassment scandals rocked each branch of the national government, nearly
defeating a Supreme Court nominee, 331 ending a senatorial career, 332
and leading to the impeachment (though not removal) of the
President. 333 And yet during that period the Supreme Court, with
remarkably little fanfare, managed to fashion doctrine that holds the
promise of constructive local problem solving around the issue.
To put the point slightly differently, there is no sharp division
between hard cases and big cases. Consider school desegregation.
For roughly the decade after Brown v. Board of Education,334 the
decision was understood as a hard case, with academic efforts focusing
on justifying the Court's adoption of the moral principle that racial
apartheid contravenes the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 335 When that point became obvious to nearly everyone, Brown morphed into a big case. Then the question became:
See, e.g., Disclosure (Warner Bros. 1994); David Mamet, Oleanna (1992).
See Jane Mayer & Jill Abramson, Strange Justice: The Selling of Clarence Thomas 6
(1994) (describing conflicting testimony of Anita Hill and Justice Thomas as having
"become part [of] an active battlefront in America's culture wars").
332 See S. Rep. No. 104-137 (1995) (report of Senate Select Committee on Ethics accompanying, and recommending adoption of, resolution expelling Senator Robert Packwood);
Katharine Q. Seelye, Packwood Says He is Quitting as Ethics Panel Gives Evidence, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 8, 1995, at Al.
333 See Office of the Indep. Counsel, Referral to the United States House of Representatives pursuant to Title 28, United States Code § 595(c) (1998) (report by Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr informing Congress that President Clinton committed acts,
including committing perjury while defendant in sexual harassment lawsuit, that may constitute grounds for impeachment), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/icreport/ (last visited
330
331

March 15, 2003).
334 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
335 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale

L.J. 421,429-30 (1960) (justifying Brown on common sense grounds); Wechsler, supra note
170, at 34 (confessing inability to find justification).
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Given massive resistance to desegregation in the South during the first
decade after Brown, and persistent nationwide de facto racial segregation since then, can the courts really alter large-scale social
institutions?336
Yet, as perhaps should have been obvious all along, Brown was
always both a hard case and a big case, and the features that made it
hard were tied up with the features that made it big. Brown was a big
case because dismantling de jure segregation meant taking apart and
replacing school assignment systems affecting tens of millions of
schoolchildren. That daunting challenge led the Court to provide
public school officials with some breathing space through the formula
of "all deliberate speed.

' 337

The fact of segregation's entrenchment

was both what made the case big-it would be difficult to disentrench-and a reflection of the fact that the case was, by the lights of
the population circa 1954, hard-for de jure racial segregation could
not have been so firmly entrenched throughout the South were there a
national consensus that the practice was an affront to the moral principle of equality.
In pointing out that Brown was both a hard and a big case, I do
not mean to imply that an experimentalist approach in 1954 would
have caused Southern resistance to the decision to evaporate. On the
contrary, where, as was true of segregation in the 1950s and 1960s,
entrenched opposition means that offending actors are likely to resist
a legal norm absent continual coercion, neither full-fledged experimentalism nor a wait-and-see approach like Brown H's "all deliberate
speed" is likely to succeed. Sometimes-as in Brown-the moral
import of a legal command will be so clear to the judge that, notwithstanding vociferous disagreement by many in the population at large,
fidelity to law requires choosing what will be received as a controversial path. Experimentalism, in short, does not eliminate that portion
of the indeterminacy problem that arises out of moral diversity.
Nevertheless, I want to suggest that even in such cases, moral
diversity may be less of an issue than it appears. If effective remedial
structures are adopted-remedial structures that address the
problems that made the case not only hard but also big-then the
process of hammering out practical solutions can have an impact on
See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (1991) (providing negative answer to question in title); Stephen L. Carter, Do
Courts Matter?, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1216, 1221 (1992) (reviewing Rosenberg, supra) (generally agreeing with Rosenberg's assessment, though observing that he "gives short shrift to
[Brown's] vital importance as a confidence-building device for those who were fighting for
reform").
337 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).
336
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how people understand the underlying value. Practical deliberation,
in other words, can work around value differences, and in the long
run, even change them.
To take one more cut on the problem, we might think of experimentalist judging as operating in what would traditionally be understood as the remedial domain. 338 Because the typical problem for
courts in selecting remedies is one of institutional competence, the
remedial character of experimentalism would again suggest that it is a
strategy for dealing with complexity rather than moral diversity. Yet
the distinction between rights and remedies is itself artificial. As
Daryl Levinson nicely puts the point: "Rights are dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their
scope, shape, and very existence. '339 If experimentalism is a strategy
for enabling courts to overcome the complexity that bedevils the
selection of a remedy, it is, ipso facto, a strategy for announcing-or
perhaps for facilitating the unfolding of-rights, notwithstanding the
problem of moral diversity.
But not always. My strategy for showing that experimentalism
could have utility in hard as well as big cases has been to show how
the distinction between the two categories is not always so clear.
However, I must admit that there are some cases that are simply hard
without being big, and that therefore may not be amenable to experimentalist solutions.
For example, the question of whether the First Amendment protects the right to burn an American flag as a means of expressing disapproval of government policy-to which the Supreme Court
answered yes by a five-to-four margin in 1989 34 0-was a hard but not
a big question. By saying the case was hard I do not mean that it
presented especially difficult issues of doctrine. Prior precedent had
established that laws targeting expressive conduct because of hostility
to the speaker's message are subject to exacting judicial scrutiny, 341
and flag desecration did not fit into any of the Court's previously
announced categorical exceptions to freedom of speech. 342 Nonetheless, the closeness of the vote in the Court, and the strong negative
338 See supra Part IV.B (illustrating remedial function of problem-solving courts, in contrast to that of other bodies).
339 Daryl J.Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L.
Rev. 857, 858 (1999).
340 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
341 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (reserving mid-level scrutiny
for incidental restrictions on expressive conduct where "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression").
342 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 430 (listing, inter alia, obscenity, libel, and fighting words
(citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942))).
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political reaction to the decision, 343 demonstrated that the case was

hard in the sense that matters from the perspective of the indeterminacy problem: Most Americans did not think that the First Amendment's protection for "freedom of speech" encompassed the right to
burn an American flag, and the constitutional text was hardly a sufficient basis for showing them to be wrong.
The flag-burning case was not big, however. The Court's invalidation of the Texas statute and its subsequent invalidation of a similar
federal statute 344 did not require the judiciary to root out a deeply
entrenched social practice, nor to set up or oversee some large administrative apparatus. These decisions simply excised crimes from the
statute books, and for that reason there was no occasion for the Court
to establish any remedial scheme at all.
Much the same might be said about a case like Griswold v.
Connecticut,345 which invalidated a state ban on contraceptive use.
Griswold actually was hard in the doctrinal sense: Given the constitutional text's failure to mention contraception or a general right of
autonomy, the challenge for the Court was to justify a penumbral
right of privacy without seeming to license, as the dissent accused the
majority of licensing, the sort of open-ended judicial power of the
Lochner era. 346 Griswold was also hard in the sense that there was
moral opposition to contraceptive use. However, by 1965, when the
case was decided, the number of people who strongly believed the
government ought, on moral grounds, to forbid contraceptive use was
sufficiently small that the Court's decision engendered nothing like
the resistance to Brown or to Griswold's most famous successor in the
347
privacy line of cases, Roe v. Wade.
I shall return to Roe momentarily, but first I want to pause over a
point that may seem too obvious even to mention: Whether a case is
hard in the sense of bringing into play the problem of moral diversity
is always a contingent social fact. Slavery was a hard question in 1856
but is easy today-and not simply because the Constitution now contains the Thirteenth Amendment. Arguments that the antebellum
Constitution prohibited slavery were a staple of (one branch of) aboli343 A constitutional amendment that would have given Congress and the states the
power to prohibit flag desecration passed the House of Representatives in 1995, but twice
failed to garner the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate. See Helen Dewar, Senate
Falls Short on Flag Amendment, Wash. Post, Dec. 13, 1995, at Al; Katharine Q. Seelye,
House Easily Passes Amendment to Ban Desecration of Flag, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1995, at
Al.
344 See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
345 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
346 See id. at 514-15 (Black, J., dissenting).
347 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tionist discourse. 348 In a counterfactual world in which slavery died
out without a Civil War and without the Reconstruction
Amendments, eventually the near-global consensus against slavery
surely would have found expression in American constitutional law.
To be sure, in such a world, a few curmudgeons would argue on
originalist grounds that slavery remained compatible with the Constitution, but without a substantial moral or material investment in
slavery as an institution, legal elites and the society at large would be
justified in dismissing such arguments. The shift in popular opinion
over time would have transformed slavery from a hard to an easy
question, in much the same way that in our actual world, shifting
public opinion over time has transformed the constitutionality of de
jure segregation from a hard to an easy question. 349
Slavery on the eve of the Civil War, of course, was not merely a
hard question. It was also a big question. Suppose that instead of
invalidating the Missouri Compromise in Dred Scott, the Supreme
Court had invalidated slavery. The Court would have stood no realistic chance of implementing its decision, no matter what means it
might have chosen. That is not to say that the antebellum Court acted
correctly in making its peace-and then some-with slavery. When
faced with an undeniable evil that a substantial fraction of one's fellow
citizens do not recognize as evil, one may have a moral duty to act in
contravention of the norms of one's profession.350 But that problem is
not peculiar to the law or judging. In a society not on the verge of
civil war and in which the spirit of tolerance prevails, even on most
issues as to which there is substantial moral disagreement, one will not
find the sort of moral certainty that might be thought to justify civil
disobedience by judges and others.
Perhaps abortion and a handful of other profoundly divisive
moral issues are to our age what slavery was in the nineteenth century;
they create such polarization and depth of feeling that any judicial
resolution-even a decision not to decide-will be viewed as illegitimate by a great many citizens. If so, however, that is a contingent
historical fact about these moral issues at this moment in time. The
348 See Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or
Anti-Slavery? (1860), in 2 The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass 467, 468 (Philip S.
Foner ed., 1950) ("I... deny that the Constitution guarantees the right to hold property in
man .... "); see also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
349 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, The Paths to Legal Equality: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 Cal.
L. Rev. 791, 801-07 (2002) (arguing that social and attitudinal change typically must precede wholesale changes in law's treatment of categories of persons).
350 See Dworkin, supra note 21, at 105-07 (asking whether ethical judge in Nazi
Germany could perform job).
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current intractability of some moral questions is certainly not an
351
indictment of experimentalism.
The advantage I claim for experimentalism is twofold. First, in
those cases that are primarily big, that is, those cases where the judiciary's competence but not its moral authority seems doubtful, experimentalism offers courts a mechanism for coordinating local learning
without having to superintend a top-down bureaucracy. Second, in
those hard cases in which the Court's resolution of the central issue
does not simply put an end to some practice, an experimentalist
approach-by devolving deliberative authority for fully specifying
norms to local actors-can soften (though not eliminate) the sting for
those on the losing end of the initial decision. By giving citizens an
opportunity to participate in the local elaboration of a general norm
adopted by the Court-such as the norm against sexual harassmentexperimentalism responds to the indeterminacy problem.
Finally, to the extent that the problems of complexity and moral
diversity are often inextricable, my analysis suggests that experimentalism may be a superior institutional response to the indeterminacy
problem than one of the standard alternatives: judicial/legislative dialogue. Various critics of judicial supremacy have taken the Court to
task for its arrogation to itself of the sole power of constitutional
interpretation. 352 The milder form of this criticism (which I myself
have made) urges the Court to give greater deference in its own decisionmaking processes to legislative judgments. 353 Harsher forms
would either strip the courts of the power of judicial review or, as in
354
Canada, make their decisions subject to a legislative override.
To be sure, there is a version of the dialogic solution that bears a
substantial resemblance to experimentalism as I have described it. A
court might find that some challenged law or practice violates constitutional or other legal norms and order the legislature to adopt some
solution, without specifying the precise contours of that solution. The
German Constitutional Court's 1975 and 1993 abortion rulings 355 and
351 1 put to one side the question whether the intractability of some moral questions is a
reason to prefer hard positivism-which denies that courts should make moral judgments
in discerning the law's content-over other approaches to legal interpretation.
352 See Kramer, supra note 97, at 13-16 ("There is... a world of difference between
having the last word and having the only word: between judicial supremacy and judicial
sovereignty."); cf. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, supra note 41, at 90-91 (arguing that
judicial decisionmaking is no less arbitrary than legislative decisionmaking).
353 See Dorf & Friedman, supra note 33, at 67, 81-83.
354 See Tushnet, supra note 34, at 127 (describing Canada's procedures for legislative
override of judiciary's constitutional decisions); id. at 163-65 (asking what world without
judicial review would look like).
355 In Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG, 39 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1, the court ruled that West German legislation permitting abortion
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the Vermont Supreme Court's 1999 ruling on same-sex unions356

follow this pattern. In my view, this approach will often be preferable
to a command-and-control judicial decree, but it is still not identical to
experimentalist appellate decisionmaking as I have described it.
Perhaps a legislature can, in response to a judicial order, craft a
workable once-and-for-all-time solution to a morally divisive question
like abortion or same-sex marriage. But to the extent that the
problems bedeviling judicial resolution of ambiguity are rooted in
complexity, the refractory nature of many of our social problems is
likely to pose difficulties for any centralized decisionmaker, whether it
is a court, the legislature itself, or a traditionally hierarchical administrative agency to which a legislature delegates power. The crucial
question for addressing complexity, in other words, is not whether the
task goes to courts, legislatures, or agencies, but whether whichever
institution is charged with the task adopts problem-solving methods
equal to the challenge. Given the connections between complexity
and moral diversity, that observation is likely to be true of many divisive moral controversies as well as seemingly more technical
questions.
V
CONCLUSION

For over a generation, constitutional theory and academic jurisprudence have struggled to explain how judicial resolution of contests
over the meaning of ambiguous legal texts can be justified as the
application, rather than the creation, of law. That struggle has
reached the point of diminishing returns. It is time to ask whether
more progress might be made by looking, not for alternative accounts
of what the courts do, but for alternative activities in which the courts
might engage.
was insufficiently protective of the rights of fetuses, and ordered that, absent other adequate means of protecting fetal life, the government was duty-bound to punish abortion
criminally. See id. at 46-48. After unification, in Judgment of May 28, 1993, BVerfG, 88
BVerfGE 203, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed its 1975 ruling but found that, for the
most part, the government could meet its duty without employing criminal sanctions. For a
thorough, English-language explanation of the decisions, see Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in
the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and
Germany, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 273 (1995).
356 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886-87 (Vt. 1999) (ordering legislature to provide
same-sex couples with opportunity "to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded
by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples," but leaving legislature "reasonable
period of time" to craft solution and choice whether to allow for same-sex marriage or
some version of domestic partnership not formally denominated marriage).

HeinOnline -- 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 978 20032

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. School of Law

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:875

Drawing on the magisterial work of Hart and Sacks, I have
argued that the key question is how courts can engage deeply with the
other institutions of our public life. Departing from that same work, I
have suggested that the answer should not assume that institutions are
fixed or that the process of interaction is one that operates by tacit
rather than explicit principles. Problem-solving courts, as they are
beginning to develop to tackle drug addiction and other issues, as well
as problem-solving institutions more broadly, point the way toward an
understanding of the legal process as the collective search for practical
solutions, rather than a largely inward-looking quest for the "true"
meaning of legal texts.
To be fair, Hart and Sacks also understood legal institutionsincluding appellate courts-as first and foremost problem-solving
rather than truth-seeking bodies. The Legal Process was an effort,
after all, to absorb the lessons of legal realism, not to repudiate
realism. The limits of the Hart and Sacks approach can be found in its
both too-modest and too-ambitious conception of the role courts
properly play in an ensemble of problem-solving institutions.
The Hart and Sacks notion of an institutional settlement was too
modest in its assumption that courts should simply defer to institutional settlements. Hart and Sacks did not recognize that courts have
the capacity to disentrench broken or rotten systems. That fact, perhaps more than anything, explains why, despite holding liberal political views, Hart and Sacks were so uncomfortable with the Warren
Court's landmark decisions on malapportionment and racial segregation. They could not imagine a role for courts as catalysts of social
change that the courts themselves would only indirectly superintend.
The excessive modesty of the Hart and Sacks approach was parasitic upon its excessive ambition. In the kinds of cases that were committed to judicial resolution, they believed in the power of reasoned
elaboration to produce appropriate outcomes. Yet reasoned elaboration provides no answer to the indeterminacy problem, and one senses
that Hart and Sacks knew as much. That is why they cabined the
domain of reasoned elaboration by requirements that courts defer to
institutional settlements on multiple fronts: private actors relying on
market principles; administrative agencies applying expertise; local,
state, and national elected bodies and officials expressing the popular
will. By deferring on nearly all sides, courts could keep the domain of
reasoned elaboration tolerably small.
Is it a coincidence that H.L.A. Hart made nearly the identical
move in explaining how it is that legal indeterminacy does not swamp
the legal system? Note, however, that H.L.A. Hart thought that
judges in hard cases exercise discretion, in his Postscript describing
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reasoned elaboration (by a different name) as simply a form of post
hoc rationalization for the exercise of discretion. It is difficult to resist
the conclusion that Hart and Sacks held the same view. They understood that one person's reasoned elaboration is another person's
caprice and thus, wherever possible, subordinated reasoned elaboration to deference to institutional settlements.
Described at a sufficiently high level of generality, my own preferred approach to the indeterminacy problem is the same as that of
Hart, Dworkin, and Hart and Sacks. All of us believe that the job of
justifying law is one of showing how the law's area of what Hart called
open texture is sufficiently small that it does not undermine law's
authority. There are, however, crucial distinctions between experimentalism and the other approaches. Whereas Hart and Dworkin
took the law's relative determinacy as an article of faith, experimentalism treats legal indeterminacy as a real problem calling for a real
institutional approach. In that respect, experimentalism resembles the
Legal Process approach. But where the Legal Process approach to
other institutions was to defer to their processes, experimentalism is
more activist in the sense that it asks those institutions to justify the
deference they demand by producing a record of performance that
can withstand comparative assessments. And where the Legal Process
School extolled the power of reasoned elaboration by judges to divine
correct answers to questions of principle, experimentalism-wherever
possible-resorts to deliberation about practical problems by ordinary
people. Experimentalism is, in that sense, deeply democratic.
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